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General Abstract 
 
Over a decade of research evidences that the perceived time and space 
between two events becomes contracted when we believe there is a causal 
connection between them. The present thesis investigated how such measures of 
implicit causal beliefs translate to meaningful, social contexts, inspired by 
research from the areas of sense of agency and immanent justice reasoning.  
Specifically, how effective were the popularly employed methods of temporal and 
spatial binding at reflecting or extrapolating beyond simple stimuli or otherwise 
explicit reports of causal beliefs. Chapter 1 gives an overview of the literature on 
causality, the sense of agency, the binding phenomenon, and immanent justice 
reasoning. Chapter 2 focuses how the emotional valence of our outcomes 
modulates temporal binding. These experiments were conducted to establish a 
basic effect that in intentional binding, and by extension, our SoA, could be 
modulated by social outcomes. Chapter 3 focuses on the extent to which 
unconnected events could be causally linked due to their moralistic congruency, 
measured via temporal binding. Chapter 4 investigated causal binding with 
regards to self- and other-actions. These experiments were conducted to explore 
whether top-down processes (knowledge of a causal relationship) were sufficient 
to produce the binding phenomenon. Chapter 5 investigated extent to which 
explicit self-report measures used within immanent justice reasoning research 
replicates with spatial binding. Finally, Chapter 6 offers a general discussion of the 
findings from my research, and implications for future research centred on the use 
of the binding phenomenon in causal and sense of agency research. 
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Inferring Causality and the Sense of Agency 
 
“The whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life . . . depends on our 
sense that in it things are really being decided from one moment to 
another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged 
innumerable ages ago” (William James, 1890) 
 
Understanding causal relations within our environment is vital for social 
interaction (Bodner, Engelhardt, Minshew & Williams, 2015), learning (Gopnik, 
Sobel, Schulz & Glymour, 2001), reasoning (Goswami & Brown, 1990) and self-
awareness (Duval, Silvia & Lalwani, 2012; Duval & Wicklund, 1973). Without 
understanding causal relations – if, how, where, when and why one event causes 
another to occur – we must consider whether we would develop knowledge of the 
world, and by reflection, ourselves. For instance, to infer causality is the 
foundation to operant conditioning (e.g., learning that leaving the toilet seat up 
causes my partner to condemn my lack of bathroom-etiquette), and a 
demonstration of our brain’s finesse to effortlessly compute probabilistic 
inferences upon external events (e.g., my partner’s prior knowledge of my 
bathroom-etiquette leads her to infer it was myself, and not one of our guests, that 
left the bathroom seat up). Pivotal to my thesis, understanding causal relations is 
the bedrock of our understanding of ourselves as causal agents in this universe, 
that our voluntary actions cause meaningful, intended consequences (e.g., to 
intentionally irritate my partner). 
This sense of our agency (SoA; Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009) is 
typically referred to as the subjective awareness that one is initiating, executing, 
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and controlling one's own volitional actions (for a review, see Moore & Obhi, 
2012). To illustrate this, we are often under the impression that we execute our 
voluntary actions willingly, a feeling that is often confirmed by the predicted or 
expected outcome of our action. For example, we flick a light-switch, which, to our 
senses, produces immediate light. In everyday life, the perception that we are 
causal agents is confirmed routinely by our many, goal-directed actions and the 
outcomes they produce. In psychological science, the SoA can be measured 
through explicit self-reports, or attributions, of causality, where the individual is 
asked whether they believe they, or perhaps another agent, are responsible for an 
event or outcome that occurred (Dewey & Carr, 2013; Sato & Yasuda, 2005). This 
is thought to tap into reflective agency, as it is measured after the outcome has 
occurred and allows retrospective inference. However, these explicit self-
attributions can introduce bias due to distorted inferential processes and 
individual differences related to cognitive capacities or personality (Aarts, Custers 
& Wegner, 2005; Dewey & Knoblich, 2014), and therefore processes of 
retrospective inference are mainly seen as measures of congruency between 
current intention and an experienced effect (Wegner, 2003). Therefore, of interest 
to many researchers is the ability to measure pre-reflective, i.e., implicit, processes 
that indicate SoA.  
One such highly popular method of measuring implicit SoA is known as 
intentional binding, which refers to the compression of the perceived time interval 
between voluntary actions and their sensory consequences (Engbert, 
Wohlschläger & Haggard, 2008; Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002; Moore et al., 
2009). More specifically, an outcome (e.g., a tone) is experienced earlier when it is 
triggered by a voluntary action compared to when it occurs in isolation or is 
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triggered by an involuntary movement. Similarly, actions that trigger an event are 
experienced later than actions with no discernible outcome (see Moore & Obhi, 
2012, for a review). Therefore, rather than just a perceptual bias, intentional 
binding has been proposed to serve as a function to help construct a coherent 
conscious experience of our actions in relation to their outcomes (Haggard et al., 
2002).  
Intentional binding parallels David Hume’s (1739/1978) notion of 
temporal contiguity, where two events occurring temporally close together are 
more likely to be inferred as causally related. Indeed, the observed temporal 
contraction between causally-related events seen within the intentional binding 
literature indicates that not only are temporally contiguous events are inferred to 
be more causally related, but the belief in the existence of a causal relationship 
between two events influences our perception to engender the events to become 
more temporally contiguous (Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, 2011; Moore & Obhi, 
2012). This phenomenon has also been reported directly, where estimated 
temporal intervals between cause and effect are much shorter relative to non-
causally related events (Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Moreton, Callan, & Hughes, 2018).  
Such perceptual biases equally transfer to spatial binding, which 
complements intentional binding; instead of the perceived temporal interval 
becoming contracted, it is the perceived space between events that contracts with 
increased conformity to laws of cause and effect; for example, temporal propriety 
(Buehner & Humphreys, 2010). Although spatial and intentional binding bear a 
1:1 mapping of spatial/temporal perceptual distortion, spatial binding has, thus 
far, been employed as a measure of perceptual biases in general causality (e.g., 
Buehner & Humphreys, 2010), whereas intentional binding is routinely used in 
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research pertaining to self-caused actions and the SoA (Haggard et al., 2002; 
Moore & Obhi, 2012). 
The binding phenomenon has received extensive attention over the last 16 
years since Haggard et al.’s (2002) seminal paper, and despite the question of 
whether intentional binding truly measures agency (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; 
Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013), intentional binding persists in usage as a 
proxy measure of SoA. However, the nature of the binding phenomenon, both 
temporal and spatial, has been heavily debated in terms of whether it reflects SoA 
or causality in general (Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). The nature 
of the binding phenomenon and its relation to causality is discussed further within 
this chapter. 
Cognitive biases can emerge during the attribution of causal agency 
(Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Takahata et al., 2012). A prominent example within 
social psychology of a bias in causal attribution is immanent justice reasoning, 
where actions are thought to bring about deserved outcomes; rewards for moral 
or good behaviour, and punishments for immoral or bad behaviour. However, the 
crucial element of immanent justice reasoning lies within the lack of any plausible 
connection between the two events. As such, two events, such as someone 
behaving immorally, and then encountering something bad happening to them 
later, are often more causally linked due to beliefs that the world is governed by, 
not only laws of physics, but equally laws of justice, order and predictability 
(Callan, Ellard & Nicol, 2006; Callan, Sutton, Harvey & Dawtry, 2014). In other 
words, those who believe more in a just world are more likely to attribute a causal 
connection between a bad person (e.g., somebody who had committed murder) 
and something bad happening to them (e.g., they later suffered a fatal traffic 
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accident), simply because they deserved their fate (Callan, Sutton & Dovale, 2010; 
Harvey & Callan, 2014).  
 The previous research pertaining to causality, the SoA, and immanent 
justice reasoning amalgamates towards the aim of this thesis and my doctoral 
research project: how causal perception can be modulated during social settings. 
To this end, I combined two complimentary areas of causal perception: The Sense 
of Agency and Immanent Justice Reasoning, and employed the binding 
phenomenon as an implicit measure of causality. Both SoA and immanent justice 
reasoning contain research demonstrating that, despite our capacities for complex 
causal judgements, this process can be skewed in favour of personal biases and 
beliefs. These phenomena are particularly well suited to further explore how we 
infer causality, what biases moderate the causal attribution process, and how this 
process translates to social contexts, since they provide an indirect measure of the 
causal relationship between events in the world. Such phenomena equally afford 
an alternative to the self-report measures typically used in immanent justice 
reasoning research, where any underlying cognitive mechanisms have yet to be 
explored. In short, whether cognitive or personal biases modulate the perception 
of causal relations. 
Crucially, preliminary evidence already suggests that the SoA is amenable 
to top-down modulation (Desantis, Roussel & Waszak, 2011; Hughes, 2015; Kuhn, 
Nenchev, Haggard, Brass & Gallinat, 2011; Pantelis & Feldman, 2012), and is 
subject to similar biases (e.g. self-serving bias, Baumeister, 2010) as explicit causal 
attribution (Yoshie and Haggard, 2013; Takahata et al., 2012). This provides an 
excellent basis for investigating the extent to which intentional binding is 
moderated by social factors, such as the emotional consequences of actions, and 
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equally, if binding is a general measurement of causal inference via temporal 
contiguity (Buehner, 2012), whether it can be applied to immanent justice 
reasoning.  
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to discussing the background 
literature to my research in greater detail, centring in turn on causality, the SoA, 
intentional binding, and immanent justice reasoning. These will be discussed 
within the broader context of what my thesis aims to explore: how attributions of 
causality, specifically the perceptual error phenomena observed within SoA 
research, translate to social, meaningful contexts. Additionally, I aim to address 
the effectiveness and accuracy of binding, both temporal and spatial, at measuring 
the perceived causality of events.  
Causal Inference: A Background 
“All knowledge degenerates into probability.” (David Hume, 1739) 
 
Causality has been both debated extensively within philosophy, physics and 
psychology for at least, to our knowledge, 2000 years. Causality’s earliest origins 
within the academic arena appear to hark back to Aristotelian philosophy where 
‘cause’ means to explain or to answer why or how ‘effects’ occur. Causality, or, 
specifically, understanding causal relations, appears at the heart of learning, 
experience and knowledge (Gopnik, Schulz, & Schulz, 2007), where even Aristotle 
himself advocated "we do not have knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its 
why, that is to say, its cause." (Aristotle, Physics 194 b17–20). Although this 
appears self-evident, that our knowledge is gained through experience of the 
world, of the physical mechanisms that interact and give rise to many phenomena, 
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of interest to many researchers of the current century, myself included, are causal 
reasoning and inference. In other words, what moderates how we infer causal 
conclusions based on premises, or using premises to explain conclusions, and 
what can moderate or influence this process.  
 Three distinct types of causal reasoning emerge through these millennia of 
discourse: deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning (Copi, Cohen & 
McMahon, 2016; Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993; Josephson & Josephson, 1994). 
Deductive reasoning refers to the logical deduction of a conclusion based upon 
one or more premises. To continue our toilet-themed examples: if men have bad 
bathroom etiquette (first premise), and I am man (second premise), I therefore 
have bad bathroom etiquette (conclusion). Where deductive reasoning is the 
application of logical premises to arrive at a concrete conclusion (i.e., going from 
the general to the specific), inductive reasoning utilises observations to form a 
potentially sound theory and enable generalisations. Inductive reasoning bases 
the strength of its conclusion upon available evidence, allowing for the possibility 
that the conclusion may be false (i.e., going from the specific to the general); for 
example, our discovery of biological life forms upon Earth has shown a 
dependence upon water to exist. Therefore, all biological life depends, to some 
extent, on water to exist. Thus, inductive reasoning allows for probabilistic 
predictions; the conclusion, in other words, is a testable hypothesis. 
Lastly, abductive reasoning is a logical inference process that seeks to 
explain observations with the best or most reasonable explanation based upon all 
available evidence. For example, witnessing a moving eight ball on a billiard table, 
one might logically explain the eight-ball’s movement by the ball having been 
recently struck by the white cue ball. Abductive reasoning is, therefore, a type of 
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retroactive inference, making use of prior, albeit often incomplete, knowledge to 
arrive at the most likely conclusion, of which will be updated in the light of new 
information. Use of abductive reasoning, however, should be treated with caution. 
For example, the famous Hawthorne effect (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939) was 
discovered by a series of experiments set within the Hawthorne Works factory, 
Illinois, where work productivity was incorrectly linked to different lighting 
settings installed by the researchers. Confused at the temporary nature of the 
boost in work productivity, they later realised the latter increased as a result of 
their presence in the factory, declining quickly after their departure.  
Thus, utilising abductive reasoning also requires scientific inquiry, given 
that there are often multiple possible causes for an effect, in order to arrive at the 
most likely cause from the available evidence. However, when used as a basis to 
form hypotheses, and conclusions drawn are critically evaluated, abductive 
reasoning is regarded as the foundation for scientific realism (Harman, 1965; 
Ladyman, Douven, Horsten, & van Fraassen, 1997; Lipton, 1992; 2009). 
Inductive and abductive reasoning are routinely employed for hypothesis-
generation and testing. Indeed, when generating and evaluating scientific 
hypotheses, inductive and abductive reasoning are combined into what is known 
as the ‘inference to the best explanation’ (Peirce, 1974; 1992; Raftopoulos, 2016). 
In other words, we generalise from specific, known truths, which generates 
specific hypotheses based on the available evidence. For the purposes of my 
doctoral topic, it is this inferential process that is key; separate from actual 
causality, inference of causality is a mental process that can occur consciously (Dik 
& Arts, 2007) or subconsciously (Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2002). Causal 
inference forms the foundational basis to which we interpret causal events and 
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where our biases may interfere with the perception of causal relationships 
between ourselves and the external world. 
Some 2000 years after Aristotle, David Hume composed his Treatise of 
Human Nature (1739/1978), detailing his account of human knowledge 
acquisition; how knowledge is garnered through inferences from probability. 
Hume remains a strong influence upon scientific and statistical inquiry, continuing 
to guide our understanding of causality well into our era of contemporary 
research (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Granger, 1980; Holland, 1985). Hume 
argued we infer causal relations based on these experiences, rather than from 
direct perception of this relation, and there is strong evidence to support this 
notion given our sensory organs’ inability to detect causal relations, nor does 
sensory input provide explicit information as to causal relations (Nadel & Hardt, 
2011; Shanks, Holyoak, & Medin, 1996; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000).  
However, a primary contribution by Hume relevant to my doctoral thesis 
is his identification of three criteria upon which we generate causal associations: 
spatial/temporal contiguity, temporal succession, and constant conjunction. 
Spatial/temporal contiguity refers to two events occurring close together in space 
and time. The importance of contiguity, for example, can be illustrated by its 
necessity to behaviourism: for example, within Pavlovian conditioning the neutral 
stimulus must occur temporally and spatially contiguous to the unconditioned 
stimulus to become a conditioned stimulus (Rescorla, 1988; Siegel & Allan, 1996). 
In operant conditioning, where and when the action and outcome occur are key to 
generating association/causal inference (Schwartz, 1989). For example, if one 
presses a lamp’s switch, and the lamp turns on, you may reasonably infer that your 
button press turned the light on. However, if a different lamp turned on (a lamp 
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not spatially contiguous to your switch) or if the lamp turned on 5 minutes later 
(an occurrence not temporally contiguous to your action), the action’s effect 
becomes ambiguous, and causality would be harder to infer. Temporal succession 
is largely self-explanatory, where the cause, as is universally advocated, must 
precede the effect (Rigden, 2005). Lastly, the constant conjunction refers to the 
events of cause and effect occurring consistently, and that over time the perceived 
causal connection strengthens with each consistent repetition of the cause-effect 
circumstance (or is subsequently weakened or abolished if the effect does not 
follow the cause). Our sensory and perceptual experiences throughout life deliver 
us constant conjunctions between a myriad of cause and effects, and through this 
our internal representation constructs what we believe as the causal external 
world (Hume, 1973; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). 
Thus, Hume set out specific criteria with which we learn causal relations 
via inductive reasoning, in which we use this knowledge in future instances when 
judging the same or similar causal relations (i.e., abductive reasoning). 
Contemporary cognitive science continues to demonstrate the strength of Hume’s 
criteria within the causal reasoning process (Buehner, 2012; Griffiths & 
Tenenbaum, 2009; Holland et al., 1985). Employing Humean criteria, the power 
PC (probabilistic contrast) theory of causal inference (Cheng, 1997; Cheng & 
Novick, 1990; 2005) stands as a widely accepted account of causal inference, 
where both learning through covariation and a priori knowledge are necessary to 
acquisition of causal relations (Buehner, Cheng and Clifford, 2003; Tenenbaum, 
Griffiths & Kemp, 2006). In other words, we infer causal relations depending on 
the frequency of covariation between cause and effect, and a given cause’s 
predictive power to produce the effect. A widely known example of this from 
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medical statistics is that, although several factors can influence the incidence of 
lung cancer, the most powerful predictor is smoking, accounting for an estimated 
72% of lung cancer cases (Cancer Research UK, Lung Cancer Risk, 2018). Hence, 
we form a causal structure of varying probabilities of causes that could account 
for the occurrence of a given effect (Cheng, 1997).  
A useful, albeit general, maxim of the plethora of discourse within the field 
of causality (see Perales & Shanks, 2007, for a review) is that a given cause’s 
predicted strength on producing the cause is defined as the probability of the 
effect occurring when all alternative candidate causes are absent. However, 
therein also lies an inherent problem; the existence of multiple contributing 
causes to an effect leaves room for bias during the interpretation of causal events. 
Different evidences have different emphases placed upon them depending on 
one’s culture (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1989; Raman and Winer, 2004), learning 
(Legare, Evans, Rosengren & Harris, 2012) and the extent to which the individual 
conforms to a variety of personal biases, such as the self-serving bias (Campbell & 
Sedikides, 1999) and the need to believe in a Just World (Callan & Ellard, 2010; 
Lerner, 1980), particularly when selecting a primary cause as the most likely.  
The rest of this chapter focuses on the potential moderators of implicit 
causal inference with reference to the experience as a causal agent, how we can 
implicitly measure the extent to which an individual infers a causal relationship, 
and how such moderators/measures may be applied to events external to the self.  
Causal Inference 
Humans are famously curious creatures, constantly striving to know 
and/or explain the reasons behind behaviour and environmental change. Such 
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knowledge empowers us, allows us to grow, and, evolutionarily speaking, 
increases our chances of survival (Gopnik, 2000; Horner & Whiten, 2005). Indeed, 
“If you want to alter outcomes, you need to know what causes them. Thus, knowing 
why you are unhappy, sick, or your car would not work is crucial if you want to be 
content, well, or mobile, respectively” (Callan, Sutton, Harvey & Dawtry, 2014, pp. 
107). However, even the causal mechanisms that underlie natural phenomena 
that occur in everyday life are rarely simple. For example, it might be easy to apply 
abductive reasoning to explain the movement of a billiard ball: we can observe 
that ball, being hit and subsequently moved by the white cue ball, fulfils the three 
causal criteria suggested by Hume. However, even ostensibly simple phenomena 
such as an infant’s cry, the family car suddenly ceasing to start, or, God forbid, the 
seemingly unexplainable sudden change in your significant other’s mood, rarely 
have a sufficient evidence/an obvious cause. Though we can employ our internal 
causal model of probabilities to determine a likely cause, even in a perfectly 
rational and logical mind-set, we still play a game of chance in our causal 
estimations. Thus, we are always capable of choosing, and acting upon, bad or 
incorrect explanations due to poor or lack of information (Roethlisberge & 
Dickson, 1939), if we are not already motivated towards causal explanations that 
suit our bias, beliefs and ideologies (Callan et al., 2014; Malle, 2006; Ross, 1977). 
It is at this junction that two interesting areas of causal inference arise: that 
of our own sense as a causal agent, in the form of the Sense of Agency (SoA; see 
Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a review), and the events that we judge causally related 
in order to uphold a belief that the world is an organised, predictable and just 
place, in the form of Immanent Justice Reasoning (IJR; see Callan et al., 2014, for a 
review). Although these two relatively embryonic areas, academically speaking, 
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are not explicitly related in current research, they are complimentary to one 
another in terms of assessing the degree to which we make causal inferences: 
While SoA research investigates what factors influence the extent to which we feel 
our actions produce specific action-effects (i.e., the perceived causal relationship 
between our own actions and events in the world), immanent justice reasoning 
research investigates what factors influence the extent to which beliefs about the 
world influence the perceived causality between different events in the 
environment.   
Our belief in a just world appears to be related to our sense of self-efficacy 
(Correia, Salvado & Alves, 2016; Riley & Baah-Odoom, 2012). In other words, our 
sense of personal causal effectiveness is tied to beliefs that our actions bring about 
deserved outcomes. Both areas are additionally linked from cognitive biases that 
serve to promote self-esteem and well-being in healthy individuals (Dalbert & 
Stoeber, 2006; Dzuka & Dalbert, 2006; Linden & Maercker, 2011; Renes & Aarts, 
2017). For example, the self-serving bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999) refers to 
the over-attribution of positive outcomes to the self, and negative outcomes away 
from the self. This has been demonstrated within SoA research where the 
temporal interval between an action and its action-effect is perceived to be shorter 
for outcomes of financial gain vs. loss (Takahata et al., 2012) and of positive audio 
sounds vs negative (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). The self-serving bias is equally 
apparent with regards to IJR, where we often feel less vulnerable on the basis that 
we believe we have not done anything to cause negative outcomes (Furnham, 
2003). Indeed, those who lack self-esteem are also less likely to adopt a self-
serving bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999) and endorse IJR to explain negative 
events happening to them (Callan, Kay, Davidenko, & Ellard, 2009). 
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The research contained within this doctoral thesis explores both concepts 
of the SoA and IJR. Therefore, the next two sections will be dedicated to relevant 
background literatures of both areas. 
Causal Inference and the Sense of Agency 
“The sense that I am the one who is causing or generating an action. 
For example, the sense that I am the one who is causing something to 
move, or that I am the one who is generating a certain thought in my 
stream of consciousness” (Gallagher, 2000, p. 15) 
 
 The SoA can be defined as the feeling of control over our voluntary, goal-
directed actions and their associated outcomes (Moore & Obhi, 2012; Moore, 
Wegner & Haggard, 2009). In other words, it is recognising our causal influence 
on the world. Broadly speaking, SoA is largely a constituent of self-consciousness 
(Metzinger, 2000; Vogeley, May, Ritzl, Falkai, & Zilles et al., 2004) that internally 
monitors our actions in the context of our willed intentions. Such intentions (e.g., 
to turn on a light) generate goal-specific motor programs (hand/finger movement 
and positioning) that direct motor action and coordination, and the ensuing motor 
feedback (hand/finger movement in real-time) allows us to manage our motor 
behaviour to adjust our actions and achieve our goals. Post-action, perceptual (i.e., 
sensorimotor, visual and proprioceptive) feedback (e.g., the light turning on) 
allows us to compare the expected outcome of our action to the actual outcome in 
order to gauge whether our intentions have been achieved, and contributes to an 
overall volitional, agentic experience of action (David, Newen & Vogeley, 2008).  
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To further illustrate the SoA in terms of action as a causal agent, I am 
voluntarily moving my fingers to type this very sentence, as you are voluntarily 
adjusting your eyes to read this sentence. Accompanying this action, I have the 
implicit sense that I am controlling and executing button presses to produce the 
desired articulation of this definition. Hence, SoA is separate from simply the 
intention to move or act in the future, and it is equally different to body ownership 
and sense of control; it is the online conscious experience of action fulfilling 
intention (Gallagher, 2000). We are agents of our actions and thoughts, and we are 
provided with both a sense and confirmation of this as expected outcomes 
routinely follow our actions. Indeed, such everyday causal relations between 
motor commands and sensorimotor consequences are so ordinary and familiar 
that they tend to be overlooked, occurring beneath our active awareness, and the 
more automatic or learned our actions are, the deeper they fall from this 
awareness, becoming ephemeral in the process. However, we still retain an 
agentive experience of our actions, pre-flective – that is, a subliminal experiential 
level of control over the consequences to our actions (Pacherie, 2001). 
The SoA plays important roles both personally and societally – from 
distinguishing our actions and their consequences from other peoples’ actions, to 
the notion of responsibility where legal systems are concerned (Gallagher, 2000; 
Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998; Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004). Thus, conceptually, as 
the reader may have already surmised, the SoA is related to the notion of free will 
(Aarts & Van de Bos, 2011; Davidov & Eisikovits, 2015; Feldman, 2017; Monroe, 
Dillon & Malle, 2014; Rigoni & Brass, 2014; Rigoni, Sammicheli & Brass, 2011), 
where, at the psychological level, free will and our SoA are intertwined with 
feelings of control; that our intentions are causally effective, and appears to 
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operate as a default state of our experiences and perceptions. Free will and SoA 
are thus very conceptually similar (Feldman, 2017), however the latter 
distinguishes itself by focusing on the explicit/implicit cognitive processes of 
intentions, action, and estimations of causal effectiveness and responsibility in the 
light of sensory feedback – in effect, our SoA is the experience of the exercise of 
free will, or as some would argue, the illusion of willpower (Wegner, 2003; 2004). 
The SoA acts similarly to the principles of causality (Michotte, 1963; De 
Vignemont & Fournet, 2004; Wegner 2003; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), whereby 
our actions can be readily attributed to ourselves if our motor commands produce 
outcomes that satisfy the criteria of contiguity, temporal succession (also known 
as priority) and consistency. A further criterion is typically added, known as 
exclusivity, where no other event can explain the outcome. In the aforementioned 
light-switch example, the emerging light from the lamp would be less readily 
attributed to our own actions should there be multiple possible causes (such as 
another light-switch) or failing to correspond with any other of these criteria. 
However, voluntariness of action may also be necessary for the SoA to arise: In a 
seminal study by Haggard, Clark and Kalogeras (2002), intentional binding, a 
proposed implicit measure of SoA, was shown to only be present in voluntary 
actions. However, voluntariness of action is hotly debated within SoA research, 
largely pertaining to whether the methods used to measure SoA, such as 
intentional binding, require intention as a key component (Buehner, 2012; 
Hughes et al., 2013). Intention and its contribution to attributing causality are 
discussed further in the subsection entitled ‘Intentional Binding’. 
In the previous 16 or so years, much research corroborates the Humean 
criteria when investigating moderators of the SoA – in other words, when the 
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harmonious flow of intention, action and sensorimotor feedback can be 
manipulated. For example, we experience less SoA with spatial deviations in visual 
representations of our movements (Farrer, Franck, Frith, Decety, Georgieff, et al., 
2004; Ogawa & Inui, 2007); unexpected outcomes (Sato & Yasuda, 2005); and 
during ambiguity of outcome authorship (Tsakiris, Haggard, Franck, Mainy & 
Sirigu, 2005). Other research additionally shows less sensory attenuation, defined 
as the reduction in the perceived intensity of a stimulus (discussed further later 
within this chapter), with externally triggered outcomes compared to self-caused 
outcomes, both auditory (Bäß, Jacobsen, & Schroger, 2008) and visual (Hughes & 
Waszak, 2011). Interestingly, further evidence stems from patients diagnosed 
with schizophrenic disorder, i.e., those suffering from loss of the ability to 
attribute their own thoughts and actions to themselves. Within such patients, self-
attributions of actions can become even more impaired with temporal delay 
(Frank, Farrer, Georgieff, Marie-Cardine & Daléry et al., 2001) and unexpected 
sensorimotor feedback (Hauser, Knoblich, Repp, Lautenschlager, & Gallinat, et al., 
2011).  
Delving further, the comparator model, otherwise known as the forward 
model, is supported by a large body of evidence with regards to illustrating the 
cognitive computation of SoA. The comparator model proposes an internal, pre-
reflective comparison process in which the motor system, governed by intention, 
dictates a ‘desired state’. Subsequently, this desired state is compared to an 
estimated actual state’ based on current motor commands and updates itself 
continually within a feedback loop in order to perform specific, desired action 
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Lindner, 
Haarmeier, Erb, Grodd, & Thier, 2006; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008; 
38 
 
Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). However, in terms of SoA, the primary assumption of 
the comparator model is that SoA arises from congruency between predicted state 
or ‘outcome’ and the actual outcome of our actions (see Fig 1.). Intentions result 
in motor commands that produce action, of which predicts sensorimotor 
outcomes via an ‘efferent copy’ of the motor command. These are compared with 
the actual state or outcome, and congruency between predictions and outcomes 
increase our sense of sensorimotor control, and thus our feelings of control over 
our voluntary, goal-directed actions (Kumar & Srinivasan, 2017; Nahab, Kundu, 
Gallea, Kakareka, & Pursley et al., 2011). 
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Chapter 1, Figure 1. Neurocognitive comparator mechanism underlying the 
Sense of Agency. 
The internal comparison process of SoA has been well documented over a 
variety of experimental procedures (de Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004; Evans, 
1982; Farrer et al, 2003; Farrer, Franck, Paillard & Jeannerod, 2003; Marcel, 2003; 
Mechsner, Kerzel, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2001; Saito, Mushiake, Sakamoto, Itoyama, & 
Tanji, 2005), and is equally popular due to its explanation of differentiating 
sensory events caused by our own actions and those that occur via extrinsic causes 
(Frith et al., 2001). The comparator model also retains other advantages, such as 
accounting for attenuated sensorimotor consequences (Blakemore, Frith, & 
Wolpert, 1999; Haarmeier, Bunjes, Lindner, Berret & Thier, et al., 2001; Lindner 
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et al., 2006) and being intrinsic to action-processing, i.e., via efferent copies of 
motor commands, without requiring higher-orders of conceptualisation or 
independent processing from action, and is thus a parsimonious explanation of 
SoA computation (Synofzik et al., 2008). 
 Similar to our internal model of causal structures, the comparator model 
does not operate on a Boolean congruence/incongruence format - we infer 
sensorimotor consequences, much like causality, from probabilistic contingencies. 
For example, we still experience SoA despite slight spatial, temporal or perceptual 
deviations from our predicted outcomes (Daprati & Sirigu, 2002; Farrer et al., 
2003, Farrer, Franck, Paillard, & Jeannerod, 2003; Franck et al., 2001; Frith, 2005). 
Cahill, Silbersweig, and Frith (1996) demonstrated that modifications of our own 
voices (e.g., altering the pitch) still produce SoA, despite what would have been 
incongruence between predicted and actual sensorimotor feedback.  
One interpretation is the experience of SoA varies upon a gradient (from 
no experience to a complete experience) rather than a binary system of whether 
SoA is present or not, depending on how congruent our prediction is to our action, 
as restrictive as the window of comparator processing may be (Bays, Wolpert, & 
Flanagan, 2005; Blakemore et al., 1999). In other words, the extent to which our 
predictions match the sensorimotor feedback may also predict the amount of 
agency we feel over those actions, given a statistical relation between events 
(Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Moore & Haggard, 2008). However, if the comparator 
model permits a degree of ambiguity in self-attributions, then extrapolating this 
notion would necessitate additional attribution mechanisms when self- vs. other-
causal attributions are unclear (Franck et al., 2001; Farrer et al., 2003). When 
mismatches between expected and actual outcomes occur, further mechanisms 
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may provide additions to, if not supplant, action-processing in estimating self- 
versus other- causal attributions (Synofzik et al., 2008). For example, some 
evidence suggests that proprioceptive and visual cues are equally important for 
determining agency (Fourneret, Paillard, Lamarre, Cole, & Jeannerod, 2002; 
Farrer et al., 2003b). Further proposals cite that multiple sensory feedback 
modalities should be incorporated into the framework of the comparator model, 
if not indicating a revision of the comparator model to a more general 
action/sensory feedback comparator system (Sato, 2009; Synofzik et al., 2008; 
Zopf, Polito, & Moore, 2018). Indeed, recent research demonstrates that visual 
cues play a vital role in determining agency, and incongruence between our 
expected and actual visual predictions (e.g., a 3D-rendered hand controlled by our 
own hand) significantly impairs our SoA (Caspar, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2015; 
Zopf et al., 2018).  Thus, criticism of the comparator model questions the 
sufficiency of explaining SoA purely through efferent copies of motor commands 
(Mechsner, 2004; Prinz, 2003; Saito et al., 2005; Synofzik et al., 2008) and 
neglecting retrospective elements to attributing agency (for a review, see Wegner, 
2003). Regardless of the significance of motor signals in attributing agency, 
prediction derived from action matching expected sensory feedback is well 
accepted as a necessary antecedent for SoA to arise. 
In terms of perceiving ourselves as a causal agent, herein lies a distinction 
between feelings of agency, and judgements of agency: judgements of agency are 
reflective, following reflection on the congruency between action and expected 
outcomes. Judgements are typically made through explicit self-reports, or 
attributions, of causality, where the individual is asked whether they believe they, 
or another agent, are responsible for the outcome that occurred (Dewey & Carr, 
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2013; Sato & Yasuda, 2005), the simplest example being “I caused X to occur”. 
Judgements of agency are thus typically a form of abductive reasoning, employing 
Humean criteria in order to deduce the likeliest of explanations.  Conversely, 
feelings of agency are more elusive, pre-reflective, and constitute a low-level, 
subconscious feeling of being in control of actions and the events succeeding them. 
A variety of methods aim to tap into this implicit form of agency, two of which 
popularly employed are sensory attenuation and intentional binding. Sensory 
attenuation posits that self-made actions provoke less intense sensory outcomes 
than outcomes externally generated, a classic example being that we are unable to 
tickle ourselves (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998a). Intentional binding, on the 
other hand, is defined as the compression of the perceived time interval between 
voluntary actions and their sensory consequences (Haggard et al, 2002). More 
specifically, an outcome (e.g., a tone) is experienced earlier when it is triggered by 
a voluntary action compared to when it occurs in isolation or is triggered by an 
involuntary movement. Similarly, actions that trigger an event are experienced 
later than actions with no discernible outcome (see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a 
review). Regarding models of agency, the comparator model, or at least a 
comparison between actions, intentions, and perceptual (i.e., sensorimotor, visual, 
proprioceptive, etc.) feedback is concerned, has been argued to tap into this 
feeling of agency (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014; Synofzik et al., 2008).  
Whichever type of agency one wishes to measure depends on one’s 
research aims. However, both judgements and feelings of agency are not without 
their disadvantages: where judgements measure reflective agency, as it is 
measured after the outcome has occurred, these explicit self-attributions can 
introduce bias due to distorted inferential processes and individual differences 
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related to cognitive capacities or personality (Aarts, Custers & Wegner, 2005; 
Dewey & Knoblich, 2014), or prior expectations about the task (Gawronski, LeBel, 
& Peters, 2007; Synofzik et al., 2008). Moreover, judgements of agency can easily 
be influenced by contextual or social cues; for example, Wegner (2002) 
demonstrated that priming participants by subliminally presenting either the 
word “I” or “Me” prior to target onset prompted more self-attributions than other-
attributions of having caused an event when authorship was ambiguous. 
Conversely feelings of agency are more elusive, and popular implicit 
measurements of agency are not without their criticisms; for example, that 
intentional binding may measure temporal predictability and control rather than 
agency (see Hughes et al., 2013, for a review; see below for further discussion on 
intentional binding). Of interest to many researchers is the ability to measure pre-
reflective, i.e., implicit, processes that contribute to the experience of SoA, void of 
the potential confounding factors of explicit attributions, and thus a plethora of 
studies use, and continue to use, intentional binding as a measure of agency whilst 
strongly proposing a tight link between intentional binding and SoA (Aarts & van 
de Bos, 2011; Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Moore & Haggard, 
2010; Obhi & Hall, 2011; Pfister, Obhi, Rieger, & Wenke, 2014; Ruess et al., 2017; 
Takahata et al., 2012).  
Sense of Agency: External modulation  
Progressing beyond action-prediction mechanisms, external cues 
constitute a potentially powerful influence over our SoA, particularly when 
overriding prediction-outcome mismatches. To continue the previous illustration, 
as I am typing this sentence to further define the SoA, I routinely make typos 
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because I am a clumsy keyboard-user. This knowledge, coupled with the fact I am 
the only producer of letters upon this document, does not decrease my SoA when 
I make a typo, despite that my letter-prediction frequently does not match the 
sensory feedback I desire. As Wegner (2003) points out, external cues, in the form 
of context and social cues, retrospectively add to our SoA contingency equation to 
predict the most likely cause of action (see Fig 2). This top-down information, that 
I am imperfect in my keyboard strokes, maintains my predictions of sensory 
feedback whilst equally allowing for unpredicted feedback to nevertheless still be 
attributed to myself. 
 
 
Chapter 1, Figure 2. Multi-factorial model underlying the Sense of Agency. 
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However, external cue modulation of SoA is relatively younger in terms of 
research potential, particularly in terms of social and contextual cues. Indeed, SoA 
and intentional binding are relatively new constructs within the body of 
psychology literature. As a result, research has primarily focused on the 
conditions required for intentional binding and sensory attenuation, implying 
presence of SoA, and the underlying predictive and reconstructive mechanisms to 
which we attribute agentive causation (Engbert et al., 2008). Experimental tasks 
often involve simple actions, such as a button press, producing simple outcomes, 
such as an auditory tone. These arguably lack the affective or cognitive motivation 
with which humans perform goal-directed actions to produce meaningful 
outcomes in everyday life (Moretto et al., 2011). Therefore, despite their 
relevance, these studies restrict our inference of how SoA translates to (relatively 
more) meaningful actions and outcomes.   
To investigate whether these findings have real-world application, several 
research paradigms have recently shown that measures of SoA, through 
intentional binding, can be either be increased or reduced in various social 
contexts. These effects largely occur when either manipulating the context in 
which the action performed or the outcome for participants’ actions. For example, 
Desantis and colleagues (2011) found that, when induced to believe that the 
outcome (a sound) could be produced by either the participant themselves or a 
confederate, naïve participants showed significantly less intentional binding (i.e., 
they judged the time interval to be longer) for outcomes when informed the 
confederate was responsible for the outcome, despite that the participant’s 
actions were the cause of all outcomes incurred.  
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Existing studies arrive at the head of very recent research that explores 
how the findings from intentional binding and SoA can be applied to social 
settings. Findings indicate SoA coinciding with a self-serving bias, a form of 
attributional bias defined as a need to maintain and enhance self-esteem, or the 
tendency to perceive oneself in an overly favourable manner (Baumeister, 2010; 
Bradley, 1978; Miller & Ross, 1975). These findings typically involve greater 
intentional binding for positive outcomes relative to negative outcomes, such as 
financial gain vs. loss (Takahata et al., 2012), self- vs. other-generated outcomes 
(Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas & Haggard, 2007), 
priming with reward-related information (Aarts et al., 2012) and success 
attributions compared to failure (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde & Hankin, 2004). Such 
research highlights the suggestibility of our SoA over socially salient outcomes 
when specific information is known about the current action-outcome 
relationship.  
Campbell and Sedikides (1999) conducted a meta-analysis of research on 
the self-serving bias, revealing that a perceived threat to oneself, for example 
notions that contradict our self-esteem, significantly increases the likelihood of a 
self-serving bias occurring. Likely a result of evolutionary mechanisms that 
promote well-being (Taylor & Brown, 1988), the self-serving bias continues to be 
observed within agency research where the SoA may be modulated to promote 
self-enhancement or protect pre-existing self-models rather than the pursue 
accurate, objective self-knowledge (Duval & Silvia, 2002; Gentsch, Weiss, 
Spengler, Synofzik & Schütz-Bosbach, 2015; Taylor & Brown, 1994). Indeed, other 
experimental studies have shown that the desire for self-enhancement or 
verification of pre-existing self-conceptions often overrides motives for obtaining 
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accurate or objective self-knowledge (Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014; Sedikides and 
Strube, 1995).  
As we can gather from the current advances in SoA research, it is 
reasonable to suggest that, measured via intentional binding, the temporal 
interval between action and outcome is perceived to be shorter for positive 
outcomes relative to negative outcomes. In other words, the valence of the 
predicted outcome for a given action can influence how we perceive the timing of 
the two events.  The prevalence of the self-serving bias indicates that sensory 
action consequences are subject to the emotional content of action-effects, and 
thus emphasising the function of social cues interacting with cognitive cues when 
we infer a causal relationship, such as covariation and temporal contiguity 
(Amundson & Miller, 2007).  
Whilst the influence of social contexts has been recently established, we 
have only scratched the surface regarding affective components of behaviour. 
Given the ubiquitous close relation between actions and emotions in our daily 
activities (Eder, Musseler & Hommel, 2012; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Tamietto & 
De Gelder, 2010), it would be apt to update current models of SoA with affective 
components of our actions, either through affective states during action or the 
emotional value of the outcome. This omission has been recently addressed by a 
selection of novel studies indicating that SoA may be modulated by emotion: 
Yoshie and Haggard (2013) asked participants to make a voluntary action (a 
button press) that produced either neutral, positive or negative valence sounds 
(Experiment 1), and only either positive or negative sounds (Experiment 2), after 
an interval of 250ms. The sounds used as outcomes were a tone for neutral 
valence, applause and laughter for positive, and fear and disgust for negative. 
48 
 
Participants performed their actions in specific blocks dedicated to either valence, 
such that during one block (consisting of 32 trials), participants only produced 
outcomes of one valence. Yoshie & Haggard (2013) employed the Libet clock 
method, such that participants were required to estimate the onset time of either 
their button press or the ensuring sound. Composite intentional binding scores 
(combining the total error of onset estimation relative to actual occurrence) 
showed that, across both experiments, the total amount of error (i.e., perceiving 
actions closer to outcomes, and outcomes closer to actions) was significantly more 
for positively valenced sounds compared to negative. On closer inspection, 
positive sounds tended to produce minor intentional binding effects compared to 
neutral sounds, with arguably no self-serving bias. However, negative sounds 
produced significantly less onset estimation error than the other two conditions. 
Moreover, the majority of perceptual shift was carried largely in favour of 
outcome binding (i.e., the temporal attraction of outcome towards action).  
Yoshie and Haggard (2013) corroborates self-serving bias research and 
provides insight as to how the self-serving bias is manifested, at least to the extent 
of auditory stimuli. However, this study suggests that SoA differences in terms of 
emotional valence are largely due to a reduced SoA over negative outcomes, rather 
than the assumed self-serving bias notion that positive self-attributions would, at 
least, equally contribute to these differences.  
The findings of Yoshie & Haggard (2013) equally support evidence of 
emotional distancing (Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2016), rather 
than the attribution of positive outcomes to oneself. These findings also mirror 
observed intentional binding effects when actions produce financial reward or 
punishment, where the perceived tones indicating punishment are perceived as 
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much later, rather than reward-associated tones being perceived as earlier, 
compared to neutral tones (Takahashi et al., 2012). Additionally, Hughes (2015) 
highlights the salience of emotional content of outcomes to our actions using 
sensory attenuation: Hughes found that stimuli conveying emotion modulated the 
sensory attenuation effect more so than neutral stimuli, with more neural 
suppression of expected fearful faces than unexpected fearful faces and both 
expected/unexpected neutral stimuli. 
In the larger context of causality, we may skew temporal contiguity of 
negative outcomes such that we avoid causally attributing events that may harm 
our self-esteem or self-image. In other words, we infer less of a causal relationship 
between our actions and negative outcomes, relative to positive outcomes. Rather 
than the basic premise that causal inference allows us to learn and understand the 
world accurately, particularly in terms of ourselves as causal agents, cognitive 
biases emerge where perceptions are altered in order to perceive the causal 
relations we want to see, or at least, those that fall within our prior beliefs. 
The first set of experiments of my PhD research, contained within chapter 
2, aimed to build upon this body of research, and investigate causal inference 
biases with respect to SoA. This was achieved by investigating socially salient 
outcomes for voluntary actions in the form of emotional valence. Given my 
research aims of investigating whether cognitive biases modulate the perception 
of causal relations, I employed a binding paradigm to measure SoA. One particular 
goal was to explore if and how affective components modulate SoA experiences 
(given the aforementioned self-serving bias). Specifically, together with my PhD 
research supervisors (Dr. Gethin Hughes and Prof. Mitchell Callan) we conducted 
three studies that implicitly measured the SoA via intentional binding over actions 
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that produce positive or negative emotionally valenced outcomes. Our 
expectations were weighted upon the preceding evidence that a self-serving bias 
largely contributes to SoA experiences.  
Intentional Binding  
“An hour sitting with a pretty girl on a park bench passes like a minute, 
but a minute sitting on a hot stove seems like an hour.” (Einstein, Einstein 
in America: The Scientist’s Conscience in the Age of Hitler and Hiroshima, 
Sayen, 1985, p. 130) 
 
Although intentional binding has been discussed previously within this 
chapter, the debate surrounding its nature and underlying mechanisms 
necessitates a more elaborate discussion. Indeed, as my research identifies over 
the subsequent chapters, the binding phenomenon is not unlike other 
psychological phenomena that provoke both intrigue and dispute.  
 To define intentional binding sufficiently, binding refers to the 
compression of the perceived time interval between voluntary actions and their 
sensory consequences (Haggard et al., 2002; see Fig. 3). Libet, Gleason, Wright and 
Pearl (1983), developed a clock-face method (thus dubbed the ‘Libet clock’) upon 
which participants would make temporal estimations of the onset of events. The 
Libet clock consisted of a screen displaying a clock-face with a singular rotating 
hand that took 2560ms per rotation, and numbered in intervals of 5, displaying 5-
60.  
Employing the Libet clock some decades later, Haggard et al., (2002), 
explored how voluntariness of action impacted the perceived timing of events – 
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an action and its following outcome. In two conditions, participants, at their 
leisure, pressed a button. This button produced no outcome (condition 1) or 
produced a tone that occurred 250ms after the button press (condition 2). Each 
time the participant pressed the button, they were asked when, referring to the 
clock-face, their action occurred (for example, ‘17’). In two further conditions, 
participants heard a tone in isolation (condition 3) or pressed the button that 
produced the tone, again occurring 250ms later (condition 4). In these conditions, 
participants were asked when the sound occurred. Relative to the temporal 
judgements of actions producing no outcomes and sounds heard in isolation (i.e., 
no prior action or cause), judgements of the onset of actions that produced tones, 
and of the onset of tones that had been produced by the button-press, were 
distorted; actions were judged to have occurred much later, and sounds were 
judged to have occurred much earlier.  
In the full study, Haggard et al. compared such voluntary actions to two 
additional conditions: one employing TMS stimulation over the motor cortex to 
invoke an involuntary action, and sham TMS stimulation. The tone followed 
voluntary actions, the motor cortical TMS, and sham TMS (indicated by an audible 
click made by TMS applied to the parietal cortex) by 250ms. Comparing voluntary 
actions to the TMS pulse, voluntary actions were perceived much closer to the 
time of the produced tone compared to actions performed in isolation. Equally, 
sounds produced by voluntary actions were perceived earlier than sounds with 
no discernible cause. Conversely, a reverse binding effect was observed in the TMS 
condition, where actions and outcomes were perceived further apart relative to 
their baseline conditions. The sham TMS condition showed only minor perceptual 
attraction between actions and outcomes. The authors suggested that binding of 
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intentional actions to their effects represents a mechanism by which the brain 
integrates intention, motor commands, and sensory feedback into a coherent 
conscious experience. Moreover, that binding enables the construction of an 
experience of our own causal agency.  This assertion has been further reinforced 
by other research showing that agency beliefs enhance the binding effect 
(Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, 2011; Haering & Kiesel, 2012). 
 
Chapter 1, Figure 3. Illustration of the intentional binding phenomenon. 
 
However, the classic Libet clock paradigm, despite its popular usage 
(Moore & Haggard, 2008; Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard, Aschersleben, Gehrke, & 
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Prinz, 2002), has not suffered without criticism. For example, questionable 
accuracy over event-onset time estimations (Banks & Pockett, 2007) given the 
subjective nature of time and its fluctuating relation to real time (Eagleman et al., 
2005; Hallett, 2007). Additionally, as Humphreys and Buehner (2009) highlight, 
the Libet clock is, at best, an indirect method of measuring an individual’s 
perceived time between two events given that it captures the perceived onset 
times of individual events rather than, as Fig. 3 illustrates, the perceived interval.  
As such, the Libet clock method enables investigation into the specific 
contributions of action-binding and outcome-binding separately. However, its 
criticisms, as well as both the inclination for a direct method of measuring the 
perceived contraction in time, and to explore whether temporal binding is not 
simply an artefact of using the Libet clock, led to the application of other methods 
of measuring time perception. One such method is interval estimation, measured 
by asking participants to estimate the interval between the two events (such as 
the action and the outcome), using either a verbal estimate (Engbert et al., 2008; 
Kumar & Srinivasan, 2017; Moore et al., 2009) or an estimate via a time scale 
(Moreton, Callan, & Hughes, 2017). Neither a reference interval or feedback is 
given, as typically the concern is the relational estimation differences between 
conditions – for example, Engbert et al. (2007) showed that the interval between 
self-generated actions (a keypress) and somatic stimulation applied to either the 
participant’s or the experimenter’s index finger was estimated as significantly 
shorter than estimations of the same sequence but with the experimenter as the 
cause of the outcome. 
Another alternative of the Libet clock method to measure intentional 
binding, stimulus anticipation, was developed by Buehner and Humphreys 
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(2009), where participants are asked to time a button press with the onset of an 
outcome stimulus (e.g., a visual or auditory cue). Intentional binding occurs when 
participants anticipate the outcome by pressing a button before it appears. 
Anticipation reflects temporal contiguity: causally related events are perceived 
closer together in time, where this perceptual bias induces the notion that causally 
produced outcomes will appear sooner relative to unrelated or merely 
correlational secondary events (Buehner, 2012). For example, Buehner and 
Humphreys (2009) showed that auditory tones caused by keypresses were 
anticipated much earlier than simply timing the keypresses to the onset times. 
Following Haggard et al.’s (2002) work, intentional binding has been 
routinely used to assess the level of agency one experiences over a given action or 
following outcome predominantly using the Libet clock and interval estimation 
methods. However, the link between intentional binding and SoA is frequently 
assumed (Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Engbert et al., 2008; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; 
Moore et al., 2009; Obhi & Hall, 2011), despite the lack of full understanding of the 
relationship (Hughes et al., 2013; Moore & Obhi, 2012) and alternate accounts 
suggesting binding results from knowledge of general causal mechanisms 
(Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Stetson, Montague, & Eagleman, 2006). Regardless 
of the specific mechanism of binding, a plethora of research suggests that, as a 
causal agent, intentional binding will occur when we voluntarily perform an action 
that produces an outcome (Cravo, Claessens, & Baldo, 2009; Engbert et al., 2008; 
Haggard & Clark, 2003; Haggard et al., 2002; Humphreys & Buehner, 2010; Moore 
& Haggard, 2008). Equally, studies (e.g., Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 
2013) that sought to modulate SoA with social outcomes employed binding as 
their measure. In other words, we can infer social factors impact intentional 
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binding (as well as, presumably, SoA), and thus our perception of the outcomes to 
our actions. 
Haggard et al.’s (2002) research first prompted the idea of intentional 
binding – that intentional actions and their outcomes are drawn together. This 
emphasises the requirement of voluntary action. However, several studies have 
shown that intention of action is not necessary to produce the binding effect, but 
may rather be a contributing factor (Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2010; 
Humphreys & Buehner, 2009), particularly given that binding also occurs for 
observed outcomes (Moore, Teufel, Subramania, Davis, & Fletcher, 2013; Poonian 
& Cunnington, 2013). Consequently, the term ‘intentional binding’ has been 
critiqued to the point that many researchers have adopted the moniker ‘temporal 
binding’ instead (Buehner, 2012; Cravo et al., 2009; Engbert & Wohlschläger, 
2007; adopted henceforth throughout my thesis), despite continued referral to the 
binding phenomenon as ‘intentional binding’ by other researchers (Christensen, 
Yoshie, Di Costa, & Haggard, 2016; Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012).  
Another possible interpretation posits that a causal relationship between 
events is sufficient for said events to be drawn together in conscious experience 
(Buehner, 2012; Suzuki, Lush, Seth, & Roseboom, 2018), highlighted by research 
showing that binding disappears with actions performed intentionally but 
without causality (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). Moreover, Buehner (2012) 
found comparable temporal binding to self-caused actions by those performed by 
a machine. In other words, simply knowing of the existence of a causal relationship 
between two events may sufficiently produce a perceived temporal contraction 
between them.  
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Referring to our internal model of causal structures, and to Bayesian 
principles of ambiguity reduction, one could interpret that, in order to reduce 
ambiguity during the noisy perception of sensory information, our past 
experiences of temporally contiguous events indirectly influences our perception 
of the timings of future events, drawing action-effect pairings closer together. 
Therefore, intentionality may represent a sub-structure of temporal binding, 
wherein it supplies an additional cue available to the perceiver that provides 
information when discerning causal antecedents to outcomes. This temporal 
contraction between such causally-related events may indicate that not only are 
temporally contiguous events judged to be more causally related, but the belief of 
a causal relationship influences our perception of events to become more 
temporally contiguous. 
From the multiple explanations of temporal binding’s underlying 
mechanism, one can conclude that the binding phenomenon is far from cemented 
in terms of our understanding. Not only are there conflicting explanations, but 
several studies portray conflicting findings: for example, actions and outcomes 
appear to be drawn together when movements are congruent to intentions (Ebert 
& Wegner, 2010; Zopf, Polito, & Moore, 2018). Conversely, other research 
distinctly found the reverse, where binding is not influenced through 
manipulating congruence of action-outcomes (Desantis et al., 2012; Hughes, 
2018), suggesting alternative mechanisms, in the form of temporal predictability 
and temporal control, take precedent. One possible explanation of these 
inconsistencies lies in that action-binding (the perception of our actions occurring 
temporally closer to an action-effect) and outcome-binding (the perception of 
outcomes occurring temporally closer to our action) may be driven by different 
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processes, and thus different processes may underlie them (Hughes, 2018; 
Waszak, Cardoso-Leite, & Hughes, 2012). 
One of the most forefront inconsistencies, however, is that binding, as an 
implicit measure of agency, often fails to correlate with explicit measures of 
agency (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). For example, Obhi and Hall (2011) showed 
that, during an actor-observer paradigm, both participants experienced temporal 
binding of the actor’s actions, but only the actor reported explicit agency. 
Assessing the degree to which binding is modulated by factors that also modulate 
explicit agency reports is important to determine the relationship between 
implicit and explicit agency. Given that explicit (i.e., judgements of) and implicit 
(i.e., feelings of) agency are proposed to be distinct processes, they will rarely, if 
ever, show complete convergence, as the former is influenced by inferential 
processes in addition to the predictive mechanisms outlined in the previous 
section. However, positive evidence of covariation is important to argue that 
conscious reports and unconscious biases are indeed measuring the same 
underlying construct. Recent evidence suggests that neither temporal binding 
(Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Saito, Takahata, Murai & Takahashi, 2015) nor sensory 
attenuation, a prominent alternative to binding in measuring SoA, correlate with 
explicit reports of agency, or even with each other (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). 
Hughes et al.’s (2013) systematic review of temporal binding studies and their 
methodologies advocates that, although action-effect prediction may contribute 
to the binding phenomenon, other factors such as temporal predictability (the 
ability to predict when an outcome will occur) and temporal control (the ability to 
control the onset of a given outcome) may contribute a greater deal to binding 
than current research assumes.  
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However, what we do know currently is that the sensory predictions of our 
actions are derived from motor and perceptual cues and depend on the context 
within which they are performed (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). A belief in a causal 
relationship between our actions and learned outcomes appears to successfully 
induce temporal binding (Desantis et al., 2011; Ebert & Wegner, 2010). Moreover, 
that the self-serving bias has been shown to modulate binding in a few preliminary 
studies (Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013) may be interpreted that, 
as far as binding as a mechanism for forming a coherent conscious experience an 
agent (Haggard et al., 2002), negative outcomes are less prone to being 
incorporated into such an experience; or at least, are less prone to forming a 
coherent conscious experience. From the perspective that binding represents a 
general mechanism of causal perception (Buehner and Humphreys, 2009), less 
binding for negative outcomes suggests that negative outcomes may be less likely 
to be causally attributed to oneself. Such theoretical positions lay the foundation 
for continued research that explores factors that modulate binding, and by 
extension, contribute towards the discussion on whether intentionality of 
voluntary action is necessary for binding to occur, as opposed to simply 
possessing knowledge of or belief in a causal relationship.  
 Thus, in line with previous research, temporal binding will be used as an 
implicit measure of the extent to which we self-attribute social outcomes. The 
findings from my PhD research expected to build upon findings showing support 
for the self-serving bias modulating temporal binding (e.g., Yoshie & Haggard, 
2013). Additionally, given proposed alternative mechanisms (Hughes et al., 2013) 
and evidence that questions whether temporal binding is indeed a measure of SoA 
(Dewey & Knoblich, 2014), my PhD research, secondary to my primary research 
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aims, also investigates whether temporal binding holds the validity as a SoA 
measure throughout current research, and provide more clarity to the discussion. 
If temporal binding is indeed modulated by social outcomes, as has been 
demonstrated (e.g. Yoshie & Haggard, 2013), this will both provide evidence of the 
self-serving bias’s impact, consistent with the suggestion that binding reflects 
implicit SoA. Conversely, if we find, however, that social outcomes do not impact 
temporal binding, this provokes questions regarding the relationship between the 
self-serving bias and SoA, and the replicability of findings derived from temporal 
binding measures. Moreover, given that evidence has shown explicit SoA can be 
modulated by a self-serving bias (Oishi, Tanaka, & Watanabe, 2018), a lack of effect 
of social outcomes would contribute towards the discussion that explicit and 
implicit measures tap into independent constructs (Moore, Middleton, Haggard & 
Fletcher, 2012). 
 
Measuring Causal Inference 
 At this juncture of my thesis, and in correspondence to the outcomes of my 
experiments contained within Chapter 2 (minor spoiler alert), it is necessary to 
further highlight the lack of solidarity over methods of measuring implicit causal 
beliefs. Although temporal binding is routinely employed as a measure of SoA, 
much research questions its proposed validity (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; 
Moreton et al., 2018; Stetson et al., 2006), not to mention the struggle to replicate 
key findings within the literature (Moreton et al., 2017; see Chapter 4). 
Additionally, although the aim of my thesis was to investigate implicit causal 
beliefs within the context of SoA first, and then adapt my experiments to more 
60 
 
socially relevant settings and known explicit biases in causal reasoning, again, the 
findings from experiments within Chapter 2 forced a shift in theoretical focus. 
David Hume’s (1739/1888) notion of contiguity refers to both temporal 
and spatial parameters. While temporal binding relates to temporal contiguity, 
spatial contiguity begets spatial binding (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010). The two 
concepts are virtually identical in theory, save for the one difference being that in 
spatial binding it is the physical space between two events that becomes 
perceptually contracted when a causal belief is held or implied. The roots of spatial 
binding date back to Michottean-era research (Michotte, 1946/1963) where 
Michotte observed induced perceptual causality with a launching task. In this 
classic task, one ball would make contact and launch a second ball, and causal 
beliefs reported by participants. Although a simple task, and not without its 
limitations (Beasley, 1968; Joynson, 1971), this visual account of perceptual 
causality guided research to discover a new perceptual bias we humans can make.  
The basic Humean notion for contiguity relates to that, if two events occur 
close together in temporal and spatial proximity, we are more likely to infer that 
they are causally related (Straube & Chatterjee, 2010; Woods, Lehet, & Chatterjee, 
2012). However, the converse is also true: events that are causally linked are 
perceived to be closer together in both time (Faro, Leclerc, & Hastie, 2005) and 
space (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010). For instance, actions and their ensuing 
sensory outcomes are bound towards one another in time (Haggard et al., 2002; 
Hughes et al., 2013). Similarly, Buehner and Humphreys (2010) demonstrated 
that the distance between two moving balls is judged to be smaller when the 
movement of the two balls are causally linked. In their study, Buehner and 
Humphreys (2010) asked participants to replicate the size of a rectangular bar 
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between two events: one ball hitting the bar on the left side, and another ball 
launching as soon as the first ball contacts the bar, along the same trajectory. In a 
second condition, there was a temporal delay of the second ball’s launch. The 
authors found that errors in bar replication showed that participants perceived 
the bar in the first condition shorter relative to non-causally related events (i.e., 
spatial binding), whereas the converse was true in the delayed condition. In their 
second experiment, two further conditions were added: priority violation, where 
the second ball launches before the first ball makes contact, and upward launch, 
where the second ball launches upwards instead of along the same trajectory as 
the first ball. They replicated their findings with the first two conditions, and in 
the two new conditions also found spatial binding, but at a significantly reduced 
rate compared to the first condition. 
Buehner (2012) followed the previous research by demonstrating that 
temporal binding is likely causality-induced time compression, as opposed to 
specifically related to motor-identity planning and intentional action. Thus, 
overall, both time and space appear to contract when causal beliefs are held about 
two events. Given that the self-serving bias, an explicit bias, has been reported to 
interact with temporal binding (Takahashi et al., 2012), other such biases might 
also be effectively captured using the binding phenomenon.  
One such explicit bias, known as Immanent Justice Reasoning (IJR; Callan 
et al., 2014), is a causal reasoning bias where one morally-valenced event is said 
to have caused a following, morally-congruent event, despite an absence of 
plausible physical mechanism between the two events. As stated in a previous 
sub-section of this thesis, and to keep the shift in theoretical focus thematically 
related, SoA and IJR are complimentary given the fact both are supposedly linked 
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through cognitive biases that serve to promote self-esteem and well-being in 
healthy individuals (Dalbert & Stoeber, 2006; Dzuka & Dalbert, 2006; Linden & 
Maercker, 2011; Renes & Aarts, 2017; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). Furthermore, 
exploring IJR with temporal binding allows us to assess the degree to which the 
binding phenomenon translates to more complex stimuli without apparent 
physical mechanisms or causal laws, and investigate whether personal biases (for 
instance, the belief in a just world) impacts not only our attitudes and judgements, 
but also our cognitive capacities for perceiving causal relationships within our 
environment. In other words, how do the perceptual error phenomena observed 
within SoA research translate to social, meaningful contexts?  
Chapter 2 questions whether temporal binding can be modulated by 
emotional valence, where one possibility is that the binding phenomenon is a 
result of general causality between events (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010; 
Buehner, 2012; Schlottmann, Ray, Mitchell, & Demetriou, 2006; Scholl & 
Tremoulet, 2000) rather than forward-motor identity prediction (Haggard et al., 
2002). Unlike emotional valence, IJR stems from a wealth of research 
demonstrating its modulatory power over explicit causal judgements (Callan et 
al., 2006; Callan et al., 2012). Thus, despite our lack of findings in Chapter 2, we 
pursued our original research aim in Chapter 3 by exploring whether top-down 
causal beliefs (such as IJR) may modulate causal binding, similar to how external 
factors have been shown to modulate SoA (Aarts et al., 2012; Caspar et al., 2016; 
Engbert et al., 2007).  
To be clear, the causal mechanisms of outcomes in temporal binding 
research are physical by nature; for example, producing a tone or image (e.g., 
Engbert et al., 2008; Haggard et al., 2002; Moore & Fletcher, 2012) to appear 
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onscreen via a mechanical action performed. As such, the mechanisms of binding 
appear to arise from a weighted integration of sensory evidence and specific prior 
belief (Kawabe, Roseboom, & Nishida, 2013; Lush et al., 2018 Synofzik, Vosgerau, 
& Lindner, 2009). Within IJR research, however, the mechanism is abstract; there 
is no physical mechanism by which an individual may attribute the moral valence 
of one event as the cause to another (discounting probabilistic causal sequences 
of events). Hence, my research additionally explores whether the power of causal 
beliefs to modulate physical causality (e.g., Desantis et al., 2011) can be applied to 
abstract causality. If knowledge of a causal relationship is entirely sufficient to 
produce a temporal or spatial contraction between two events, as suggested by 
Buehner (2012), then there is reason to suspect that causal events without a 
physical mechanism may suffer the same modulatory processes. Thus, this work 
builds upon the concept that binding reflects causal beliefs, rather than reflecting 
the integration of sensory cues and predicted action-effects during physical causal 
events. Conversely, if the abstract causal link between two morally congruent 
events do not produce similar modulated consequences to temporal binding (i.e., 
contracted when a causal relationship is believed to be present), then one possible 
interpretation is that temporal binding between two causal events requires 
weighted integration of sensory evidence from physical events. 
Furthermore, IJR is predominantly measured through self-report, and thus, 
if binding, both temporal and spatial, were truly measures of implicit causal 
beliefs, it would be of interest to explore how such explicit ratings of causal 
judgements correlate with implicit measures of causality via temporal (Buehner, 
2012) and spatial binding (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010).  
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Exploring IJR with implicit causal measures such as temporal and spatial 
binding is instrumental to our original research aim of investigating whether 
cognitive biases modulate the perception of causal relations, exploring if and how 
temporal binding observed within SoA research translated to social contexts; 
specifically, to implicit causal inference between morally skewed events. 
However, as mentioned previously, the findings from experiments within Chapter 
2 question whether temporal binding is modulated by social outcomes in the form 
of emotional valence. However, given the precedence set by research suggesting 
temporal binding might reflect an implicit sense of causal relations (Buehner 
2012), as well as the wealth of evidence in the form of biased causal reasoning in 
explicit judgements (see Callan et al., 2014, for a review), in Chapter 3 we decided 
to pursue our original research aims. Thus, the goal of the Chapter 3 was to extend 
previous IJR research by employing temporal binding, where participants 
estimated the perceived temporal interval between events. The next subsection 
focuses on the background literature of IJR, before culminating in an overview and 
description of the research presented throughout this thesis. Furthering my 
research conducted on emotional valence and IJR, Experiments 6 and 7 of my PhD 
research, contained within Chapter 4, I, along with my PhD supervisors, employed 
a stimulus anticipation method to test causal binding with regards to self- and 
other-actions. Experiment 6 conceptually replicated Buehner (2012), who 
compared self-caused outcomes to those of a machine’s to explore whether 
intention or simply the appearance of a causal mechanism would necessitate 
temporal binding. These experiments were conducted to extrapolate Buehner’s 
(2012) findings and investigate whether causal knowledge is truly necessary to 
elicit temporal binding. We used stimulus anticipation again in Experiment 7, this 
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time conceptually replicating Desantis et al.’s (2012) research showing that the 
belief of another causing an outcome, despite the outcome being self-caused, can 
reduce temporal binding (compared to believed self-caused outcomes). Given the 
findings from Experiment 6, we explored how stimulus anticipation, rather than 
the Libet clock method used in Desantis et al. (2012), could measure the impact of 
authorship beliefs on temporal binding. If stimuli are anticipated more for self vs. 
other actions or other prediction signals signifying a following event, and thus 
there is greater binding, this evidences a self-serving bias and the role of 
intentionality and causal mechanisms. Equal or less anticipation, however, 
questions such roles, despite their propagation as necessary. 
Causal Inference and Immanent Justice Reasoning 
  “We're seeking justice, Alfred. How can that ever be a mistake?” 
(Batman, Batman Vol. 1, Batman Year 3 - Changes Made, Wolfman & 
Broderick, 1989) 
 
Implicit measures of causal attributions pertaining to self-actions also 
apply to those of other-actions (Callan, Moreton & Hughes, submitted; Buehner, 
2012). Advancing beyond the self-serving bias, another interesting bias that 
modulates explicit reports of causal inference is immanent justice reasoning, 
where actions are thought to bring about morally congruent outcomes. Given the 
promising findings that events can be perceived as causally linked due to inherent 
desires for justice and predictability within the world (Callan, Ellard & Nicol, 2006; 
Callan, Sutton, Harvey & Dawtry, 2014), I investigated the perceived causal 
relation between justice-themed events using implicit measures, offering an 
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alternative to the self-report measures typically used in immanent justice 
reasoning (IJR) research.  
Illustrations of IJR are not uncommon in news cycles, particularly when a 
person in a position of authority deigns to explain an event via scientifically 
implausible means, likely to insert their ideological beliefs within their 
explanation. For example, designated the Great East Japan Earthquake, in May 
2011 a magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred off the eastern coast of Japan. The 
earthquake and resulting tsunami caused thousands of fatalities and injuries, in 
addition to destroying over 100,000 households. Globally, experts concerned 
themselves over the geological explanations of the event. Many who sought to 
explain the earthquake by other, irrational means, however, accompanied these 
explanations. Prominently, the governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, incited that 
the catastrophe was deserved and just, proclaiming divine intervention as the 
cause due to the people of Japan’s “selfishness and greed” (McCurry, 2011). This 
example neatly defines IJR, which is the belief that actions bring about deserved 
outcomes, be they rewards or punishments, when there is no physically plausible 
means by which they might have done so (Callan, Sutton, Harvey & Dawtry, 2014). 
IJR represents a departure from normal types of rewards and punishments – a 
robber receiving a prison sentence, for example; it is the distinct lack of plausible, 
or even possible, logical connection between the two events.  
IJR is interesting and worthy of study simply because, in contrast to the 
previous section on causal reasoning, attributing one event as the cause to 
another, despite the absence of any plausible or rational link, flies in the face of 
basic logic and scientific understanding of physical laws. Humans are capable of 
understanding complex causal relationships, but, as it appears, personal bias or 
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beliefs are equally capable of overriding logical causal reasoning. Such thinking 
has the power to be harmful and cause social unrest, especially when tragic events 
are attributed to one’s religious beliefs or sexual orientation (Burt & DeMello, 
2003; Gledhill, 2009). 
Causal understanding develops during early childhood (Gopnik et al., 
2001), despite disagreements as to whether domain-general causal knowledge is 
innate (Goodman, Ullman, & Tenenbaum, 2011) or entirely constructed through 
experience (Carey, 2009). Constrained by lack of knowledge of causal/physical 
laws, parental sanctions of behaviour, and a tendency to view the complex world 
as a coherent, intentional system, IJR flourishes where past deeds seemingly have 
a direct impact on future events (Fein & Stein, 1977; Piaget, 1932/1965). 
However, the capacity to endorse causal attributions that defy logic persists well 
into adulthood, and possibly at a greater frequency than children (Callan, Ellard, 
& Nicol, 2006; Callan et al., 2014; Maes, 1998; Raman & Winer, 2002, 2004; 
Woolley, Cornelius, & Lacy, 2011). As a classic example, Callan et al. (2006) gave 
participants a vignette regarding a man (‘David’) who had suffered a brutal traffic 
accident. In two conditions, participants were either informed that David recently 
had an extra-marital affair, or that he had purchased a family vacation. 
Participants in the former condition attributed, via a Likert rating scale, David’s 
accident significantly more to his prior behaviour than when David had not had 
an affair. 
Multiple studies reaffirm the findings of Callan et al. (2006; Callan, Sutton, 
& Dovale, 2010; Callan, Harvey, Dawtry, & Sutton, 2013; Harvey & Callan, 2014; 
Raman & Winer, 2002, 2004; Woolley, Cornelius, & Lacy, 2011), yet there are 
multiple possibilities as to how adults engage in this particular brand of faulty 
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causal reasoning, and how it comes to exist alongside our internal causal 
structures and abilities to compute complex causal matrices. Moral intuitions, 
cultural traditions and emotional connotations, teaching us right from wrong from 
early age, may persist into adulthood as a bias when it comes to decision-making 
(Baumard & Chevallier, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 
2012). Equally, absence of knowledge of cause and illiteracy of scientific principles 
are well known to invoke irrational arguments for causes, a prominent example 
being the ‘God of the gaps’ argument (Callan et al., 2014; Coulson, 1955). 
Additionally, adults develop multi-focused thinking that allows them to entertain 
multiple arguments for a cause that vary across their grounding in reality. 
Exposure to cultural messages, be they religious, folklore, etc., increases 
throughout development, reinforcing notions that our behaviour and outcomes 
are morally congruent. This process may prompt adults to both maintain and 
employ both rational and non-rational forms of logic and reasoning, with either or 
both being exposed given specific circumstances to the individual (Legare, Evans, 
Rosengren, & Harris, 2012). 
These reasons largely explain how we can preserve non-natural 
explanations of causal relations into adulthood, but the motivation to engage in 
IJR stems from the need to believe in a just world (Lerner, 1980). Just World 
Theory states that we behave and interpret information in a way that allows us to 
maintain the view that the world is fair, just, and orderly. People get what they 
deserve, and when making sense of misfortune, especially given a disastrous event 
with no obvious cause, we can justify faulty causal explanations in order to 
maintain perceptions of justice and deservingness (Callan & Ellard, 2010; Hafer & 
Bègue, 2005; Lerner, 1980). Thus, IJR acts as a defence mechanism when we 
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perceive a threat to our belief in a just world. This bears similarity to the 
frequently observed outcome of victim derogation, where, upon witnessing or 
learning information about a negative circumstance (for example, an otherwise 
innocent individual suffering a tragic accident or illness), devaluing or finding 
fault with the victim helps us ‘make sense’ of the events transpired (Lerner & 
Miller, 1978; Ryan, 1971). 
Indeed, IJR appears to serve multiple functions from the a Just World 
perspective (Lerner, 1980): recent research shows that construing events to be 
consistent with a just world allows us to make long-term goals (Bal & van den Bos, 
2012; Callan, Harvey, Dawtry, & Sutton, 2013; Xie, Liu, & Gan, 2011), avoid self-
defeating behaviours (Callan, Kay, & Dawtry, 2014), avoid smaller, immediate 
rewards in order to obtain larger, delayed rewards (Callan, Shead, & Olson, 2009), 
and maintain a commitment to justice in the face of threat (Hafer & Bègue, 2005). 
Rather than a strictly causal-reasoning account of social cognition, IJR 
represents a form of motivated reasoning when explaining events that seemingly 
have no causal connection. If no prior cause (other than sheer chance) is available 
when a specifically positive or negative event occurs, we become motivated to 
search for morally congruent behaviour to explain the events and shape them 
accordingly to fit into a Just World narrative. However, an imbalance also exists 
where negative events appear to threaten the belief in a just world more than 
positive events (Callan et al., 2006; Percival & Haviland, 1978). Whereas a positive 
event might incline us to search for good prior behaviour, negative events impact 
our motivations for justice to the extent that we resolve our justice concerns 
throughout future events. For example, Callan et al. (2006) gave participants 
either of two scenarios: one where a woman suffering from AIDS either made no 
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recovery from her treatment, or that she had recovered and was experiencing no 
further symptoms. Afterwards, participants were given two further vignettes, one 
detailing a horrific traffic accident involving a bully, and one involving a charitable 
elderly couple winning the lottery. Participants were asked to what extent did 
they think the prior behaviour of the bully/elderly couple caused their later 
misfortune/fortune. Callan et al. found that participants presented with the 
vignette detailing the continued suffering of the woman with AIDS were 
significantly more like to attribute the bully’s misfortune to his prior conduct, 
compared to those who read about the woman’s successful treatment. However, 
there was no difference between groups regarding IJR accounts of the elderly 
couple. Thus, negative events appear to inspire more motivation to resolve threats 
to justice than positive events. This, as has been said, helps us maintain the view 
that the world is not chaotic and unpredictable, but rather fair and just, where 
people get what they deserve if they behave poorly (see Callan et al., 2014, for a 
lengthier discussion on positive vs. negative differences in IJR).  
An underpinning factor related to IJR is the idea of deservingness – that is, 
when the moral congruency of action and outcome are consistent (Lerner, Miller, 
& Holmes, 1976). What may directly impact upon the extent we employ IJR, as 
opposed to systematically judging causal probabilities, is the perceived 
deservingness of an event given prior unrelated behaviour (Callan et al., 2006; 
2010). Deservingness and IJR are separate, yet mutually inclusive, and whether 
deservingness estimations act as a justification for employing IJR in causal 
estimations, or rather deservingness is an underlying mechanism and 
precondition to IJR, is still unclear (Callan et al., 2014). Concerns for deservingness 
and justice appear to go hand-in-hand when motivations arise to pursue a causal 
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connection that is otherwise physically impossible (Bal & van den Bos, 2012; 
Callan, Shead, & Olson, 2009, 2011; Hafer, 2000a; Hafer, Bègue, Choma, & 
Dempsey, 2005) and estimations of causality and deservingness consistently 
correlate strongly (Callan et al., 2006). However, some evidence suggests that 
deservingness mediates the relationship between prior behaviour and causal 
attributions towards future events, such that the more deserved an outcome, the 
more frequently IJR is used (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). The research 
contained within chapter 5 of this thesis aims to elucidate the role between IJR 
and implicit measures of causality. 
Moving forward, IJR research often utilises self-report methods to measure 
the strength of the causal link between someone’s prior (mis)deeds and a future 
event. For example, reading a vignette detailing a fatal accident had occurred to 
either a good or bad person, followed by the question ‘‘to what extent do you feel 
that what happened to xxx was a result of his/her conduct?” (Callan et al., 2013). 
To address this dependence on explicit measures of causality, Callan, Ferguson 
and Bindemann (2012) showed that motivations to perceive justice exist beyond 
retrospective causal judgements using eye-tracking. Participants listened to a 
recorded vignette describing either a good or bad person through headphones, 
and their eye-gaze was recorded whilst two possible outcome images (good or 
bad) were displayed partway through the vignette. Callan et al. found that 
participant gaze shifted towards the morally congruent image, such that when 
listening to the bad (good) behaviour of a person, eye-gaze focused onto the bad 
(good) outcome. For example, when listening to the description of Allen either 
shouting and swearing at his overworked wife to make him food (bad) or 
sympathising with his overworked wife, buying her flowers and making his wife 
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her favourite dinner (good), participants’ eye gaze more frequently fell to the 
morally congruent visual depiction of a following outcome (e.g., a successful 
business contract for a good outcome/terrible car accident for bad) before the 
outcome was announced. These findings suggest not only are we motivated to 
retrospectively assert morally congruent reasons for specific outcomes (Callan et 
al., 2006), we also anticipate morally congruent outcomes when justice is 
concerned. 
The research within Chapters 3 and 5 aims to extend previous IJR findings 
by exploring whether valence-laden sentences within a scenario are perceived 
closer in time, measured via temporal binding (Chapter 3) or felt closer in space, 
measured via spatial binding (Chapter 5). Thus, in terms of IJR, morally congruent 
sentences should be more temporally contiguous to one another and felt closer in 
space. Conversely, morally incongruent sentences, and hence less causally related, 
should be felt further apart. 
Increased spatial proximity has already been shown to increase conceptual 
similarity between words (Casasanto, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Spatial 
proximity between stimuli underlies a categorisation function of stimuli, 
impacting how close we feel two sets of stimuli are to each other. Selecting the 
spatial proximity between morally laden sentences may then be influenced by 
how easy we feel they are to categorise together. Reversing this logic, sentences 
that provoke concerns for justice may equally follow the same categorisation 
protocol, where morally congruent sentences will feel closer in spatial proximity 
than incongruent sentences.  
Another reason for advancing IJR research beyond explicit causal 
judgements is that IJR represents prereflective and intuitive needs to defend the 
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belief in a just world (Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Lerner, 2002). Unlike the belief in a 
just world, which is to say, a consciously evaluated belief, the need to defend the 
belief is not a rationalised appraisal of reality, but rather a preconscious process 
(Sutton et al., 2008; Sutton & Winnard, 2007). Thus, I investigated IJR using 
implicit measures of causality via temporal and spatial binding. If IJR reflects such 
a prereflective and intuitive form of causal judgement, we would expect implicit 
measures to reflect the explicit causal bias observed within the self-report 
methodologies thus far (Callan et al., 2006; Callan et al., 2012), where the temporal 
interval/physical space between morally congruent events would be perceived 
closer in time/space. 
The goal of the Chapters 3 and 5 was to extend previous IJR using temporal 
and spatial tasks, where participants estimated the perceived temporal interval 
between events (Chapter 3) and varied the distance between sentences depending 
on how close they feel in space (Chapter 5): a ranked choice task (Experiment 8), 
a free positioning task (Experiment 9) and a sentence-chasing task (Experiment 
10). On the basis of previous findings (Buehner et al., 2009; Callan et al., 2006; 
Casasanto, 2008), we explored whether the power of causal beliefs to modulate 
physical causality (e.g., Desantis et al., 2011) can be applied to the abstract 
causality, where binding is reflected in biased judgments about the timing or 
spatial position of abstract representations of moral acts.  
However, in the wider context of my research, attention must be redrawn 
to the research aims with which my research was conducted: whether cognitive 
biases modulate the perception of causal relations. Additionally, a secondary aim, 
as a consequence of my findings from Chapter 2, became to assess the viability of 
temporal binding as a measure of general causal inference. In other words, to 
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elucidate the current discussion over the specific mechanisms of temporal binding 
as a measure of SoA and implicit causal attribution in general, specifically in terms 
of whether the perceptual attraction of two events in time depended upon 
weighted integration of sensory evidence from physical events could be applied 
to non-physical causal events. Thus, where Chapter 2 sought to investigate 
temporal binding with emotional valence, Chapter 3 pursued the research aims by 
employing temporal binding as an implicit measure of causal inference between 
two morally charged events via IJR. Chapter 4, as a result of non-significant 
findings from the prior two chapters, explored whether causal knowledge was 
sufficient for binding. Finally, where our findings from chapters 2-4 remained 
inconclusive in regard to the research aims, we decided, as a final set of 
experiments, to explore IJR with spatial binding in Chapter 5. 
Overview of Present Studies  
Chapter 2: Experiments 1—4 
We attempted to conceptually replicate findings that suggest that the 
emotional content of an action outcome can modulate the effects of intentional 
binding. Experiments 1 and 2 utilised an interval estimation measurement of 
temporal binding. Participants made voluntary keypresses that produced visual 
outcome stimuli after one of three time intervals (100, 400 or 700ms). Shortly 
afterwards, a time estimation scale was presented to the participants, where 
participants were asked to estimate the time between their key press and the 
resulting image. Contrary to previous findings, we found no evidence that 
intentional binding was affected by the emotional valence of action outcomes. 
Experiment 3 was conducted to validate the stimuli for equivalence of perceived 
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emotional valence and arousal using Likert scales. Experiment 4 directly 
replicated Yoshie and Haggard’s (2013) original experiment using sound 
vocalizations as action outcomes and measuring intentional binding via Libet 
clock method (Libet, 1980). Our replication attempt failed to detect a significant 
effect of emotion on temporal binding. Subsequently, these studies suggest that 
the emotional valence of action outcomes exerts little influence on temporal 
binding. The potential implications of these findings are discussed. 
Chapter 3: Experiment 5 
 
In Experiment 5, we investigated immanent justice reasoning using 
temporal binding within a 2x2 factor design. As with Experiments 1 and 2, 
Experiment 5 used an interval estimation procedure to gauge temporal binding, 
where participants were asked to judge the time interval between a keypress and 
a previously-shown possible outcome. Participants witnessed two possible 
outcomes happening to an individual, either fortuitously good or bad, in the form 
of images to a coming scenario. Participants then read the scenario, which 
depicted the individual as either a good or bad person. After reading, participants 
then pressed a button that produced one of the two previously presented 
outcomes after an interval of either 100, 400, or 700ms. Participants then 
estimated this temporal interval between scenario and outcome. We expected 
temporal binding scores, as an implicit measure of causal beliefs, to reflect moral 
congruency of behaviour and outcomes, with morally congruent behaviour and 
outcomes inducing smaller temporal estimates.  However, temporal interval 
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estimations did not vary, regardless of whether the action-outcome pairing was 
morally congruent (e.g., bad person/bad outcome) or incongruent.  
Chapter 4: Experiment 6-7 
 
Due to the findings of my previous experiments, Experiments 6 and 7 were 
conducted to assess whether temporal binding is brought about through 
knowledge or belief of a causal relationship (Buehner, 2012; Desantis et al., 2012). 
Chapter 4 attempts to extend two previous studies (Experiment 6: Buehner, 2012; 
Experiment 7: Desantis, Roussel and Waszak, 2011) to further clarify whether 
knowledge of or belief in a causal mechanism modulates temporal binding. 
Experiment 6 compared temporal binding of visual outcome (as measured via 
stimulus anticipation) in a self-caused condition and a time condition, where 
outcomes appeared within a 2 – 5s range depicted by a visual timer. We found no 
significant difference in anticipation at 500ms, but greater anticipation at 900ms 
for the timer condition. Experiment 7, also using stimulus anticipation, found no 
difference between self-caused outcomes and outcomes said to be caused by an 
online confederate. These studies question the importance of explicit knowledge 
of causal in driving temporal binding, as measured by stimulus anticipation. The 
potential implications of these findings are discussed. 
 
 
Chapter 5: Experiments 8—10 
 Chapter 5 contains 3 experiments that explored the idea that immanent 
justice reasoning influences spatial proximity. Specifically, participants positioned 
representations of people’s fortuitous bad (vs. good) outcomes within an ordered 
77 
 
list format (Experiment 8) and when they were free to move the outcome 
anywhere on the screen (Experiment 9) relative to a representation of a bad (vs. 
good) person. In Experiment 10, the positive or negative outcomes were being 
“chased” across the screen by the bad persons, and the participant was tasked with 
actively maintaining the distance between the representations. Our findings were 
consistent with our expectations that morally congruent events would feel more 
causally related, and that this would reflect in spatial proximity placements. 
Specifically, participants positioned bad (good) people significantly closer in 
space to representations of their previous immoral (moral) actions when the 
outcomes occurred to the same person (Frank punched someone - Frank was in a 
car accident) more strongly than when the outcomes occurred to a different 
person (Frank punched someone - Joe was in a car accident).  
Present Studies - Overview 
The University of Essex Ethics Committee for Human Research approved 
all experiments. Participants within Experiments 1-3 and 5-7 were recruited via 
the Prolific Academic subject pool and screened for the following exclusion 
criteria: native language other than English, left handedness, recent use of illicit 
drugs, uncorrected visual or auditory impairment and history of psychiatric or 
neurological illness. Additionally, the following were employed as inclusion 
criteria: a participation approval rating of below 90% (based on prior study 
performance-approval scores) and aged between 18-65. Experiment 4 was 
conducted within laboratory conditions at the University of Essex, and 
Experiments 8—10 recruited participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. For all 
experiments except Experiment 4, minimum required sample sizes across 
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experiments were fixed ahead of data collection, but the final sample sizes were 
not completely predetermined due to the unpredictable nature of online 
recruitment (e.g., because of slight over-recruitment and removing participants 
due to duplicate IP addresses). Power calculations for mixed-effects regressions 
can be difficult so we based our sample sizes on achieving at least 80% power to 
detect small-to-medium effects (dz = 0.35) in simpler, within-subjects t-tests. A 
consent form protocol was presented at the beginning of each study instructing 
that by continuing to the experiment, the participant confirms that they have 
understood the information provided and consent to participating in the 
experiment. Each experiment was presented via Inquisit v4.01 (Draine, 1998; 
Millisecond Software). 
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Abstract 
Temporal binding refers to the compression of the perceived time interval 
between voluntary actions and their sensory consequences. Research suggests 
that the emotional content of an action outcome can modulate the effects of 
temporal binding. We attempted to conceptually replicate these findings using a 
time interval estimation task and different emotionally-valenced action outcomes 
(Experiments 1 and 2) than used in previous research. Contrary to previous 
findings, we found no evidence that temporal binding was affected by the 
emotional valence of action outcomes. After validating our stimuli for equivalence 
of perceived emotional valence and arousal (Experiment 3), in Experiment 4 we 
directly replicated Yoshie and Haggard’s (2013) original experiment using sound 
vocalizations as action outcomes and failed to detect a significant effect of emotion 
on temporal binding. These studies suggest that the emotional valence of action 
outcomes exerts little influence on temporal binding. The potential implications 
of these findings are discussed. 
 
Keywords:  
Temporal binding, emotional valence, facial expressions conveying emotion, 
voluntary action, self-serving bias, time interval estimation, replication study. 
  
84 
 
How Much Does Emotional Valence of Action Outcomes Affect Temporal 
Binding? 
 
Temporal binding refers to the compression of the perceived time interval 
between voluntary actions and their sensory consequences (Haggard, Clark & 
Kalogeras, 2002). More specifically, an outcome (e.g., a tone) is experienced earlier 
when it is triggered by a voluntary action compared to when it occurs in isolation 
or is triggered by an involuntary movement. Similarly, actions that trigger an 
event are experienced later than actions with no discernible outcome (see Moore 
& Obhi, 2012, for a review). For example, Haggard et al. (2002) examined 
judgements of the onset time of both a voluntary action and a resulting tone using 
the Libet clock method (Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983), where one 
estimates the time of onset of an action or outcome via the position of a rotating 
clock-hand around a clock-face. These judgements were compared to those made 
when only the action was performed (i.e., with no outcome) and when a sound 
was heard in isolation (i.e., without a prior cause). Haggard et al. found that the 
perceived time of an action was later when the action produced a tone compared 
to when there was no outcome. Moreover, the perceived time of a sound was 
earlier when the sound had been produced by an action compared to when it was 
heard in isolation. In other words, temporal binding means that the time interval 
between an action and its outcome becomes perceptually compressed when we 
think there is a causal relationship between action and outcome. Temporal 
binding has also been observed with methods other than the Libet task, such as 
verbal or numerical estimates of the interval between action and outcome 
(Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Humphreys & Buehner, 2010). Temporal binding 
85 
 
has been shown to occur for both self- and other-generated actions (Moore, Teufel, 
Subramaniam, Davis & Fletcher, 2013; Poonian & Cunnington, 2013) and may be 
a general phenomenon linking causally related events (Buehner, 2012). 
To date, researchers have mostly investigated the conditions required for 
temporal binding and the mechanisms that underpin it (Hughes, Desantis & 
Waszak, 2013), and they have done so using experimental tasks that often involve 
basic actions, such as a button press, producing sensory feedback, such as an 
auditory tone (David, Newan & Vogeley, 2008; Sato & Yasuda, 2005). These 
temporal binding tasks arguably lack any real-world complexity with which 
humans perform goal-directed actions to produce meaningful outcomes in 
everyday life (Moretto, Walsh & Haggard, 2011). Researchers have started to 
examine the generalizability of temporal binding effects to stimuli beyond simple 
and arbitrary outcomes, such as priming social cues (Aarts, Bijleveld, Custers, 
Dogge, Deelder et al., 2012), authorship of action cues (Desantis, Weiss, Schütz-
Bosbach & Waszak, 2012), leader-follower cues (Pfister, Obhi, Rieger & Wenke, 
2015) and economic and pain cues (Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans & Haggard, 
2016). For example, Aarts et al. (2012) found that, when primed with a positive 
picture (taken from the International Affective Picture System; Lang, Margaret & 
Bruce, 1999) that indicated a reward, temporal binding during the Libet clock task 
increased compared to neutral primes. Takahata et al. (2012) trained participants 
to associate two tones with either financial gain or loss. Using the Libet task, they 
found that the temporal interval between judgements of onsets for actions and 
outcomes of financial loss was significantly larger than for judgements of financial 
gain. In other words, negative outcomes reduced the effect of temporal binding. 
This points towards the possibility that temporal binding might be driven by self-
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serving biases, where one is more inclined to associate positive events with the 
self compared to negative events (Mezulis et al., 2004; Miller & Ross, 1975).  
Yoshie and Haggard (2013) directly tested this idea by investigating 
whether temporal binding differed between outcomes that varied in terms of their 
intrinsic emotionality. They asked participants to make voluntary actions (a key-
press) that produced auditory sounds that were either of positive or negative 
emotional vocalisations (e.g., laughter or disgust). Participants made temporal 
estimations of their actions and the ensuing sound via the Libet clock method. 
They found that positive sounds produced shorter estimations of onset-time 
between the action and sound compared to negative sounds (Experiment 1), with 
this effect being mostly driven by decreased binding to negative outcomes 
(Experiment 2).  
Yoshie and Haggard’s (2013) research provided promising evidence that 
negative emotional outcomes reduce temporal binding, which occurs presumably 
because people are less inclined to attribute negative outcomes to themselves. 
However, despite the potential importance of Yoshie and Haggard’s (2013) 
findings, they have yet to be replicated using other temporal binding tasks and 
different emotionally-valenced action outcomes. Thus, answering Christensen, 
Yoshie, Di Costa and Haggard’s (2016) call for more research exploring the 
emotional modulation of temporal binding using alternative methods, the goal of 
the current research was to conceptually replicate Yoshie and Haggard’s (2013) 
temporal binding effects using an interval estimation procedure (vs. the Libet 
task; Moore et al., 2012) and images of faces conveying positive and negative 
emotions (vs. emotional vocalizations; experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, we 
conducted a separate study to validate the perceived valence of the face stimuli 
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we used in Experiments 1 and 2 (Experiment 3), and we conducted a highly-
powered direct replication of Yoshie and Haggard’s first experiment (Experiment 
4). On the basis of Yoshie and Haggard’s findings, we expected that temporal 
binding would be smaller for negative outcomes (faces or vocalizations conveying 
negative emotions) than for positive outcomes (faces or vocalizations conveying 
positive emotions). 
Experiment 1 
We used an interval estimation procedure to gauge temporal binding 
(Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Engbert, Wohlschläger & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Wegner 
& Haggard, 2009). In this procedure, participants are asked to judge the time 
interval between an action and its sensory outcome (e.g., a button press and a 
sound). Using this procedure, Engbert et al. (2008) found that the interval 
between voluntary actions and visual, auditory, and somatic outcomes were 
compressed compared to the interval between passive actions and similar 
outcomes. For our task, participants were asked to press the space bar, which was 
followed by emotionally valenced action-outcomes—namely, emoticons depicting 
positive, neutral, or negative emotions (see Figure 1). Emoticons are prevalent 
throughout modern technological communication, and frequently used to convey 
emotion (Derks, Bos & von Grumbkow, 2011; Hudson, Nicolas, Howser, Lipsett & 
Robinson et al., 2015). Research has shown that emoticons elicit similar cortical 
responses to real faces (Churches, Nicholls, Thiessen, Kohler & Keage, 2014) and 
that emotions conveyed in emoticons are subject to similar behavioural biases 
(Öhman, Lundqvist, D., & Esteves, 2001) and neural processing disruptions (Jolij 
& Lamme, 2005) as real faces. 
88 
 
Method 
Participants. We recruited 80 native English-speaking participants (51 
males, Mage = 33.91, SDage = 11.27) through prolific.ac, an online crowdsourcing 
platform. Participants received monetary compensation. We screened 
participants for the following inclusion criteria: an approval rating of above 90% 
on prolific.ac (based on prior experiment performance/approval scores) and 
aged between 18-65. The required sample size was fixed ahead of data 
collection, and a power analysis showed we had 90% power to detect a small 
effect (Cohen’s f = .10) of emotional valence on temporal binding (α = .05). 
Materials and procedures. Experiment 1 consisted of 100 trials: 10 
practice and 90 experimental trials. We used an interval estimation procedure to 
measure temporal binding (see Moore & Obhi, 2012). For each trial, participants 
saw a fixation cross on-screen, and in their own time, pressed the spacebar. In 
the practice block participant actions produced a neutral stimulus, which was a 
green circle with a diameter equal to the emoticon images. During practice trials, 
the green circle appeared after a randomly selected time interval from either 
0ms or a multiple of 100ms up to 900ms. We used all intervals in the practice 
block, to encourage participants to expect the full range of durations in the 
experimental block. During the practice block, feedback was provided to 
participants after they made their time estimations. Feedback consisted of both 
the participant’s estimated time and the actual time of stimulus onset to enhance 
familiarity with estimating time in milliseconds.  
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In the experimental condition, an emoticon appeared after either 100, 400 
or 700ms (Moore et al., 2009), which remained on-screen for a further 400ms. We 
varied the delay intervals to increase participants’ uncertainty regarding the 
interval between action and outcome to allow for variation in judgement times (cf. 
Ebert & Wegner, 2010). The emotional expressions of the emoticons were 
manipulated by orienting the lines representing the mouth: curved upwards for 
positive, curved downwards for negative, and a straight line for neutral. The 
emoticons were genderless, varied only in the shape of the mouth, and were 
presented on a white background in the center of the screen (see Figure 1).  
Chapter 2, Figure 1. Emoticons used in Experiment 1. 
 
Participants underwent two blocks of 45 trials, allowing for 30 
presentations of each emoticon image in total. Participants were instructed that 
they would not receive feedback for their time estimations during the 
experimental trials. A schematic display of the sequence of trial events is shown 
in Figure 2. 
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Chapter 2, Figure. 2. Schematic display of the sequence of trial events for 
Experiment 1. 
 
Both the time intervals and emoticons (either positive, negative or neutral) 
were pseudo-randomized across trials, such that there was the same number of 
trials in each condition at each time interval. A blank screen then followed the 
emoticon for 400ms, replaced by a horizontal time estimation scale in the center 
of the screen (see Figure 3). The scale ranged from 0-1000ms, with demarcation 
lines every 100ms. Participants were instructed to scroll the slider along the bar 
to the time that they believed it took the image to appear since their action (in 
multiples of 100ms). Once selected, participants confirmed their selections by 
clicking on a ‘finish’ button and proceeded to the next trial. 
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Chapter 2, Figure. 3. Time estimation scale 
 
Results                                                   
Participants’ mean time estimations for each of the three onset times (100, 
400 and 700ms) and the three emoticons (positive, neutral and negative) were 
subjected to a 3 (emotional valence: positive, neutral, and negative) X 3 (temporal 
delay: 100, 400 and 700ms) fully within-subjects ANOVA (see Figure 4). Analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of Temporal Delay, F(2, 158) = 56.54, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .77, showing that even under less controlled experimental contexts (i.e., 
within an online testing platform), participants perceived distinct time intervals 
corresponding to their actual length (see Dewey & Knoblich, 2014, for comparable 
findings within a laboratory context). There was virtually no effect of emotional 
valence on time estimations, F(2, 158) = 0.22, p =.80, ηp2 = .003, nor was there an 
interaction between temporal delay and emotion, F(4, 316) = 1.47, p = .21, ηp2 = 
.018.  
Discussion 
 In Experiment 1, the emotional valence of action outcomes did not affect 
temporal binding. One potential limitation of Experiment 1 is that although 
previous research has shown that emoticons can have the same affective 
consequences as real faces do (Yuasa, Saito & Mukawa, 2006), the emoticons we 
used might not have elicited enough of an emotional response to modulate 
temporal binding. Thus, rather than using emoticons for action outcomes, In 
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Experiment 2 we replicated our Experiment 1 procedure using images of real 
human faces expressing either negative or positive emotions.  
 
Chapter 2, Figure 3. Mean time estimations of interval delay by emotional 
expression (Experiment 1). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals of the 
means. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we used real-face images as the outcomes to participants’ 
actions. Real face images have been well-documented to elicit electrocortical 
responses, and emotional expressions are typically rated along the dimensions of 
valence and arousal: Smith, Weinberg, Moran and Hajcak (2013), using the 
NimStim collection of face-images (NimStim, Tottenham, Tanaka, Leon, McCarry 
& Nurse et al., 2009), found that emotional expressions (e.g., happy, fearful, sad), 
elicited greater cortical responses than neutral face images. Generally, both 
negative and positive emotions invoke stronger emotional responses than faces 
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with neutral expressions (Ito, Cacioppo & Lang, 1998), however the current 
literature suggests negative emotions elicit stronger cortical responses than 
positive emotions (Leppänen, Kauppinen, Peltola & Hietanen, 2007; Smith, 
Cacioppo, Larsen & Chartrand, 2003).  
Method 
Participants. We recruited 89 participants (55 males: Mage = 33.73, SDage = 
10.74) for Experiment 2. An additional participant was excluded due to a technical 
problem. Participants received monetary compensation. A power analysis showed 
that we had 95% power to detect a small effect (Cohen’s f = .10) of emotional 
valence on temporal binding (α = .05). 
Materials and procedures. Experiment 2 consisted of 110 trials: 30 
practice trials, and 80 experimental trials (see Figure 5). To prepare participants 
for the experimental procedure, we asked participants to initially perform a 
practice task consisting of 10 trials where participant actions produced a neutral 
stimulus (the green circle). Similar to Experiment 1, during practice trials the time 
interval for the stimuli to appear was randomly selected from either 0ms, or a 
multiple of 100ms, up to 900ms. Participants were provided with feedback per 
Experiment 1. 
Outcome stimuli consisted of 80 face images of young adults either 
portraying positive or negative expressions, taken from a widely used and 
validated set of face stimuli (NimStim, Tottenham et al., 2009). The facial images 
were balanced for gender, such that 10 males and 10 females were randomly 
chosen from the set (see Figure 5). Four facial images per male/female were 
chosen: two depicting positive facial emotions, and two depicting negative facial 
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emotions (80 images in total, 4 x 20). The positive facial emotions included 40 
images of a happy expression comprised the positive facial emotions, and 36 
images of disgust and 4 images of fear expressions for the negative. Images were 
presented on a white background in the center of the screen. For the initial 
practice trials, we used the same neutral stimulus (green circle) as Experiment 1. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2, Figure. 5. Example stimuli used in Experiment 2. 
 
Participants underwent two experimental task blocks of 40 trials each, 
with a break between blocks. Each block was dedicated to either solely positive 
expressions or negative expressions, and the order of task blocks was 
counterbalanced between participants. Therefore, action-effects were predictable 
within their own blocks. Furthermore, participants were instructed that they 
would not receive feedback for their time estimations. The time interval for face 
images to appear was randomised at 100ms, 400ms, or 700ms (Moore et al., 
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2009), with the same number of trials in each condition at each time interval. A 
practice block of 10 trials that contained stimuli of the related task block preceded 
each experimental block. Upon block completion, participants were instructed 
that they would be asked to complete another practice task where they will see a 
different set of images, receiving feedback with their time estimations. 
To incentivize participant to attend to the face stimuli, we also 
implemented catch-trials by informing participants that they would also be 
occasionally asked a question about the image they had just seen (specifically, 
“Was the previous face male or female?”). If they were correct, then they would be 
awarded an extra 10 pence per correct question. There were six catch trials in 
total - three trials per experimental condition. Seventy-six participants (84%) 
scored correctly on all catch trials, 8 participants (9%) scored correctly on 5 catch 
trials, and the remaining 6 participants scored correctly on 4 catch trials. 
Results 
We averaged time estimations for each of the three onset times (100, 400 
and 700ms) and for each of the two levels for face-expressions (happy and 
disgust). We conducted a 2 (emotional valence: positive and negative) X 3 
(temporal delay: 100, 400 and 700ms) fully within-subjects ANOVA. Analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of temporal delay, F(2, 176) = 225.75, p < . 001, 
ηp2 = .72 (see Figure 6). Consistent with Experiment 1, there was virtually no effect 
of emotional valance on time estimation, F(1, 88) = 0.092, p = .76, ηp2 = .001. There 
was also no significant interaction between temporal delay and emotion, F(2, 176) 
= .63, p = .53, ηp2 = .007.  
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Chapter 2, Figure. 6. Mean time estimations of interval delay by emotional 
expression (Experiment 2). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals of the 
means. 
 
Discussion 
Similar to Experiment 1, the findings from our second experiment 
indicated no modulation of negative versus positive emotions on temporal 
binding. This is despite the use of real facial images depicting emotional 
expressions (as opposed to emoticons), and the predictability of which emotion-
expression (either positive or negative) would result from the participant’s action. 
For both Experiments 1 and 2, we failed to find any meaningful effect of 
emotion on temporal binding, which seems inconsistent with earlier findings. One 
potential issue with our first two experiments, however, is that the stimuli we 
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used for the positive and negative action outcomes (emoticons and real faces) 
might be perceived as less positively and/or negatively valenced than the sound 
vocalisations that Yoshie and Haggard (2013) used and therefore produce weaker 
temporal binding effects. To validate our stimuli, in Experiment 3 participants 
rated the emotional valence and arousal of the emoticons and faces we used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 and the positive and negative sound vocalisations that Yoshie 
and Haggard used. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. Forty-nine participants were recruited via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (25 males, Mage = 34.80, SDage = 11.56). To ensure data 
independence, one additional participant was not included in the analyses 
because they had a duplicate IP address. 
Materials and procedures. Participants were informed that they would 
rate several images of faces and sound vocalizations in terms of how negative-to-
positive and emotional arousing they appeared or sounded, respectively. 
Participants first performed a sound check that asked them to identify three 
different sounds (e.g., a cow mooing) from three choices (e.g., a pig’s oink, a cow’s 
moo, or a chicken’s cluck) in order to ensure participants both could hear the 
sounds properly and were paying attention. All respondents saw the emoticons 
used in Experiment 1, all 80-face expressions used in Experiment 2, and heard 24 
sounds (three repetitions of the 8 different sounds). The sounds were the same as 
those used by Yoshie and Haggard (2013), which were a selection of 8 different 
non-verbal emotional vocalizations: four negative vocalizations (screams 
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expressing fear or retches expressing disgust, each with both male and female 
voices) and four positive vocalizations (cheers expressing achievement or laughs 
expressing amusement, each with both male and female voices). The block order 
of which type of stimulus the participants rated was randomly determined, and 
the stimuli presented within those blocks was randomised. Using the same rating 
scales as Yoshie and Haggard, after seeing/hearing the stimulus, participants 
judged the extent to which each stimulus looked (for the images) or sounded (for 
the vocalisations) negative-to-positive, on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (highly 
negative) to 7 (highly positive). Participants also rated the extent to which they 
believed each stimulus sounded or looked emotionally arousing (1 = not arousing 
at all to 7 = highly arousing).  
Results 
Ratings of valence and emotional arousal were averaged across the different 
positive and negative faces and sounds. Because we were primarily interested in 
determining whether the different stimuli were perceived to be of equivalent 
valence, we conducted a one-way ANOVA with stimulus type on three levels 
(emoticons, faces, and vocalisations) separately for positive and negative stimuli. 
Shown in Table 1, there was a significant main effect of stimulus type in terms of 
perceived valence for both positive stimuli, F(2,96) = 15.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .24, and 
negative stimuli F(2,96) = 22.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .32. Paired sample t-tests revealed 
that the happy emoticon was rated as significantly more positive than the positive 
vocalizations, t(48) = 3.52, p = .001; there was no significant mean difference 
between the positive faces and positive vocalisations in terms of perceived 
valence, t(48) = 1.95, p = .057. For the negative stimuli, the negative vocalizations 
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were rated as more positive (less negative) than both the sad emoticon, t(48) = 
5.76, p < .001, and the negative faces, t(48) = 2.70, p = .01. Thus, the emoticon and 
face stimuli we used in Experiments 1 and 2 were perceived as either the same or 
more emotionally-valenced than the sound vocalisations used by Yoshie and 
Haggard (2013).  
 
Chapter 2, Table 1. Mean (SD) ratings of the perceived emotional valence and 
arousal across the emoticons, face images and emotion vocalizations. 
 
Stimulus type 
 
Emoticons 
 
Faces 
 
 
Vocalisations 
Negative stimuli    
Valence 1.45 (.58) 1.85 (.49) 2.18 (.64) 
Arousal 2.41 (1.67) 2.71 (1.47) 2.81 (1.55) 
Positive stimuli    
Valence 6.08 (.70) 5.46 (.52) 5.68 (.77) 
Arousal 4.43 (1.83) 4.15 (1.32) 4.28 (1.45) 
Note. Means that do not share subscripts across rows are significantly different 
(p < .05). 
 
We also conducted a one-way ANOVA with stimulus type on three levels 
(emoticons, faces, and vocalisations) separately for positive and negative stimuli 
for perceived emotional arousal. There were no significant differences among the 
types of positive stimuli for the ratings of emotional arousal, F(2, 96) = 1.44, p = 
.24, ηp2 = .03. For the negative stimuli, F(2, 96) = 3.70, p = .028, ηp2 = .07, the 
negative vocalizations were rated as more arousing than the sad emoticon, t(48) 
= 2.31, p = .025, but were no more arousing than the negative faces, t(48) = .79, p 
= .43.  
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Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 3 indicate that the visual stimuli used within 
Experiments 1 and 2 and the audio stimuli of Yoshie and Haggard (2013) were by 
and large rated similarly across dimensions of perceived valence and emotional 
arousal. More specifically, the positive emoticon was rated as more positive and 
more emotionally arousing than those of real faces and emotionally valenced 
vocalisations. Similarly, the negative emoticons and the negative faces were rated 
as more negative than the vocalisations. As such, the failure to find the predicted 
modulation of temporal binding by emotion in Experiments 1 and 2 does not seem 
to be driven by differences in the emotional appraisal of the stimuli.  
Experiment 4 
Because we did not find an effect of emotion on temporal binding in Experiments 
1 and 2, we conducted a direct replication of Yoshie and Haggard (2013) to 
investigate the replicability of their findings. 
Method 
Participants. We recruited 24 participants to achieve 95% power to detect 
Yoshie and Haggard's reported effect size for their Experiment 1 (dz = .77): 12 
males and 12 females (aged 18-23: M age = 21), one for each of the 8 (2 x 2 x 2) 
possible orders of conditions. Participants were paid for their time. Following 
Yoshie and Haggard (2013), we screened for the following exclusion criteria: 
native language other than English, left handedness, recent use of illicit drugs, 
uncorrected visual or auditory impairment, and history of psychiatric or 
neurological illness. 
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Materials and procedures. Experiment 4 used the exact same auditory 
stimuli as Yoshie and Haggard (2013). The stimuli were a selection of non-verbal 
emotional vocalizations, previously validated in the native English population to 
significantly differ in perceived valence, but not in perceived arousal (Sauter, 
Eisner, Calder, & Scott, 2010). In the negative condition, each participant’s 
keypress was followed by one of four negative vocalizations (screams expressing 
fear or retches expressing disgust). In the positive condition, these were replaced 
by positive vocalizations (cheers expressing achievement or laughs expressing 
amusement). The auditory stimuli in each condition were carefully matched for 
pitch (peak frequency) and duration.  
This experiment faithfully replicated the same procedure used by Yoshie 
and Haggard (2013). We presented the experiment via Macintosh computers (OS 
X 10.9.5), and used a customised program running in Inquisit v4.01 (Draine, 1998; 
Millisecond Software) to present participants with the temporal binding task on a 
27-inch flat screen. We used the Libet clock task to measure the perceived timing 
of actions and sounds. During the experiment, participants viewed a Libet clock. 
In agency conditions, the participant was instructed to press a key on a computer 
keyboard with the right index finger at a time of his/her choosing, which caused a 
sound to appear 250ms later. The participant was then prompted to report where 
the clock hand was at the onset of their key-press or (agency action condition), in 
a separate block, at the onset of the sound (agency sound condition). In the single-
event baseline action condition, the participant pressed a key at a time of his/her 
choosing. This keypress did not cause a sound, and the participant was asked to 
judge the time of his/her keypress. In the single-event baseline sound condition, 
the participant heard sounds at random intervals, which mimicked time intervals 
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of participant key-presses, and judged the times of sound onsets. To make sure 
that participants understood the task, we asked participants to perform 5 practice 
trials before each condition. 
Participants underwent four task blocks of 32 trials each (baseline action, 
baseline sound, agency action, and agency sound) for both the negative and 
positive conditions, or 256 (32 trials x 8 blocks) trials in total. In each block four 
different sounds of an emotional condition were presented in a randomized order 
(4 sounds x 8 repetitions). Since each block contained only positive or negative 
sounds, the four different vocalisations consisted of either the disgust and fear 
sounds, or the achievement and amusement sounds (each in both male and female 
voices). Each block was further divided into two sub-blocks of 16 trials each, with 
the stimuli randomised across the two sub-blocks, such that each sub-block could 
contain an uneven distribution of sounds. To ensure attention to the auditory 
stimuli, at the end of every sub-block we asked participants which of the four 
sounds they heard most frequently during that sub-block. Participants gained a 
reward of 25 pence for each correct answer to this question. The whole 
experiment was divided into two sessions of four blocks each. Each session was 
devoted to action judgments (baseline action and agency action) or sound 
judgments (baseline sound and agency sound) only. Half of participants (n = 8) 
judged the times of action in the first session and of sound in the second session, 
while in the other half (n = 8) the order was reversed. A 10-min break was inserted 
between the two sessions. To maximize the effects of emotional valence, within 
each session the baseline and agency blocks of one emotional condition (e.g., 
negative) were presented successively, and after a 5-min break the blocks of 
another emotional condition (e.g., positive). Both the order of emotional 
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conditions (negative first or positive first) and the order of task types (baseline 
first or agency first) were consistent across the two sessions for each participant, 
and counterbalanced between participants (see Yoshie & Haggard, 2013).  
Results 
We used Yoshie and Haggard’s (2013) protocol for extracting binding 
scores. Judgement errors were calculated individually for each block by 
subtracting the actual onset of the event with the perceived onset. Positive values 
reflect a delayed judgement, and negative outcomes reflect an anticipatory (early) 
judgement. Action binding (shift) was calculated by subtracting the mean 
judgement error of the action in the baseline condition from the mean judgement 
error in the agency condition. Similarly, sound binding (shift) was calculated by 
subtracting the mean judgement error of the sound in the baseline condition from 
the mean judgement of the sound in the agency condition. Composite binding was 
calculated by subtracting the mean shift in sound judgements from the mean shift 
in action judgements. Per Yoshie and Haggard (2013), paired t-tests (negative vs. 
positive) were used to assess the effects of emotional valence on temporal binding. 
We performed a Grubbs test for outliers (Grubbs, 1950), and no participant met 
the criteria for exclusion (all ps > .05). Additionally, we compared scores between 
positive and negative vocalisations on an attention task asking participants to 
state the most frequent sound within the preceding sub-block. A paired-samples 
t-test revealed no difference in participants’ attention to sounds between negative 
(M = 3.83, SD = 1.34) and positive (M = 3.63, SD = 1.21) vocalisations, t(23) = .96, 
p = .35; dz = .20. 
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Chapter 2, Table 2. Mean (SD) judgement errors and shifts relative to baseline 
conditions between different emotion conditions. 
 
 
Action judgements  Sound judgements 
 Baseline  
(ms) 
Agency 
(ms) 
Shift 
(ms) 
Baseline  
(ms) 
Agency 
(ms) 
Shift 
(ms) 
Negative -69.28 
(110.56) 
25.76 
(114.54) 
95.04 -206.02  
(71.63) 
-345.67 
(154.51) 
-139.66 
Positive -89.54 
(129.84) 
33.70 
(141.43) 
123.24 -190.55  
(101.79) 
-347.69 
(158.95) 
-157.14 
  
Table 2 shows the mean judgment errors and shifts relative to baseline 
conditions for different emotional conditions. The presence of action binding was 
confirmed by a shift in judgement errors that was significantly different from zero 
for action judgements in both the negative, t(23) = 2.94, p = .007, dz = .60, and 
positive conditions, t(23) = 3.78, p = .001, dz = .77. Similarly, sound binding was 
also significant for both negative, t(23) = 5.47, p < .001, dz = 1.12, and positive 
vocalisations, t(23) = 5.27, p < .001, dz = 1.08. Composite binding did not differ 
significantly between the negative (M = -234.68, SD = 174.71) and positive 
conditions (M = -280.38, SD = 134.20), t(23) = 1.20, p = .24, dz = .24. Similarly, 
paired t-tests revealed no significant difference in sound binding, t(23) = .64, p = 
.53; dz = .13, or action binding, t(23) = 1.16, p = .26, dz = .24, between the positive 
and negative conditions. 
Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 4 suggest that temporal binding, as measured 
using the Libet clock method, was not significantly modulated by positive versus 
negative sound vocalisations as action outcomes. These results taken together 
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with those of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the emotional valence of action 
outcomes exerts little influence on temporal binding. 
General Discussion 
The objective of this series of experiments was to investigate the degree to 
which temporal binding is modulated by emotional valence. Experiments 1 and 2 
found no significant difference in temporal binding between positive and negative 
emoticons (Experiment 1) or positive and negative real facial expressions 
(Experiment 2). Experiment 3 revealed that the stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 
2 were equivalent in valence and arousal to stimuli that have previously been 
observed to modulate temporal binding (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). Furthermore, 
in a highly powered replication study (Experiment 4), we observed no significant 
modulation of temporal binding by emotionally valenced vocalisations (Yoshie & 
Haggard, 2013). Taken together, these finding cast doubt on whether temporal 
binding is influenced by outcome valence.  
Despite showing no significant modulation by valence, temporal binding 
itself was clearly present in Study 4. Indeed, the binding scores were overall 
somewhat larger than Yoshie and Haggard’s (2013). This suggests that the 
absence of a valence effect in our study was not due to reduced sensitivity to detect 
emotional modulation. Although not significant, the effect of valence on binding 
was in the predicted direction in the current study. However, it is worth noting 
that this was largely driven by greater action binding to positive tones, whereas 
Yoshie and Haggard’s (2013) effect was more strongly localised on outcome 
binding. More recently Christensen et al. (2016) investigated the effect of outcome 
valence on prospective and retrospective components of action binding (see 
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Moore & Obhi, 2012) with the same vocalisations used here and in Yoshie and 
Haggard (2013). They observed significantly increased retrospective action 
binding only when the valence of the outcome was unpredictable. However, for 
predictable outcomes (as used in the current study) there was reduced action 
binding for both positive and negative outcomes compared to neutral outcomes. 
Taken together with the current findings, a complex picture emerges whereby the 
precise effect of emotion on temporal binding cannot be clearly attributed to a 
simple self-serving bias such that positive outcomes increase binding. This may 
reflect a genuine complexity in the precise mechanisms driving the emotional 
modulation of binding, or it might reflect the fact that the underlying effect is small 
or unreliable. The absence of an effect of valence in Experiments 1 and 2 suggest 
that any effect, if present in the population, does not generalize to other measures 
of binding. Future work should attempt to replicate and extend other examples of 
self-serving bias in temporal binding (Aarts et al., 2012; Takahata et al., 2012) and 
sensory attenuation (Gentsch, Weiss, Spengler, Synofzik & Schütz-Bosbach, 2015; 
Hughes, 2015) to further advance our understanding of how (or if) outcome 
valence influences implicit agency.  
Assessing the degree to which binding is modulated by factors that also 
modulate explicit agency reports is important to determine the relationship 
between implicit and explicit agency. Recent evidence suggests that neither 
sensory attenuation (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014) nor temporal binding (Dewey & 
Knoblich, 2014; Saito, Takahata, Murai & Takahashi, 2015) correlate with explicit 
reports of agency. While explicit and implicit measures will never show total 
convergence, positive evidence of covariation is important to argue that conscious 
reports and unconscious biases are indeed measuring the same underlying 
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process. The current studies provide new evidence that questions the degree to 
which temporal binding is modulated by self-serving biases. 
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Chapter 3: The Use of Temporal Binding 
as an Implicit Measure of Causality in 
Immanent Justice Reasoning 
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Preface 
 
 The experiments contained within Chapter 2 were conducted in order to 
obtain a baseline effect that temporal binding, and by extension sense of agency, 
could be modulated by social factors. We strongly expected, based on prior 
findings (e.g., Yoshie & Haggard, 2013), that we would find increased temporal 
binding for positive outcomes relative to negative outcomes. However, no 
modulatory effects were found. Despite this finding, we decided to persevere with 
the original aims of this research for three reasons: 1) the relationship between 
emotional valence of outcome and causality between events was not specifically 
tested, and thus there remained scope to explore how personal bias might 
influence proposed implicit measures of causality (e.g. temporal binding); 2) 
compared to emotional valence, the immanent justice reasoning literature 
contains a wealth of research demonstrating how explicit causal attributions can 
be modulated by the presence of morally congruent events occurring to the same 
person (i.e., bad people causing bad things to happen to them; Callan et al., 2006; 
Callan et al., 2012). Thus, with a genuine implicit measure of causality, we might 
expect similar modulatory effects; 3) where Chapter 2 concerned physical 
causality between the participant’s button press and a visual outcome occurring, 
we wanted to explore whether temporal binding reflects biased judgments about 
the timing or spatial position of abstract representations of socially relevant acts. 
In this line of research, we expand upon notions that temporal binding is a 
measure of general causality (Buehner, 2012). 
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The Use of Temporal Binding as an Implicit Measure of Causality in 
Immanent Justice Reasoning 
 
Understanding causal relations within our environment is a fundamental skill 
for the human species that enables, for example, social interaction (Bodner, 
Engelhardt, Minshew & Williams, 2015; Moskowitz, 2005), learning (Gopnik, 
Sobel, Schulz & Glymour, 2001), reasoning (Goswami & Brown, 1990) and self-
awareness (Duval, Silvia & Lalwani, 2012; Duval & Wicklund, 1973). 
Understanding causal relations, put simply, is the process of identifying causality 
between events; the reason as to why a certain event or events has occurred.  Such 
an understanding elicits the ability to alter the course of events to ensure 
unwanted outcomes are avoided; knowing a lack of oil in the family car would 
cause the engine to seize, we actively maintain the oil gauge to a healthy level.  
Data collection and analysis allows humans, already capable computing 
complex causal matrices of probabilistic causes that contribute to events or 
outcomes (Cheng, 1997), further enhances our knowledge of causal relations.  For 
example, medical research has shown smoking accounts for an estimated 72% of 
lung cancer cases (Cancer Research UK, Lung Cancer Risk, 2018).  
However, when such data is missing, we are left with events of ambiguous 
origin. This can lead us to explain events from our learned experiences, and such 
a causal reasoning process is subject to biases in favour of less-informed, if not 
whimsical, explanations of events (Callan, Sutton, Harvey, & and Dawtry, 2014). 
As humans are infamously susceptible to biases and ideologies, particularly in 
conjunction with illiteracy of scientific or logical principles, we may infer or adopt 
erroneous causal beliefs to explain phenomena, even at the expense of physical 
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plausibility. Despite the lack of logical/physical connection between two events, 
the notion that one’s moral behaviour not only influences, but is a direct cause of, 
subsequent events in our lives persists in the form of Immanent Justice Reasoning 
(IJR; Callan, Ellard, & Nicol, 2006; Callan, Sutton, & Dovale, 2010; Callan, Harvey, 
Dawtry, & Sutton, 2013; Harvey & Callan, 2014).  
IJR is defined as a lapse in naturalistic causal reasoning where actions bring 
about deserved outcomes, be they rewards or punishments, even when there is 
no physically plausible means by which they might have done so (Callan et al., 
2006; Callan et al., 2014). Although linked with concerns for the deservingness of 
the outcome (e.g., bad people deserve bad things to happen to them), IJR takes this 
notion a step further where the moral worth of the person or behaviour is the 
direct cause of the outcome in the face of more naturalistic explanations (Callan et 
al., 2006; Harvey & Callan, 2014). Thus, IJR is a form of causal reasoning bias that 
enables us to preserve the belief that the world is predictable, just and orderly 
(Callan et al., 2014). 
According to Lerner’s (1980) just world theory, IJR serves as a function to 
maintain just world beliefs. Not only are we biased in our causal judgements, but 
we particularly are motivated to prefer explanations that help defend against 
threats to our belief in a just world. Recent research shows that construing events 
to be consistent with a just world allows us to make long-term goals (Bal & van 
den Bos, 2012; Callan et al., 2013; Xie, Liu, & Gan, 2011), avoid self-defeating 
behaviours (Callan, Kay, & Dawtry, 2014), and avoid smaller, immediate rewards 
in order to obtain larger, delayed rewards (Callan, Shead, & Olson, 2009). 
However, IJR research often utilises self-report methods to measure the strength 
of the causal link between someone’s prior (mis)deeds and a future event. For 
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example, reading a vignette detailing a fatal accident had occurred to either a good 
or bad person, followed by the question ‘‘to what extent do you feel that what 
happened to xxx was a result of his/her conduct?” (Callan et al., 2013). Callan, 
Ferguson and Bindemann (2013) showed that motivations to perceive justice 
exist beyond retrospective causal judgements using eye-tracking. Participants 
listened to a recorded vignette describing either a good or bad person through 
headphones, and their eye-gaze was recorded whilst two possible outcome images 
(good or bad) were displayed partway through the vignette. Callan et al. found 
that participant gaze shifted towards the morally congruent image, such that when 
listening to the bad (good) behaviour of a person, eye-gaze focused onto the bad 
(good) outcome. These findings suggest not only are we motivated to 
retrospectively assert morally congruent reasons for specific outcomes, we also 
anticipate morally congruent outcomes when justice is concerned. 
The current research aims to extend previous IJR findings by exploring 
whether valence-laden sentences within a scenario can impact our temporal 
perception of the interval between two events. This notion stems from a 
phenomenon known as temporal binding, where causally linked events are 
perceived closer in time (Engbert, Wohlschläger & Haggard, 2008; Haggard, Clark, 
& Kalogeras, 2002; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009). 
Temporal binding is rooted within David Hume’s (1739/1888) Treatise of Human 
Nature, where temporal contiguity between events underlies a causal 
relationship. In other words, the closer two events are in time, the more likely they 
are to be causally related. However, recent research demonstrates that not only 
does contiguity promote inferences of causality, but also the perception of a causal 
relationship leads one to perceive greater contiguity (Buehner et al., 2009). 
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Typically, in the time estimation version of temporal binding, two events are 
displayed sequentially, and the time between two events is estimated. This 
version of temporal binding is measured by asking participants to estimate the 
interval between the two events (such as the action and the outcome), using either 
a verbal estimate (Engbert et al., 2008; Kumar & Srinivasan, 2017; Moore et al., 
2009) or an estimate via a time scale (Moreton, Callan, & Hughes, 2017).  
Interval estimation offers a direct method of measuring temporal binding and 
has been shown to depend on causality: for example, Humphreys and Buehner 
(2009) proposed that our internal pacemaker (Wearden, 2001) slows during 
periods in which we predict the consequences to intentional, causal action. 
Indeed, the authors showed that the temporal interval between a causal event 
(pressing an on-switch and an ensuing sound) is significantly underestimated 
when compared to a non-causal event. Buehner and Humphreys (2009), also 
demonstrated binding when events are believed to be causally related, and 
suggest that mentally connected constructs, in that they are causally related, and 
perception, are inter-related.  
However, temporal binding research typically involves the causal relation 
between an individual’s action causing an outcome stimuli to occur, such as the 
participant performing a button press and causing an auditory tone or visual 
image to appear after an interval between 50-1000ms (Buehner, 2012; Engbert et 
al., 2008; Haggard & Clark, 2003; Haggard et al., 2002; Humphreys & Buehner, 
2010; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Takahata et al., 2012). In other words, such 
research has revolved around physical events occurring within a short time frame 
of one another. Conversely, events within IJR research are typically abstract and 
occur after long periods (a common connecting phrase being “Later that day…”).   
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The current research aims to extend temporal binding research beyond 
physical events. The temporal binding phenomenon is arguably rooted in causal 
beliefs; for example, Buehner (2012) demonstrated that by believing a machine to 
be its own causal agent, the outcomes of its actions were anticipated comparably 
to human actions. If a causal relationship exists between two events, then, given 
temporal contiguity, the two events are more likely to follow each other closely in 
space and time than unrelated events. Thus, our research affords a test of whether 
causally connected scenarios (via notions of deservingness) would be subject to 
the same consequences to temporal contraction as action/outcome pairings.  
Our expectations were weighted upon an overarching causal theory of 
temporal binding and research within IJR, where descriptions of a good(bad) 
person followed by a good(bad) outcome will elicit a causal relation, generating 
contiguity and estimated closer in time. Conversely, morally incongruent 
sentences, and hence less causally related, should be estimated more relatively, 
temporally, distant. 
 
Present Study 
We used an interval estimation procedure to gauge temporal binding 
(Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Engbert et al., 2008; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009). 
In this procedure, participants are asked to judge the time interval between an 
action and its sensory outcome (e.g., a button press and an image). For our task, 
participants were presented with the two possible outcomes to a scenario, each 
with their own short description of what ‘had happened’. This served to give 
participants prior knowledge of what could happen following the events of the 
scenario. Prior knowledge of the possible outcomes meant that participants would 
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retain the outcomes consciously during their reading of the scenario. In turn, 
reading the scenario would build up “just world” expectations about the 
forthcoming event (Callan et al., 2012). Thus, in terms of immanent justice 
reasoning, we would expect that prior knowledge would motivate the desire for 
the specific morally congruent outcome to appear post-scenario. This desire 
would then generate outcome identity predictions consistent with immanent 
justice reasoning, providing both the predictive and inferential processes that 
generate temporal binding (Moore & Ohbi, 2012). 
Then, participants were presented with a scenario that depicted a person 
with either a positive or negative character (with an equal male-to-female ratio 
throughout the scenarios). For example, “While walking home after work, Simon 
offered to carry an elderly woman's bags and helped her cross the road.” for 
positive, and “While walking home after work, Simon yelled at an elderly woman 
to get out of his way and shoved her into the gutter as he passed by.” for negative. 
We used 36 scenarios in total – that is, an event that occurred to the same person 
(e.g., “Simon”). As there were both positive and negative versions of each scenario, 
however, there were a total of 72 possible sub-scenarios (see Appendix A). 
However, participants only saw one version of each scenario and pseudo-
randomised to ensure equal presentation of valence. 
Every scenario ended with “Later that day…” in order to produce a 
complete sentence with the outcome-stimuli’s descriptions. The participant was 
then asked to press the space bar, which was followed by either positively or 
negatively valenced action-outcome—specifically, outcomes depicting something 
positive or negative happening to the protagonist (see Fig. 1 for examples). For 
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example, one possible outcome was for the protagonist to receive a promotion, 
therefore the completed, “Later that day he got a promotion.” 
 
 
Chapter 3, Figure 1. Example outcome stimuli.  
 
We used five images to represent a positive outcome, and four images to 
represent a negative outcome. This slight difference was due to the availability of 
images depicting a clear, unambiguous outcome. Equally, this was due to the 
availability of gender-related images. Thus, for positive outcomes, there were four 
gender-related images, (two for each gender; for example, a man cheering), and 
one neutral image (an image of a sum of money). For negative outcomes, there 
were two gender-related images (one for each gender; for example, a woman 
slipping on a wet floor), and two neutral images (a traffic accident and snake 
poised to strike a victim; for a full visual list of images). Furthermore, the scenarios 
were adapted from scenarios used previously within IJR research and have been 
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shown to be effective at eliciting IJR expectations of a just world (Callan, Ferguson 
& Bindemann, 2013). We expected time estimations of the temporal interval 
between scenario and outcome to reflect explicit measurements of IJR: scenario-
outcome combinations congruent in their valences (for example, a scenario 
describing a good person receiving an unrelated good outcome) would produce 
greater temporal binding, whereas incongruent combinations would produce less. 
Method 
Participants. We recruited 89 participants (42 males: Mage = 36.23, SDage = 
11.68) through prolific.ac, an online crowdsourcing platform. Participants 
received monetary compensation. We screened participants for the following 
inclusion criteria: an approval rating of above 90% on prolific.ac (based on prior 
experiment performance/approval scores) and aged between 18 and 65. The 
required sample size was fixed ahead of data collection, and a power analysis 
showed we had 90% power to detect a small effect (Cohen’s f = 0.10) of emotional 
valence on temporal binding (a = 0.05). 
Materials and Procedure. Experiment 6 consisted of 77 trials: 20 practice 
trials, 9 exposure task trials, 9 memory task trials, 3 pre-experimental practice 
trials, and 36 experimental trials. We used an interval estimation procedure to 
measure temporal binding (see Moore & Obhi, 2012). For each practice and 
experimental trial, participants saw a fixation cross on the screen, and in their own 
time, pressed the spacebar. In the first practice block of 10 trials participant 
actions produced a neutral stimulus, which was a green circle, and in the second 
practice block of 10 trials actions produce an image of an emotionally valenced 
emoticon, either positive (smiling) or negative (angry). During practice trials, the 
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green circle/emoticons appeared after a randomly selected time interval from 
either 0 ms or a multiple of 100 ms up to 900 ms. We used all intervals in the 
practice blocks, to encourage participants to expect the full range of durations in 
the experimental block. During the practice blocks, feedback was provided to 
participants after they made their time estimations. Feedback consisted of both 
the participant’s estimated time and the actual time of stimulus onset to enhance 
familiarity with estimating time in milliseconds.  
Participants were then randomly presented with the four negative and five 
positive outcome stimuli. Each stimulus appeared individually onscreen for four 
seconds, and afterwards was subsequently replaced with two Likert scales, 
ranging from 1-7, asking participants to "Please rate how positive/negative the 
image was." and "Please rate how emotionally arousing the image was." After 
completion, participants then completed a memory task. In this task, participants 
saw three outcome stimuli onscreen without their descriptions, and one 
description at the bottom that corresponded to one of the three stimuli. 
Participants were asked to select which of the images the description 
corresponded to. The mean score of remembering correct description to images 
was 6.07 for the nine images (SD = 2.39). 
A pre-experimental practice block of three neutral scenarios, each with 
their own two neutral outcomes, preceded the experimental block, in order to 
introduce the mechanics of the outcome-scenario-time estimation task 
presentation. However, the task sequence was the same for both the pre-
experimental practice trials and experimental trials: participants initially saw two 
possible outcomes to a forthcoming scenario. In experimental trials this was a 
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positive and negative outcome, and either randomly presented on the left-
hand/right-hand sides of the screen, including their description.  
Next, participants saw one of thirty-six scenarios depicting an individual 
with either a good or bad character. The participant was able to respond by 
pressing the spacebar to continue after 2500ms after scenario presentation. This 
was set to prevent participants from either accidentally clicking past the stimuli, 
or from speeding through trials without paying attention to the scenario. To 
indicate when a participant was able to proceed, a grey button appeared beneath 
the scenario stating ‘Press the spacebar to continue’. After pressing the spacebar, 
one of the two outcomes presented directly before the scenario appeared after 
either 100, 400 or 700 ms (Moore et al., 2009), which remained on the screen for 
a further 400 ms. We varied the delay intervals to increase participants’ 
uncertainty regarding the interval between action and outcome to allow for 
variation in judgement times (cf. Ebert & Wegner, 2010). A blank screen then 
followed the outcome stimulus for 400 ms and was replaced by a horizontal time 
estimation scale in the centre of the screen (see Fig. 2). The scale ranged from 0- 
1000 ms, with demarcation lines every 100 ms. Participants were instructed to 
scroll the slider along the bar to the time that they believed it took the image to 
appear since their action (in multiples of 100 ms). Once selected, participants 
confirmed their selections by clicking on a ‘finish’ button and proceeded to the 
next trial. Participants were instructed that they would not receive feedback for 
their time estimations during the experimental trials.  
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Chapter 3, Figure 2. Time estimation scale. 
 
During experimental trials participants were presented with the 36 
scenarios, 1 scenario per trial (hence, 36 experimental trials). These scenarios 
were divided evenly, such that 18 scenarios were the version that depicted an 
individual with a positive character, and 18 with a negative character, randomly 
presented across trials. Valence of outcome stimuli, presented after the scenario, 
was also pseudo-randomised to be presented equally in the two types of trials 
(positive and negative characters). This resulted in a within 2 (positive vs. 
negative valence of the character in the initial scenario) x 2 (positive vs. negative 
valence of outcome stimuli) factorial design. Scenarios/stimuli were 
counterbalanced across participants, such that across all 36 trials each participant 
saw an equal number of the four possible scenario-outcome combinations (i.e., 9 
trials per Good scenario-Good outcome, Good-Bad, Bad-Good, and Bad-Bad). For 
example, two participants presented with “While walking home after work, Simon 
offered to carry an elderly woman's bags and helped her cross the road.” (i.e. a 
good scenario) then being presented with the good or bad outcome (Good-
Good/Good-Bad). Subsequently, another two participants would be presented 
with “While walking home after work, Simon yelled at an elderly woman to get out 
of his way and shoved her into the gutter as he passed by.” (i.e. the same 
protagonists, but now depicting a bad scenario) and be presented with either the 
good or bad outcome (Bad-Good/Bad-Bad).  
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Time intervals were pseudo-randomised across trials, such that there was 
the same number of trials in each condition at each time interval. A schematic 
display of the sequence of trial events is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Chapter 3, Figure 3. Schematic display of the sequence of trial events: A) 
Potential outcomes (bad or good), B) Scenario (bad or good), C) Delay (100, 400 
or 700ms), D) Outcome (400ms), E) Time estimation scale. 
 
To incentivize participant to attend to the scenarios, we also implemented 
catch-trials by informing participants that they would also be occasionally asked 
a question about the scenario-vignette they had just read (for example, "Where 
did the scenario take place?"). There were six catch trials in total. 10 participants 
(11.2%) scored correctly on all catch trials, 39 participants (43.8%) scored 
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correctly on 5 catch trials, 33 participants (37.1%) scored correctly on 4 catch 
trials, and 7 participants (7.9%) score correctly on 3 catch trials or lower. 
Results 
Firstly, ratings of valence for our stimuli were averaged across the positive 
and negative outcome stimuli, and a paired-samples t-test revealed that positive 
outcomes (M = 6.29, SD = .23) were rated significant more positively than negative 
outcomes (M = 2.06, SD = .39), t(89) = -26.54,  p < .001, d = 13.21. 
Participants’ mean time estimations for each of the three onset times (100, 
400 and 700 ms) and the four scenario-outcome valence combinations: 
good(scenario)-good(outcome), good-bad, bad-good, bad-bad were subjected to a 
fully within-subjects ANOVA (see Fig. 1). Analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of temporal delay, F(2, 176) = 183.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .68, showing that even 
under less controlled experimental contexts (i.e., within an online testing 
platform), participants perceived distinct time intervals corresponding to their 
actual length (see Dewey & Knoblich, 2014, for comparable findings within a 
laboratory context). There was no statistically significant effect of scenario-
outcome valence congruency on time estimations, F(2,264) = 0.51, p = 0.67, ηp2 = 
0.006, nor was there an interaction between temporal delay and scenario-
outcome valence congruency, F(6,528) =.62, p = 0.71, ηp2 = 0.007.  
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Chapter 3, Figure 4: Table depicting the mean temporal estimations for each 
scenario-outcome valence combination by temporal delay. Error bars show 95% 
confidence intervals of the means. 
Discussion 
Events that are causally linked appear closer together in time (Faro et al., 
2005; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). However, within our study, we failed to 
demonstrate any temporal perception variability across our experimental 
conditions. Despite the widespread usage of temporal binding as a measure of 
implicit causal beliefs, the congruency of scenarios used did not influence 
temporal estimates. Our findings suggest that not only does our perception of time 
fail to be modulated by concerns for justice. Given the wealth of research showing 
the reliability of immanent justice reasoning on these types of scenarios, these 
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findings also point the possibility that temporal binding may not be suitable as an 
implicit measure of causal beliefs.  
Three possible conclusions explain the results of our experiment from a 
theoretical standpoint: 1) the experimental mechanics, i.e., use of a temporal 
binding measure between a vignette and visual outcome, were not appropriate to 
detecting implicitly held causal beliefs; 2) IJR is not susceptible to implicit 
measures of causal relations between two events, or at least, the effect size is 
vastly small in comparison to its relative success using explicit measures (Callan, 
Sutton & Harvey, 2014); 3) temporal binding, as has been purported (Hughes, 
Desantis & Waszak, 2013), is less of a measure of causal relations, but is rather 
much more susceptible to low-level processes such as temporal prediction and 
control. However, from a practical standpoint, our experiment may have had a 
limitation in that the temporal interval may have been estimated as the time 
between the button press and the outcome image, rather than from the scenario. 
This would render any modulatory effects due to causal beliefs unmeasured. As a 
follow-up test, future experiments may benefit from an observational, rather than 
action, oriented procedure, whereby participants estimate the interval between 
two events whilst passively observing the sequence. This would also fit in with 
previous research (Buehner, 2012), that suggests that temporal binding occurs 
due to the causal relation between events, rather than any action involved.  
One foreseeable limitation to using abstract events concerning justice is 
that, due to the nature of the stimuli, a plausible connection, despite lacking 
explicit information, may still arise between some scenarios. For example, where 
“Jamie saw a homeless man with a bucket for change, and stole the homeless man's 
money”, and later that day “He broke his arm”, one could construe that, possibly 
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while feeling excitement at his achievement, guilt over his actions, or perhaps 
simply whilst fleeing the scene of the crime, Jamie became careless or distracted 
and consequently broke his arm. Naturally, we would expect those who possess a 
need to believe in a just world, and are sensitive to threats that challenge this 
belief, would be more prone to adopting the IJR account of events rather than 
construing a more rational explanation (Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Lerner, 1980). 
Moreover, such a construal would be more probable with morally congruent 
events given the conceptual similarity between stimuli (Casasanto, 2008). 
Although near-impossible to remove every possible chain of events that one may 
conjure to link the two events, future work should make efforts when controlling 
for probabilistic links in their stimuli. For example, external raters could score the 
plausibility of one event causing the second event. Additionally, mixed effects 
modelling including fixed effects for perceived similarity between events could 
assess the unique predictive power of similarity upon temporal estimation over 
and above moral congruence. 
A further limitation to our study concerned, without use of an explicit 
causal measure, the difficulty to be fully confident that any differences in interval 
estimations would have been due to engagement in immanent justice reasoning. 
Future work, where exploring novel implicit measures, should include explicit 
measures to enable correlational tests to improve confidence that the implicit 
measures are measuring the same underlying construct. 
One experiment alone cannot provide enough strength to counter prior 
published research showing the modulatory effects of causal beliefs. However, 
what we do present is that, given the conflicting findings that surround temporal 
binding as to its underlying mechanisms (e.g., Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Moreton, 
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Callan, & Hughes, 2017; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013; Zopf, Polito, & Moore, 2018); 
further inquiry may be required to ascertain temporal binding’s accuracy as a 
measure of implicit causal beliefs. Spatial binding, the spatial equivalent to 
temporal binding, may procure more promising results after previous evidence 
demonstrates its relative consistency as a measure of causal beliefs (Buehner & 
Humphreys, 2010; Woods, Lehet, & Chatterjee, 2013). Given the strength of 
evidence behind IJR with explicit measurements (Callan et al., 2006; Callan et al., 
2010; Callan et al., 2013; Harvey & Callan, 2014), we expect that a robust measure 
of implicit causal beliefs will yield similar results. 
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Preface 
 
 Although temporal binding is routinely employed as a measure of SoA, 
several studies question its proposed validity (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; 
Moreton et al., 2018; Stetson et al., 2006). Chapter 2 suggests that, not only is 
temporal binding immune to modulatory effects of emotionally valenced 
outcomes, but also contributes to the ongoing discussion of conflicting findings 
within the literature (for example, regarding learned action-effects to 
congruent/incongruent actions, see Desantis et al., 2012, Ebert & Wegner, 2010, 
Hughes, 2018, and Zopf, Polito, & Moore, 2018). Chapter 3, though not without its 
limitations, makes a preliminary suggestion that binding may not result from 
causal mechanisms; or at least, abstract causality without a direct, physical 
mechanism. Thus, at this juncture of my research, we decided to metaphorically 
take a step back and approach the aim of this research by investigating the role of 
causal belief in temporal binding. Chapter 4 attempts to extend two previous 
studies (Experiment 6: Buehner, 2012; Experiment 7: Desantis, Roussel and 
Waszak, 2011) to further clarify whether knowledge of or belief in a causal 
mechanism modulates temporal binding. Specifically, whether temporal binding 
would increase when: a) a causal agent (the participant) produced an outcome 
relative to conditions without any apparent causal mechanism (Experiment 6), 
and b) authorship of the outcome is believed to have been caused by the 
participant relative to an external agent. 
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The Role of Causal Knowledge in Temporal Binding Measured via Stimulus 
Anticipation 
 
Understanding causal relations within our environment is key for social 
interaction (Bodner, Engelhardt, Minshew & Williams, 2015; Moskowitz, 2005), 
learning (Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz & Glymour, 2001), reasoning (Goswami & Brown, 
1990) and self-awareness (Duval, Silvia & Lalwani, 2012; Duval & Wicklund, 
1973).  
However, causal relations (for example, that event ‘A’ is the cause of event 
‘B’) can never be explicitly known given our sensory organs’ inability to detect 
causal relations, nor does sensory input provide explicit information as to causal 
relations (Cheng, 1997; Nadel & Hardt, 2011; Shanks, Holyoak, & Medin, 1996; 
Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). Instead, we infer causal relations from the extent to 
which they fulfil criteria first proposed by Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature 
(1739/1888).  
One such criterion, that of temporal and spatial contiguity, identifies that 
events occurring closer together in time and space (respectively) are more likely 
to be inferred as causally related. However, research suggests this conjecture is 
only one half of a bi-directional constraint of Bayesian causal inference (Eagleman 
& Holcombe, 2002; Fereday & Buehner, 2015), where events causally related to 
an ensuing event are often perceived as more temporally/spatially contiguous 
(Buehner & Humphreys, 2009, 2010; Callan, Moreton, & Hughes, submitted; Cravo, 
Claessens, & Baldo, 2009; Engbert, Wohlschläger, & Haggard, 2008; Haggard & 
Clark, 2003; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). In other words, when we know 
two events to be temporally/spatially contiguous, we infer causality. Conversely, 
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when we know two events are causally related, we infer temporal/spatial 
contiguity.  
In terms of temporal contiguity, either the individual events (e.g., 
action/outcome) are perceived closer to one another or the temporal interval 
between the events is perceived as shorter, relative to non-causally related events.  
As such, this temporal contraction, otherwise known as temporal binding, has 
been used as a measure of implicit causal inference (e.g., Blakey et al., 2019; 
Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009), and is employed throughout 
experiments 6 and 7 reported here. 
Temporal binding, operationalised as the reduced perceived temporal 
interval between an action and an ensuing outcome (compared to the actual 
interval), has evoked a wealth of research (see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for a review). 
However, several interpretations of how the binding phenomenon arises exist: as 
stated, previous research suggests that binding, both spatial and temporal, results 
from knowledge of causal mechanisms between events, where the knowledge that 
one event will cause another renders our perceptual faculties to temporally and 
spatially bind the two events together (Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 
2010). Conversely, the forward model promotes that the human motor system 
gives rise to temporal binding when intentional actions are met with expected 
motor identity predictions, where the latter refers to prediction of the learned 
identity of a sensory event based on an action performed by the participant 
(Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas, & Haggard, 
2007; Haggard et al., 2002; Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013) Moore & Fletcher, 
2012; Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009; Obhi & Hall, 2011). However, multiple 
accounts have arisen that challenge the proposition that motor identity-prediction 
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is a necessary component of temporal binding (Barlas, Hockley, & Obhi, 2017; 
Desantis, Hughes and Waszak, 2012; Hughes et al., 2013). For example, Desantis 
et al. (2012) found that temporal control (i.e., the ability to control the temporal 
onset of an outcome) produced greater temporal binding than the ability to 
predict the identity of the outcome. Buehner and Humphreys (2009) equally 
showed that, despite identical outcomes, , actions that caused a tone, compared to 
actions timed to the onset of a signal indicating that the tone will occur,  produced 
the most binding. In other words, regardless of knowledge over what specific 
outcome will occur, understanding that there is a causal relationship between a 
given action and some event occurring afterwards may be the primary modulatory 
factor that temporally attracts outcomes towards their cause (and vice versa). 
Thus, given our understanding requires further clarification over temporal 
binding’s underlying mechanism, we further investigated whether knowledge of 
a causal relationship between two events was sufficient to produce binding 
relative to non-causally related events across two experiments. 
Experiment 6 extended Buehner’s (2012) research that measured binding 
via stimulus anticipation, where participants are asked to time a button press with 
the onset of an outcome stimulus (e.g., a visual or auditory cue). In this method, 
the participant presses a button that either produces the outcome (causal 
condition) or a signal indicates that the outcome will occur after a given time 
interval (baseline condition). Hence, temporal binding is quantified as the 
anticipatory error of the timed action to the onset of the outcome. As such, greater 
anticipation reflects greater temporal contiguity: causally related events are 
perceived closer together in time, where this perceptual bias induces the notion 
that causally produced outcomes will appear sooner relative to unrelated or 
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merely correlational secondary events (Buehner, 2012).   Indeed, using stimulus 
anticipation, and consistent with the causal binding hypothesis, research has 
shown causally produced outcomes are anticipated more than non-causal 
outcomes (Blakey et al., 2019; Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys 2009). 
However, Buehner (2012) introduced a further condition, where across 
two experiments he compared self-caused actions to machine-caused actions in 
order to test whether intentional action or causal agency (i.e., an agent performing 
a specific action that produces an outcome) were sufficient to produce binding. 
Thus, Buehner employed three conditions: self-causal, machine-causal, and 
baseline. In the self-causal condition, participants pressed a button on the left-
hand side of a response box that would cause an LED bulb to flash after an interval 
of either 500, 900, or 1300ms (blocked) on the right-hand side of the response 
box. The participant’s task was to press a second button on the right-hand side of 
the box when they thought the LED was going to flash. In the machine causal 
condition, participants initiated a machine by pressing a button on a machine, 
which, after a period of 2-5s, would activate a lever that pressed down on the left-
hand button on the response box. Participants again pressed the right-hand 
button on the response box when they thought the LED would flash. As a point of 
emphasis, Buehner (2012) strongly advocated to participants that the machine 
was separate from any computer influence and acted on its own behalf within the 
given time frame. A baseline condition involved a signal LED flash on the left-hand 
side of the box after a period of 2,300 to 2,800ms after trial onset, indicating that 
the response LED would flash after the interval. The results showed that, 
compared to the baseline condition, both self-causal and machine-causal 
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conditions showed greater stimulus anticipation of the LED flash, without 
differing from each other.  
Thus, contrary to the forward model where intentional action being met 
with expected consequences produces temporal binding, Buehner (2012) 
provides evidence that an intentional action is not strictly necessary to produce 
binding. Rather, the author proposed an account of causal binding to explain how 
a machine’s action could equally produce temporal binding, and that the temporal 
binding phenomenon occurs when a perceiver understands the underlying causal 
relation linking events. The fundamental principle of temporal binding, as 
proposed, is the predictive relation between two perceivably causally linked 
events. In other words, when one understands that event A causes event B, the 
time interval between the two events contracts.   
Across 2 experiments we tested the degree to which temporal binding, as 
measured using the stimulus anticipation paradigm devised by Buehner (2012), 
required a causal relationship between events. In experiment 6, we tested 
whether the explicit instruction to the participants regarding the computer being 
“an autonomous mechanical causal agent” (p.1491), was necessary to produce the 
binding effect in the machine causal condition. Buehner (2012) reasoned that 
previous studies using machine-caused conditions (e.g., Wohlschläger, Haggard, 
Gesierich, & Prinz, 2003) had not produced temporal binding because both the 
target tone, and the machine press were caused by the computer running the task. 
This means that the computer would be the common cause of both events rather 
than the machine causing the tone. 
Buehner (2012) represents a departure from the traditional view that 
intentional action is a key mechanism for temporal binding of actions and 
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outcomes given that, according to the forward model, it is a necessary component 
for generating sensorimotor predictions in order to compare actual vs. expected 
sensory feedback of our actions (Engbert et al., 2008; Haggard & Clark, 2003; 
Haggard et al., 2002; Moore, 2016). Nonetheless, other studies (e.g., Cravo, 
Claessens, & Baldo, 2009; Moore & Haggard, 2008) suggest that both action (vs. 
passive observation) and the impression of a causal relation between two events 
are required for binding, with neither sufficient to produce the effect alone.  
Experiment 6 thus sought to further clarify the roles of intention and 
causality in temporal binding. In our extension of Buehner (2012), we replaced 
the machine-causal condition with a timer condition. Effectively, this condition 
maintains the components of the machine-causal condition, but removes the 
machine’s presence as an agent, and thus any causal component to Buehner’s 
condition. The timer condition was named so for the visual presence of a timer 
counting upwards, which was present upon the machine used in the original 
experiment. Buehner (2012) found greater stimulus anticipation for self-caused 
and machine-caused outcomes compared to those outcomes preceded by a 
temporally predictable signal at 500 and 900ms. Thus, if participants anticipate 
outcomes to a comparable degree between the self-causal and timer conditions 
(compared to baseline) this would suggest that a causal element between events 
is not solely necessary. Conversely, if outcomes within the timer condition are 
anticipated closer to baseline levels, this would suggest the reverse. As such, 
Experiment 6 was designed to test the degree to which actions produced by an 
autonomous agent modulated stimulus anticipation.  
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Experiment 6 
In Experiment 6 we extended previous research (Buehner, 2012) in order 
to test whether knowledge of a causal mechanism to produce a stimulus change 
would elicit temporal binding. We modified our experiment in three ways 
compared to Buehner (2012): firstly, given the similarity in results of stimulus 
anticipation for temporal intervals 900ms and 1300ms in the original study, we 
only employed prediction time intervals of 500ms and 900ms. Secondly, we 
replaced the machine-causal condition with a time-sequence condition, which 
displayed a clock counting upwards in seconds on the left-hand side of the screen. 
Both experiments took place online, and so Experiment 6 utilised a virtual control-
box instead (see Fig. 1) of the physical control box used in Buehner (2012), and 
instead of LED flashes to indicate Event A (signal of cause) and Event B (outcome), 
we used images of light bulbs to indicate events. Thus, a signal light bulb image 
appearing on the left-hand side (Event A) of the screen preceded a target light bulb 
image appearing on the right-hand side (Event B). As in the original study, the 
participant’s task was to press the appropriate button when they thought the 
target light bulb would appear after a stimulus prediction interval (SPI) after the 
signal light bulb.  
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Chapter 4, Figure 1. Virtual control box with: A) Signal lightbulb flash, B) Delay 
screen, C) Target lightbulb flash 
Method 
Participants. We recruited 80 participants (43 males: Mage = 36.41, SDage = 
11.26) through prolific.ac, an online crowdsourcing platform. An additional 
participant was excluded due to a technical problem. Participants received 
monetary compensation. We screened participants for the following inclusion 
criteria: an approval rating of above 90% on prolific.ac (based on prior 
experiment performance/approval scores) and aged between 18 and 65. 
Additionally, we applied the following exclusion criteria: native language other 
than English, left handedness, recent use of illicit drugs, uncorrected visual or 
auditory impairment and history of psychiatric or neurological illness. The 
required sample size was fixed ahead of data collection, and a power analysis 
showed we had 90% power to detect a small effect (Cohen’s f = 0.10) of causal 
relations and stimulus predictivity on temporal binding (a = 0.05). 
Materials and Procedure. Participants were told they would partake in a 
stimulus-anticipation experiment, in which their task would be to anticipate an 
image of a target light bulb appearing on the right-hand side of their computer 
screen by pressing a button (P) then they thought the light bulb would appear. 
This target light bulb was preceded by a signal light bulb that flashed for 100ms 
on the left-hand side of the screen, separated from the target light bulb with either 
a short (500ms) or long (900ms) SPI. SPI was blocked, and counter-balanced 
across participants. Participants were tasked with initiating each trial when 
presented with a message instructing them to press the spacebar to begin the trial 
(throughout all conditions, as per Buehner, 2012, Experiment 7).  
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During the baseline condition, after trial-initiation with the spacebar, the 
signal light bulb appeared on the left-hand side of their computer screen after a 
randomly determined interval between 2,300 and 2,800ms. Then, after the SPI, 
the second light bulb flashed for 100ms on the right-hand side of the screen. 
Participants were asked to press the ‘P’ button on their keyboard when they 
expected the target light bulb to appear.  
The self-causal condition procedure was identical to the baseline condition. 
However, instead of the first light bulb appearing after a random interval, 
participants activated the first light bulb by pressing the ‘Q’ button at a time of 
their choosing. After the SPI, the target light bulb appeared, where participants 
were asked to press the ‘P’ when they expected the target to appear. 
During the time-sequence condition, a timer began 1000ms after the trial 
began. Starting from 0, the timer counted upwards in seconds at the location of 
the signal light bulb. After a randomly determined interval between 2-5 seconds, 
the signal bulb flashed, followed by the target light bulb after the SPI. Specifically, 
participants were informed, “After 2 to 5 seconds, you will see a light bulb flash on 
the LEFT-hand side of the screen. This indicates that another light bulb will flash 
on the RIGHT-hand side of the screen.  Your task is to press the 'P' button on your 
keyboard when you think the second light bulb will appear”. In other words, that 
the timer would not cause the target light bulb to flash, but only to indicate when 
the signal light bulb would appear. Once again participants were tasked with 
pressing ‘P’ when they expected the target to occur. 
Experiment 6 consisted of 60 trials: 20 baseline trials, 20 self-causal trials, 
and 20 time-sequence trials. Each condition was blocked, and the order sequence 
randomised across participants. Equally, the prediction interval (500ms or 
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900ms) was blocked within each condition, and randomly presented across 
participants. Thus, participants experienced both time intervals before advancing 
to the next condition.  
Results 
Employing Buehner’s (2012) data analysis protocol, median stimulus 
anticipation times of the last 10 trials of each block were calculated for the two 
prediction intervals (500 and 900ms) and for each of the three conditions. Four 
participants whose data included scores three times the inter-quartile range from 
the median were excluded from data analysis. We then conducted a 3 (condition: 
baseline, self-causal and time-sequence) X 2 (prediction interval: 500 and 900ms) 
fully within-subjects ANOVA (see Fig. 2).  
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Chapter 4, Figure 2. Mean stimulus anticipation error by condition (Experiment 
6). 
 
Analysis revealed a significant main effect of prediction interval, F(1, 74) = 
53.97, p < .001. Analysis also revealed a main effect of condition on stimulus 
anticipation, F(2, 148) = 4.31, p = .015, ηp2 = .055. There was also a significant 
interaction between prediction interval and stimulus anticipation, F(2, 148) = 
16.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .179. Paired sample t-tests revealed that the self-causal 
condition produced more temporal binding than the baseline condition at a 
prediction interval of 500ms, t(74) = 2.65, p = .01, dz = 0.03. However, there was 
no difference between the time-sequence condition and the other conditions (ps 
> .05). At a temporal interval of 900ms, the time-sequence condition produced 
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more temporal binding than the both baseline condition, t(74) = 3.26, p = .002, dz 
= 0.10, and the self-causal condition, t(74) = 4.24, p < .001, dz = 0.42, with no 
differences observed between the latter two (p > .05). 
Experiment 6 - Discussion 
Experiment 6 found greater binding via stimulus anticipation at 500ms for 
self-caused actions than passively observing a sequence of two events (baseline). 
Our timer condition did not significantly differ from either self-causal or baseline 
conditions. Conversely, at 900ms, we observed greater stimulus anticipation of 
the second stimulus during the timer condition than both other conditions. This 
complex pattern of results does not provide clear support for the assumption that 
perceived causality drives temporal binding in this task. Unlike in Buehner et al., 
(2012) we did not instruct participants that the outcome was caused by an 
independent agent (a machine in their case), we simply presented participants 
with a sequence that was not initiated by them and asked them to anticipate the 
presentation of the second stimulus. At least at 900ms, this was sufficient to 
produce greater intentional binding than in the baseline condition. It is also 
noteworthy that although self-caused and baseline conditioned significantly 
differed at 500ms, they did not differ at 900ms. Although a similar pattern was 
observed in Buehner et al. (2012), they did not show a significant interaction 
between interval and condition, whereas we did (although see Humphreys and 
Buehner, 2009, also discussed below). 
Experiment 7 aimed to further extend these findings by directly 
manipulating perceived causality by instructing participants that either they or 
someone else triggered the outcome. Such a strategy has previously been 
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successfully shown to modulate temporal binding using the Libet Clock method 
(Desantis et al., 2011), so here we aimed to further assess the stimulus 
anticipation paradigm as a measure of causal binding by conceptually replicating 
another experiment, Desantis et al. (2011), using a stimulus anticipation measure 
of temporal binding.  
In their paper, Desantis et al. (2011) investigated whether prior causal 
beliefs influence temporal binding via the Libet Clock method (Libet, Gleason, 
Wright, & Pearl, 1983). In typical temporal binding experiments employing the 
Libet clock method (Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Haggard et al., 2002; Moore 
& Haggard, 2008, 2010; Wohlschläger, Haggard, Gesierich, & Prinz, 2003) self-
generated actions are estimated to have occurred later, relative to baseline 
measurements, whilst the reverse happens for outcomes, and thus actions and 
outcomes are perceptually drawn together in time for self-generated actions.  
In Desantis et al. (2011), during a set of belief implementation phases, 
participants were instructed that they would participate alongside the 
confederate as a second participant. Furthermore, that their task was to press the 
space bar and estimate the onset times of either their action or the ensuing tone 
(occurring 150, 300 or 450 ms after action) via the Libet clock when their name 
appeared at the top of the screen. During these phases, participants also observed 
a confederate estimating onset times of their (the confederate’s) actions (with a 
different button)/tones when the confederate’s name appeared. During 
experimental trials, participants (and the confederate) pressed their button to 
produce the sound regardless of the name appearing at the top of screen, although 
were informed that only the action given by named person would produce the 
sound. However, during experimental trials, the participant’s actions caused all 
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outcomes to occur, regardless of the name at the top of the screen. Participants 
again reported onset estimations of actions and outcomes in separate conditions.  
The findings of Desantis et al. (2011) showed that, despite being 
responsible for all outcomes, participants showed less temporal binding when 
they believed the sound to have been caused by the confederate’s button press. 
From the perspective of the forward model, these findings suggest that causal 
beliefs (i.e., thinking you did not cause an outcome despite the opposite being 
true) can inhibit what would have otherwise been a predicted action-effect. In 
turn, the process in which actual/predicted sensorimotor effects is absent, hence 
actions and action-effects are not temporally drawn to one another. In other 
words, Desantis et al., (2011) provide evidence that the forward model is an 
insufficient account of temporal binding. Such an interpretation equally appears 
to be in line with research suggesting both intentional action and causal relation 
are both required to induce temporal binding (Cravo et al., 2009; Moore & 
Haggard, 2008).  
From the causal binding perspective, the findings from Desantis et al. 
(2011) support the notion that causality, not intentional action, is at the root of 
binding. Desantis et al. (2011) proposed that causal knowledge indicates what 
outcomes to predict, from the position of the forward model, and thus unpredicted 
outcomes cannot be temporally bound to an action believed not to cause an 
outcome. However, this conjecture contends with Buehner’s (2012) causal 
account of binding that eliminates intentional action from the temporal binding 
equation, where even mechanical agents enacting causally effective actions 
produce the observed reduction in the temporal interval between action and 
outcome. Indeed, Desantis et al. (2011) premise their study on prior research 
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claiming that an intentional agent is required to produce binding (Wohlschläger, 
Engbert, & Haggard, 2003; Wohlschläger, Haggard et al., 2003), which Buehner 
(2012) directly criticised for lacking a genuine causal connection between 
machine actions and the ensuing outcome.  
More directly, Desantis et al. (2011)’s findings equally contend with the 
strength of causal knowledge as a modulator of temporal binding in Experiment 6 
presented here. Participants passively observing the sequence of stimuli in the 
timer condition anticipated the secondary flashbulb significantly more than 
outcomes produced in the self-causal condition at 900ms.  
Desantis et al. (2011) employed the Libet clock method (Libet et al., 1983) 
to capture temporal binding. However, this method has been subject to criticisms 
that suggest the clock is an inadequate method of testing the interval between 
events (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Pockett & Miller, 2007), highlighting the 
rise in alternative measures such as interval estimation and stimulus anticipation. 
Thus, Experiment 7 of the present paper aimed to conceptually replicate Desantis 
et al.’s (2011) research on prior causal beliefs by employing stimulus anticipation 
to measure temporal binding. By doing so, we again renew any exploration of the 
mechanisms of temporal binding by replicating previous research.  
As such, there are three potential hypotheses to Experiment 7: 1: Both self 
and other causality will lead to increased anticipation but will not differ (i.e. 
binding is generated by causality, independent of whether you caused the 
outcome or someone else). This hypothesis corresponds with the explanations of 
temporal binding within Buehner (2012), where there is a clear causal connection 
between action and outcome. 2: Binding is present in both conditions, but greater 
in the self-caused condition (i.e., binding is causality related, but is also boosted in 
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reference to the self). 3) There is no binding in either condition, suggesting that 
stimulus anticipation does not accurately track causal belief or intentionality. 
Experiment 7  
Methods 
Experiment 7 conceptually replicated Desantis et al.’s (2011) work on the 
roles of intentional action and causal beliefs upon temporal binding. Instead of the 
Libet clock method, we used stimulus anticipation to measure temporal binding. 
As Experiment 7 was conducted online, participants were led to believe they were 
paired with another user of the crowdsourcing platform Prolific.ac (as opposed to 
the original study, which used a real-life confederate). Stimulus anticipation was 
achieved through similar methods to Desantis et al.: training phases reinforced 
the notion that self-action caused a visual stimulus to change (see procedure 
below), in the form of a rocket launching (see Fig. 3; stimuli acquired from Blakey 
et al., 2019), on the screen, and that the other ‘user’ was acting autonomously, 
performing their own actions and rendering changes to their own stimuli. 
However, during experimental phases, participants were solely responsible for all 
stimulus changes, and we expected stimulus anticipation scores, and thus 
temporal binding, to reflect those observed within the original study: perceived 
self-caused action-effects would induce greater temporal binding than perceived 
other-caused action-effects, despite all action-effects being self-caused.  
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Chapter 4, Figure 3. A) Depiction of both participant’s and other ‘user’s stimuli 
at rest, name above indicating who must launch their rocket. B) Depiction of 
participant’s rocket launching after SPI. 
 
Participants. We recruited 95 participants (33 males: Mage = 39.19, SDage = 
10.12) through prolific.ac, an online crowdsourcing platform. Due to unclear 
reasons, many participants did not respond correctly to the task and ‘timed out’ 
during the time-sensitive conditions (see below for an explanation). We excluded 
participants who timed out more than 10 times, leaving 64 participants left with 
useable data for analysis (mean/SDs of timeouts for included participants: M = 
4.60, SD = 2.99; for excluded participants: M = 20.41, SD = 9.76). The high exclusion 
rate is further discussed below. We screened participants for the same 
inclusion/exclusion criteria as Experiment 6.  
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Materials and Procedure. Participants were instructed they would 
partake in an experiment alongside another Prolific.ac user. In this experiment, 
participants had a specific rocket that belonged to them on the left-hand side of 
the screen, whilst the other ‘user’ owned a rocket on the right-hand side (Fig. 3a). 
The participants were tasked with initiating their rocket’s launch sequence with 
the ‘Q’ button, and then anticipate the onset of the rocket launching by pressing 
the ‘R’ button when they thought the rocket was going to launch (Fig. 3b).  
Participants were briefed on what to expect throughout the experiment, 
which involved two training phases and the main task, and asked to type a name 
they wished to be referred to as throughout the experiment. They then proceeded 
to a sham ‘connecting’ screen, which showed a box displaying that the experiment 
was attempting to connect to another user. After 30 seconds, participants were 
told they had successfully connected to another user named ‘George’, who would 
be their partner for the remainder of the experiment.  
A pre-trial screen containing the name indicating whose turn it would be 
to launch their rocket in the coming trial, displayed for 2500ms at the top of the 
screen, preceded each trial throughout the experiment. This pre-trial screen was 
then followed by a fixation cross, displayed for a random interval between 1500 
to 2700ms, before the participant’s rocket (left) and George’s rocket (right) 
appeared, whilst the name of whose turn it was to launch their rocket remained 
throughout the trial. 
Two training phases preceded the main task. During the first training 
phase, participants were instructed that their name appearing during the pre-trial 
screen, as well as at the top of screen during the trial, indicated that it was their 
turn to press their launch button (‘Q’) to initiate the launch sequence of their 
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rocket on the left-hand side of the screen, and anticipate when they thought their 
rocket was going to launch by pressing ‘R’. During ‘George’s’ trials, participants 
were told they did not have to perform any action. Participants completed two 
comprehension-check questions regarding what the correct button was for 
launching the rocket, and what was the correct button to press when they 
anticipated it to launch, before the training phase commenced.  
Following the training phase instructions, participants advanced to the 
task, which involved the pre-trial screen indicating whose rocket would be 
launched in the following trial. Throughout participant trials, the two rockets 
appeared on the screen after the fixation cross and following the participant’s 
action (pressing ‘Q’), the participant’s rocket launched. Participant’s action and 
the rocket launching were separated by a stimulus prediction interval (SPI) of 
either 500ms or 900ms (blocked). Subsequently, stimulus anticipation was 
measured via the error between participant’s button pressed indicating when 
they thought the rocket was going to launch (‘R’) and the trial’s SPI.  
In trials where George’s name was present, the two rockets appeared on-
screen after the fixation cross, and the rocket on the right-hand side of the screen 
launched after a random interval (600-1400ms for the 500ms SPI, and 1000-
1900ms for the 900ms SPI). George’s launched rocket displayed onscreen for 
1000ms before the trial ended (see Fig. 2).  
The first training phase lasted two blocks of 20 trials each, one for each SPI, 
and randomly presented between participants. Ten trials per block were 
dedicated to each ‘participant’ (naïve and false/non-existent). After the first block 
concluded, participants were instructed that they would be doing the same task, 
but with a different interval separating the launch and anticipation button presses. 
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The second training phase was similar to the first phase; however, 
participants were now encouraged to respond as quickly as possible to the rockets 
appearing onscreen after the fixation cross. During participant trials, failing to 
respond within one second of the rockets appearing resulted in an error message 
being displayed, and the trial repeated. Additionally, participants were also 
encouraged to press their launch button on the other user’s trials as well, and to 
predict when their rocket would launch with the ‘R’ button, as this would aid them 
in the main experiment, even though this would have no impact on the trial.  
Similar to the first training phase, the second phase lasted for two blocks 
of 20 trials each, one for each SPI, randomly presented, and 10 per ‘participant’.  
To reinforce the presence of another user, 2 of George’s trials ended in an error 
message stating that the other user had failed to respond within the time limit, 
and that their trial would repeat. 
After the two training phases, participants were then told they would now 
move onto the main task, which would be very similar to the second training 
phase. As with the training phases, the participant’s overall task was to initiate the 
launch sequence with ‘Q’ when the rockets appeared after the fixation cross, and 
press ‘R’ when they thought the rocket was going to launch. However, participants 
were instructed to respond to the rockets appearing with their launch button 
regardless of whose name appeared during the pre-trial screen/at the top of the 
screen during the trial, and that during the other user’s trials this would not 
impact the timing of their rocket’s launch. However, contrary to these instructions, 
and to the training phases, participants’ action controlled the launch sequences of 
both rockets, regardless of whose name appeared during the pre-trial screen. In 
other words, the participant’s action (‘Q’) always initiated the launch sequence of 
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the rocket of the respective owner’s trial (i.e., launched their own rocket when 
their name was displayed, and launched George’s rocket when their name was 
displayed). Thus, similar to Desantis et al. (2011), unbeknownst to the 
participants, participant’s action always produced the outcome (i.e., either rocket 
launching, depending on the designated author) and controlled when the outcome 
would occur, regardless of whose name designated authorship of the outcome. To 
encourage participants to respond to the rockets appearing in a timely fashion 
during ‘George’s trials, participants were told they could earn extra income by 
responding the quickest to the image of the two rockets appearing, at 2p per 
trial(for a total of £1.60) throughout the main task.  
Additionally, participants were instructed to predict when either rocket 
would launch (i.e.,  both their own and the other user’s rocket).  Thus, the main 
task involved participants unknowingly initiating the launch sequences of both 
their own and George’s rockets, and predicting when they thought said rocket 
would launch. As with Desantis et al. (2011), we expected that, when believing one 
to be the cause of the outcome, action/outcome would be temporally drawn 
together. Conversely, when under the belief one is not the cause, such temporal 
binding would be significantly diminished. After comprehension-check questions 
that asked what buttons they needed to press during the trial, participants 
proceeded on to the main task.  
As per Desantis et al., (2011), if the participant failed to respond during 
‘other’ trials with ‘Q’, the trial would display George’s rocket launching, but repeat 
until the participant responded within one second of the stimuli appearing.  
As mentioned during the previous participants subsection, some 
participants failed to follow the main task’s instruction. Specifically, 31 
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participants managed to respond correctly with the launch button (‘Q’) to both 
their own and George’s rockets, but failed to  anticipate when the participant 
thought the rocket was going to launch with ‘R’. Subsequently, these participants 
frequently timed out, and were removed from data analysis.  
The main task consisted of two blocks of 40 trials each, one block per SPI, 
and 20 trials per block per ‘participant’.  
The baseline condition appeared either before or after the main task was 
completed. This involved a singular rocket appearing onscreen after 500ms. For 
those who performed the baseline condition before the main task, after a further 
interval between of 500ms a light would flash in the centre of the launcher-box 
(see Fig. 4), which indicated that after SPI of 500 or 900ms the rocket would 
launch. The participant’s task was to time the launch of the rocket with the launch 
button (“R”). For those who performed the baseline condition after the main task, 
the interval between the rocket appearing onscreen and the flash in the centre 
rocket was set from the reaction times to the stimuli appearing onscreen during 
the main task. This allowed us test for order effects of condition, whilst attempting 
to avoid any effect of onset difference during stimulus appearing / target indicator 
/ target appearing between the conditions. No difference was observed between 
the groups who experienced the baseline condition before the main task or after 
(p > .05). 
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Chapter 4, Figure 4. A) Depiction of participant’s stimulus rocket at rest during 
baseline condition. B) The light flashing on the launcher-box indicating the rocket 
will launch. 
 
Participants were told that after a certain amount of time, a singular rocket 
will appear, and that unlike the previous tasks (those performing the baseline 
condition after the main task), they were not reacting to this image. Instead, 
participants were instructed to wait for a light on the rocket to flash, which would 
indicate that, after a certain amount of time, the rocket will launch, and that their 
task would be to press the launch button ('R') when thought the rocket would 
launch. 
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Additionally, questions regarding the causal belief of the outcome occurred 
after 10 trials randomly throughout the main task. Participants were asked ‘Who 
triggered the outcome? Please make this judgement based upon your own feeling 
of you or your partner having caused the outcome.’ 
The SPI between launch button (‘Q’) and the rocket launching lasted either 
500ms or 900ms. SPIs were blocked, such that participants completed training 
and experimental trials before moving on to the other SPI and were 
counterbalanced between participants. After participants completed the main 
experimental trials for one SPI, they then proceeded to the second training phase 
again, but with the remaining SPI between launch button press and the rocket 
launching. Afterwards, participants repeated the main experimental trials with 
the remaining SPI. 
After completion of all experimental trials, participants were debriefed as 
to the use of deception used with the experiment and given the option to withdraw 
their data. As participants had been deceived as to the nature of the reaction time 
element of the main task, and subsequent possible monetary reward, each 
participant was paid an extra £1 on top of their participant payment. 
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Results 
We used the same analysis procedure as Experiment 6, with a 3 (condition: 
baseline, self-causal and other-causal) X 2 (prediction interval: 500 and 900ms) 
fully within-subjects ANOVA (see Fig. 5).  
 
Chapter 4, Figure 5. Mean stimulus anticipation error by condition (Experiment 
7). 
 
Similar to Experiment 1, analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
prediction interval, F(1, 63) = 245.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .796. However, there was no 
main effect of condition on stimulus anticipation, F(1, 63) = 1.22, p > .05, ηp2 = 
.019. There was also no significant interaction between prediction interval and 
stimulus anticipation, F(2, 126) = 0.27, p > .05, ηp2 = .179.  
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 Results from the causal questions presented throughout the main task, 
equally distributed between the ‘self ‘and ‘other’ trials, showed participants 
responded with ‘self-caused’ (identifying themselves as the cause of the rocket 
launch) on 87.5% of trials for both the ‘self’ and ‘other’ trials. This significant lack 
in the belief that George’s outcomes were indeed caused by him is in conjunction 
with post-experiment questions: when asked "Do you feel that, during the main 
experiment, your launch button 'Q' caused the other user's rocket to launch?",  
56% of participants felt that their launch button did not cause George’s rocket to 
launch.).  
To reconcile these percentage differences, the time elapsed between the 
main task and post-experiment questions may have afforded participants 
reflective time over the authorship of outcomes. Moreover, the actual presence of 
the question itself may have biased participants’ responses. The causal questions 
during the main task also did not allow any alternatives to ‘self’ or ‘other’ causes, 
and thus regarding the more open post-experiment question of whether 
participants thought their button press caused George’s rocket to launch, “no” 
permitted non-George alternatives (for example, the computer program/software 
itself). To the question "What do you think is the purpose of participating 
alongside another Prolific Academic user?", 16% conveyed a lack of belief that 
there was another user, supporting the idea that participants likely did not know 
precisely what the mechanism behind George’s rocket launching, but were 
nevertheless suspicious of his existence. No participant reported suspicion that 
they were the cause of the confederate’s rocket launching. 
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Discussion 
 The aim of the current paper was to investigate the role of causal belief in 
temporal binding measured using stimulus anticipation. Experiment 6 advanced 
upon Buehner (2012) who found evidence for the notion that intention is not a 
necessary component to which temporal binding arises. We extended Buehner 
(2012), however with two distinctions: we modified the machine-causal condition 
to a timer condition using the same temporal parameters as Buehner, to test 
whether knowledge of a causal relation modulates temporal binding. Our second 
distinction was our use of an online platform, rather than a laboratory setting.  
Comparisons between online and laboratory settings have shown that participant 
performance is consistent across settings in terms of reliability of data 
(Dandurand, Shultz, & Onishi, 2008; Gould, Cox, Brumby, & Wiseman, 2015), 
therefore any differences between Experiment 6 and Buehner (2012) can 
reasonably be attributed to our modification of the machine-causal condition. Our 
findings showed that, at 500ms, we replicate Buehner (2012)’s finding of self-
caused targets being anticipated earlier than those in the baseline condition. Our 
time-sequence condition that replaced Buehner’s machine-causal condition, 
however, did not differ from either baseline or self-causal conditions, at least in 
the 500ms interval condition. At 900ms, outcomes in the time-sequence condition 
were anticipated more than the other two, with no distinction between self-causal 
and baseline conditions. This peculiar result is not easily explained; however, it is 
consistent with the trend shown in Buehner (2012) where the machine causal 
condition showed consistently larger mean stimulus anticipation at longer 
intervals (900/1300ms).  
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 One explanation of this result is that temporal binding for self-causal 
actions may weaken beyond a certain threshold, where voluntary actions produce 
temporal shifts at short intervals (Engbert et al., 2008; Haggard et al., 2002). There 
exists no solid agreement over the extent of the temporal binding effect regarding 
the maximum length of the interval to which actions and outcomes become 
temporally drawn together. Haggard et al. (2002) reported the temporal binding 
effect lessening from 250ms to 650ms, whereas others have suggested that 
temporal binding may last up to 2 seconds (Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989), 
if not 4 seconds (Buehner and Humphreys, 2009; Humphreys and Buehner, 2009). 
Moreover, Buehner (2012) suggested that intentional action might drive a ‘boost’ 
in action-outcome pairings at short intervals, despite not demonstrating this in a 
later experiment.  
 Whilst Experiment 6 partially replicated the findings of its original 
study, Experiment 7 failed to replicate Desantis et al. (2011)’s findings that causal 
beliefs modulate temporal binding. Specifically, in our study, there were no 
differences between self- and other-outcome stimulus anticipations. Examination 
of participant responses to causal authorship suggests this result is likely due to 
our failed manipulation of an online confederate. However, irrespective of our 
manipulation, one would still expect a difference to emerge between causal and 
non-causal events. Thus, given the lack of difference between the causal 
conditions and baseline condition, it is difficult to assert that Experiment 7 
provides support for any particular explanation of temporal binding. Our findings, 
in reference to our hypotheses, tentatively support the possible outcome that 
there would be no binding in either condition, suggesting that stimulus 
anticipation does not accurately track causal belief or intentionality. However, we 
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should be cautious to over-interpret our findings, given that we have departed 
from both original experiments by altering procedural elements (e.g., conducting 
the experiments online). Specifically, we might expect the non-significant trend in 
Experiment 7 of the causal conditions (compared to baseline) to become more 
pronounced within controlled laboratory conditions. 
Buehner (2012) proposed that a causal connection between events would 
lead to greater binding. In other words, both the self and other conditions should 
have led to greater anticipation, as causality is generated independent of which 
agent was the cause. However, the latter conditions equally did not differ from the 
baseline condition, which contained no causal relation between events. This is also 
in contention with our findings from Experiment 6, which showed a significant 
difference between self-caused actions and passively observing events in the 
baseline condition, albeit only at 500ms. The inconsistency between experiments 
6 and 7, and between Buehner (2012)’s proposal and our findings, questions 
whether stimulus anticipation is a reliable measure of temporal binding. 
Moreover, given that only two known prior publications have utilised stimulus 
anticipation (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2012), different methods of 
measuring binding, for example, interval estimation (Engbert & Wohlschläger, 
2007; Engbert et al., 2008, Engbert et al., 2007; Fereday & Buehner, 2017; 
Humphreys & Buehner, 2009) may find success.  
However, one failing may simply be the lack of believability of our study’s 
paradigm to online participants, whereas Desantis et al. employed a real-life 
confederate. Any further exploration of this topic should ideally begin with a 
laboratory setting. Despite the previously stated research suggesting that data 
accrued from online studies is sufficiently reliable, our experiment may have not 
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been designed adequately enough to convince participants of the genuine 
presence of another online user. This was evidenced by responses to catch trials 
asking participants ‘who was the cause of previous outcome’, and to post-
experiment questions, suggesting the majority of participants did not believe that 
they participated alongside another user. Furthermore, a significant number of 
participants were excluded due to not responding within the correct time frame, 
and thus this suggests our instructions were not clear enough to ensure sufficient 
task comprehension. Again, a laboratory setting would enable the chance to clarify 
any participant confusion, and indeed others have suggested complex online 
studies should employ caution when it comes to task comprehension. 
Assessing the degree to which binding is modulated by intentionality of 
action, causal knowledge of events, and low-level processes is important for 
clarifying the mechanism of a method used frequently in causal research Buehner, 
2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2010; Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Engbert et al., 
2007; Haggard et al., 2002; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Moore et al., 2009; Obhi & 
Hall, 2011). Experiment 6 here demonstrates that causal knowledge may hold less 
influence than previously thought (Buehner, 2012). Although with potentially 
undermining weaknesses, Experiment 7 further also failed to show temporal 
binding for self-caused action outcomes using stimulus anticipation. Overall, the 
current studies provide new evidence that questions the degree to which stimulus 
anticipation is a reliable measurement of temporal binding, and the degree to 
which temporal binding, as measured via stimulus anticipation, is modulated by 
knowledge of causal relations, be it knowledge of the causal mechanism or the 
author of outcome. 
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Chapter 5: Bad People Feel Close  
to Bad Outcomes: 
Immanent Justice Reasoning by  
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Preface 
 
The experiments contained within Chapter 4, extending previous research 
(Buehner, 2012; Desantis et al., 2011), failed to provide a clear picture of temporal 
binding modulation. Outcomes produced by a causal agent were more anticipated 
relative to baseline measures where outcomes occurred after a signal stimulus at 
500ms, but not at 900ms, during Experiment 6. However, the self-causal/baseline 
distinction failed to occur during Experiment 7 for both time intervals. Our 
findings from Experiment 6, as well as those from chapters 2 and 3, challenged the 
notion that knowledge of a causal relationship between events influences the 
perceived temporal interval between the events. Yet, the experiments contained 
within chapters 3 and 4 were not without limitation, and thus we were cautious 
to accept such a finding without scepticism. To approach the aim of this PhD 
project from an alternative angle, and in conjunction with Buehner and 
Humphreys (2010) demonstrating that space appears to contract when causal 
beliefs are held about two events, we moved away from temporal binding by 
exploring whether the power of causal beliefs to modulate binding is reflected in 
biased judgments about the spatial position of abstract representations of moral 
acts. Thus, the research contained within chapter 5 of this thesis aimed to 
elucidate the role between IJR and an implicit measure of causality via spatial 
binding, where we expected morally congruent events to be positioned closer to 
each other relative morally incongruent events. 
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Abstract 
 
Spatial contiguity is a key indicator of perceived causality, such that people 
perceive events that are causally linked as being closer together in space. Across 
5 experiments, we tested the idea that immanent justice reasoning, which is this 
belief that moral actions bring about deserved outcomes, also influences spatial 
proximity. Participants positioned representations of people’s fortuitous bad (vs. 
good) outcomes significantly closer in space to representations of their previous 
immoral actions when the outcomes occurred to the same person (Frank punched 
someone - Frank was in a car accident) more strongly than when the outcomes 
occurred to a different person (Frank punched someone - Joe was in a car 
accident). This occurred both when participants ordered the sentences in a list 
(Experiment 1) and when they were free to move the outcome anywhere on the 
screen (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, the positive or negative outcomes were 
being “chased” across the screen by bad persons. Participants acted to keep good 
outcomes and bad people apart, as compared to bad outcomes and bad people. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that our desire to perceive that people get 
what they deserve biases the physical proximity of bad outcomes to previous 
immoral behavior.  
 
Keywords:  
Immanent justice; spatial proximity; spatial binding; social perception; 
deservingness 
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Bad People Feel Close to Bad Outcomes: Immanent Justice Reasoning by 
Spatial Proximity 
 
A wealth of research has confirmed Hume’s (1739/1978) assertion that 
“cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time” (p. 173). Perception of 
causality is influenced by both spatial proximity and temporal contiguity (Einhorn 
& Hogarth, 1986; Michotte, 1963; Rips, 2011). The converse is also true: events 
that are causally linked are perceived to be closer together in both time (Faro, 
Leclerc, & Hastie, 2005) and space (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010). For instance, 
actions and their ensuing sensory outcomes are bound towards one another in 
time (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Hughes, Desantis, & Waszak, 2013). 
Similarly, the distance between two moving balls is perceived as smaller when the 
movement of the two balls are causally linked than when they are not (Buehner & 
Humphreys, 2010).  
Thus, Hume’s proposed link between causality, space, and time is now well 
established. However, most previous research has focused on the degree to which 
events that are in fact causally related are subject to temporal or spatial binding. 
In the current research, we go beyond such mechanical causal relationships to 
investigate the spatial binding of social actions and outcomes in situations where 
plausible causal linkages between events are arguably missing but where 
perceivers are nonetheless motivated to perceive causality. Specifically, we 
investigated whether immanent justice reasoning influences the spatial proximity 
of actions and ensuing outcomes.  
According to Lerner’s (1980) just world theory, IJR serves as a function to 
maintain just world beliefs. Not only are we biased in our causal judgements, we 
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are motivated to prefer explanations that help defend against threats to our belief 
in a just world. Recent research shows that construing events to be consistent with 
a just world allows us to make long-term goals (Bal & van den Bos, 2012; Callan, 
Harvey, Dawtry, & Sutton, 2013; Xie, Liu, & Gan, 2011), avoid self-defeating 
behaviours (Callan, Kay, & Dawtry, 2014), avoid smaller, immediate rewards in 
order to obtain larger, delayed rewards (Callan, Shead, & Olson, 2009), and 
maintain a commitment to justice in the face of threat (Hafer & Bègue, 2005). 
However, IJR research often utilises self-report methods to measure the strength 
of the causal link between someone’s prior (mis)deeds and a future event. For 
example, reading a vignette detailing a fatal accident had occurred to either a good 
or bad person, followed by the question ‘‘to what extent do you feel that what 
happened to xxx was a result of his/her conduct?” (Callan et al., 2013). Callan, 
Ferguson and Bindemann (2012) showed that motivations to perceive justice 
exist beyond retrospective causal judgements using eye-tracking. Participants 
listened to a recorded vignette describing either a good or bad person through 
headphones, and their eye-gaze was recorded whilst two possible outcome images 
(good or bad) were displayed partway through the vignette. Callan et al. found 
that participant gaze shifted towards the morally congruent image, such that when 
listening to the bad (good) behaviour of a person, eye-gaze focused onto the bad 
(good) outcome. These findings suggest not only are we motivated to 
retrospectively assert morally congruent reasons for specific outcomes, we also 
anticipate morally congruent outcomes when justice is concerned. 
The current research aims to extend previous IJR findings by exploring 
whether valence-laden sentences within a scenario are felt closer in space. Recent 
research demonstrates that not only does contiguity promote inferences of 
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causality, but also the perception of a causal relationship leads one to perceive 
greater contiguity (Buehner et al., 2009). Thus, in terms of IJR, morally congruent 
sentences should be more contiguous to one another and felt closer in space. 
Conversely, morally incongruent sentences, and hence less causally related, 
should be felt further apart. 
The goal of the current research was to extend previous IJR across three 
experiments using spatial tasks where participants varied the distance between 
sentences depending on how close they feel in space: a ranked choice task 
(Experiment 8), a free positioning task (Experiment 9) and a sentence-chasing 
task (Experiment 10). On the basis of previous findings (Buehner & Humphreys, 
2009; Callan et al., 2006; Casasanto, 2008) we expected that morally congruent 
sentences would elicit smaller distances compared to incongruent sentences. 
 
Experiment 8 
Sampling 
We recruited participants from the U.S.A. through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk for all experiments. Unless otherwise noted, the required sample sizes across 
experiments were fixed ahead of data collection but the final sample sizes were 
not completely predetermined due to the unpredictable nature of online 
recruitment (e.g., because of slight over-recruitment and removing participants 
due to duplicate IP addresses). Power calculations for mixed-effects regressions 
can be difficult so we based our sample sizes on achieving at least 80% power to 
detect small-to-medium effects (dz = 0.35) in simpler, within-subjects t-tests for 
our within-subjects designs. The data and materials for all experiments are 
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available at osf.io/37g9k/. We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions 
in these experiments. 
Method 
Participants. In Experiment 8, 80 participants (44 males: Mage = 34.60, 
SDage = 10.26) completed a brief online study about people's perceptions of 
physical closeness. We excluded an additional 3 participants due to duplicate IP 
addresses (here and throughout, we retained the earliest response). 
Materials and procedures. We created a stimulus-manipulation 
procedure where participants moved two individual sentences, describing two 
events of a scenario, closer together or further apart depending on how close they 
felt the events were in space. There were 8 positions that the sentences could 
occupy (see Figure 1).  At the beginning of each trial, the first event of the scenario 
(e.g., “Frank raped a co-worker at a company retreat”) occupied the first position 
and the outcome event (e.g., “Frank was in a freak car accident”) occupied the fifth 
position. Participants were instructed to click and drag the sentences closer 
together or further apart from each other than this original position. Specifically, 
for each trial, participants read: “How physically close do these two events feel to 
you? If the events feel closer to you than they are right now, drag them closer 
together. If they feel further away, drag them further apart.” 
Prior to the main block, participants completed 1 practice trial with neutral 
sentences (“David took his bicycle to the corner store” and “Ross bought a new 
jigsaw puzzle”), and they were shown images of example positions for sentences 
that could be as close together as possible (positions 1 and 2) or as far apart as 
possible (positions 1 and 8). 
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Chapter 5, Figure 1. Examples of congruent (left) and incongruent (right) 
trials/scenarios across experiments. The images depict the starting positions of 
the immoral actions and outcomes for each trial. For Experiment 10, the white 
arrow illustrates the starting path of the red circle’s motion once the trial began.  
 
The scenarios we used for Experiment 8 represented the conditions of a 
fully-within 2 (Congruency: morally congruent vs. morally incongruent) X 2 
(Person: same vs. different) factorial design (for a full list of scenarios used in each 
experiment, see Appendix B). In each scenario, the individual was a bad person. 
Congruency was manipulated by varying the value of the outcome (bad vs. good; 
congruent vs. incongruent, respectively). For the Person factor, we manipulated 
whether the outcome occurred to the same person or a different person by varying 
the names of the characters within the scenarios (e.g., Frank-Frank vs. Geoff-
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Mark). We included the Person factor in our design to address one possible 
alternative explanation: that participants might spatially bind the bad (vs. good) 
outcomes to the immoral behaviours because they are similarly valenced, rather 
than because they are perceiving bad outcomes as consequences of the immoral 
actions of the people on whom they befall. Although Frank might deserve a bad 
outcome because he was a bad person, Geoff doesn’t deserve a bad outcome 
simply because Mark was a bad person. Thus, although there is a congruency 
between the value of the actions and outcomes in both cases, we expected 
congruency to affect binding more strongly when the outcome occurred to the 
person who deserved it (i.e., the same person). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two sets of 8 scenarios (2 
scenarios per each condition). The scenarios were the same across sets (i.e., the 
good/bad action by the protagonist and the ensuing outcome) except that the 
names of the characters changed (e.g., the “John embezzled funds/John’s 
apartment was flooded” scenario in set 1 became the “Mark embezzled 
funds/Tony’s apartment was flooded” scenario in set 2). In other words, across 
sets the scenarios changed conditions, such that a ‘same person’ scenario in Set 1 
became a ‘different person’ scenario in Set 2, in order to fully counter-balance any 
individual effect of scenario. Participants responded to the scenarios in succession 
and in a random order. Finally, participants reported their age and gender. We 
operationalised the perceived distance between the bad behaviors and outcomes 
as the absolute difference between the positions participants placed the two 
sentences. Thus, scores could range from 1 (the sentences were placed directly 
next to each other) to 7 (the sentences were placed as far apart as possible), with 
higher values indicating greater perceived spatial distances. 
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Results 
Distances between the behaviors and outcomes were subjected to a 2 
(Person) x 2 (Congruence) x 2 (Set) mixed ANOVA. Analyses revealed a main effect 
for Person, F(1,78) = 74.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .489, and Congruency, F(1,78) = 41.83, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .349, showing that sentences were placed significantly closer 
together when they were morally congruent and involved the same person. More 
importantly, as shown in Figure 2, there was a significant Person X Congruency 
interaction, F(1,78) = 23.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .233. Furthermore, the two sets did not 
differ in sentence placement, F(1,78) = 0.18, p = .894, and there was no significant 
interaction involving the sets and the within-subject factors: Person (2) X Set (2), 
F(1,78) = 0.29, p = .589; Congruence (2) X Set (2), F(1,78) = 0.27, p = .606; Person 
(2) X Congruence (2) X Set (2), F(1,78) = 0.29, p = .591. Referring to Figure 2, this 
effect appears to be driven by a combination of sentences being both congruent 
and involving the same person. Paired-samples t-tests revealed comparisons for 
movements of outcomes closer to the immoral actions when they were congruent 
(vs. incongruent) were significant when the events occurred to the same persons 
(t(79) = 6.84, p < .001). This effect was also present for different persons, (t(79) = 
2.88, p = .005), but to a lesser degree.  
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Chapter 5, Figure 2. The effect of moral congruency on the distance between the 
immoral behaviors and outcomes as a function of whether the outcomes occurred 
to the same vs. different persons (Experiments 8 and 9). Error bars show 95% 
confidence intervals of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 8 we demonstrated that two morally congruent sentences 
that form a scenario are placed in closer proximity to each other than morally 
incongruent sentences. Additionally, this effect was bolstered when the scenario 
events involved the same person, although there was a significant effect of moral 
congruence for different people as well. The interaction between Congruence and 
Person was also significant. Inspecting the mean scores/Figure 2, there is a clear 
advantage for events occurring to the same person in terms of spatial proximity.  
This indicates that, while congruent valence of the sentences may contribute to an 
individual’s desire to place them closer in space, a larger influence is whether the 
events involved the same person. In terms of immanent justice reasoning, morally 
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congruent events involving the same person reflect events that fit a “Just World” 
narrative (Lerner, 1980), forming a stronger causal relationship (reflected via 
spatial contiguity) than events involving different people. 
 However, the presence of a main effect of congruence suggests that IJR may 
be a contributory factor, rather than single cause for spatial proximity placements. 
In other words, morally congruent sentences were placed significantly closer 
together when events occurred to the different people compared to incongruent 
sentences. 
Experiment 9 
In Experiment 9, we wished to replicate these findings to solidify our 
observations. We developed a more flexible paradigm within which, instead of 
ranks that may limit spatial selection, participants could, by using their mouse, 
freely place one sentence of the scenario around the computer screen. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-two participants completed an online study (30 males, 
31 females, 1 preferred not to say: Mage = 34.79, SDage = 11.23). 
Materials and procedure. Participants first reported their age and 
gender. Experiment 9 was the same as Experiment 8 except that participants could 
freely move the “outcome” sentence to any position on the screen. The sentence 
describing the immoral action always occupied a fixed position in the centre of the 
screen. Each sentence was fixed to a black circle positioned directly above the 
middle of the sentence (see Figure 1). For each trial, the starting position of the 
moveable sentence was below the stationary sentence, two-thirds vertically of the 
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display-screen. We asked participants to position the circles as close or as far apart 
as they wanted. Once they had clicked to select the position of the moveable circle, 
they could confirm their choice, or cancel to reposition the circle.  We 
operationalised the distance between the deeds and outcomes as the absolute 
relative distance between the circles. We first calculated the Euclidean distance in 
pixels between the centre of the screen (the location of the fixed circle), and the 
selected position of the moveable circle. We then divided this by the maximum 
possible distance in pixels (i.e. from the centre of the screen to the corner of the 
screen), taken from the screen resolution of the participant’s computer. We took 
the absolute value of this score, to give a positive score regardless of the direction 
participants chose to move the ball. We then multiplied this value by 100, to give 
a score representing the percentage of the maximum possible distance the two 
balls could be separated. Experiment 9 was created in Inquisit 4 (Millisecond 
Software, Seattle, WA) and based on Lyons-Warren, Rema, and Hershey’s (2004) 
script for a spatial delayed response task. 
Results  
The distances between the circles (behaviours and outcomes) were 
analysed using a 2 (Person) x 2 (Congruence) x 2 (Set) mixed ANOVA as per 
Experiment 1. Analyses revealed main effects for Person, F(1,60) = 51.01, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .460, and Congruency, F(1,60) = 37.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .386. Consistent with 
Experiment 1, there was a significant Person X Congruency interaction, F(1,60) = 
7.96, p = .006, ηp2 = .117 (see Figure 1).  
Referring to Figure 2, similar to Experiment 8, this effect appears to be 
driven by a combination of sentences being both congruent and involving the 
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same person. Paired samples t-tests revealed that participants positioned the 
circles associated with the immoral behaviours closer to the circles associated 
with the outcomes when they were congruent (vs. incongruent). This effect was 
significant both when the sentences depicted the same person, (t(61) = 5.54, p < 
.001), and when the sentences depicted two different people, (t(61) = 4.05, p < 
.001). Nonetheless, the presence of a significant interaction confirms that the 
effect was significantly stronger in the same person condition than the different 
person condition.  
Furthermore, the two sets did not differ in sentence placement, F(1,60) = 
2.60, p = .112, and nor did the sets significantly interact with person, F(1,60) = 
0.97, p = .329, or congruence, F(1,60) = 0.32, p = .574. However, a three-way 
interaction, Set (2) X Congruence (2) X Person (2), was significant, F(1,60) = 4.03, 
p = .049. As shown in Figure 3, this effect appears to be driven by a difference 
between scenarios involving different persons when the action/outcome of the 
scenario were congruent.  
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Chapter 5, Figure 3. The effect of moral congruency on the distance between the 
immoral behaviors and outcomes as a function of whether the outcomes occurred 
to the same vs. different persons (Sets 1 and 2, Experiment 9). Error bars show 
95% confidence intervals of the mean. 
Discussion 
Experiment 9, affording participants more flexibility in their spatial 
proximity placements, reinforced our findings from Experiment 8. Specifically, 
morally congruent sentences that form a scenario are placed in closer proximity 
to each other than morally incongruent sentences, particularly when these 
sentences involve the same person. Additionally, as the main effect of ‘Person’ (F 
= 51.01) was relatively much larger than the main effect of ‘Congruence’ (F = 
37.68), spatial proximity placements appear to be more influenced by events that 
involve the same person rather than moral congruence, akin to Experiment 8, 
illustrated by Fig. 2. 
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As we consistently showed that sentences occurring to the same person 
generate more proximal placements compared to different persons, we removed 
the person factor from Experiment 10.  
Experiment 10 
The task we used in Experiment 10 was more active and dynamic than the tasks 
in Experiments 8 and 9. Participants controlled a moveable representation of a 
good or bad outcome and were asked to maintain its distance from a “chasing” ball 
representing a target’s immoral behaviour. The rationale for this approach is that 
while experiments 8 and 9 represented spatial binding in the form of static 
decision making, phrasing within imminent justice reasoning literature often 
speaks of “maintaining” a commitment to justice in the face of threat (Callan et al., 
2014). Experiments 8 and 9 demonstrated participants’ spatial representations of 
their feelings of proximity towards the sentences. In Experiment 10, we wanted to 
explore the effort behind maintaining a commitment to justice in the form of 
spatial binding, where participants had to continuously move the outcome 
sentence of the scenario while the descriptor sentence “chased” the participant’s 
sentence. The average distance between the two sentences would then quantify a 
participant’s effort to maintain a specific spatial proximity between the two 
sentences based on the participant’s feelings of how close the sentences should 
be. 
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Method 
Participants. We recruited 68 participants (40 males, 27 females, 1 
preferred not to say: Mage = 33.60, SDage = 9.48; 66 participants were requested 
through MTurk). 
Materials and procedures. In Experiment 10, after reporting their age 
and gender, participants controlled the movements of a circle representing the 
outcome (a white circle) while this was “chased” by a circle representing the initial 
deed (a red circle; see Figure 1). Both circles started each trial in the center of the 
screen on the vertical plane, and at 30% and 70% of the screen on the horizontal 
plane. Participants pressed one of the arrow keys to move the white circle. The 
circle moved one-step (4% of the screen) every 300 ms provided the participant 
had pressed during that time. The red circle moved one-step (2% of the screen 
size), in the direction of the white circle every 300ms. Each trial lasted 15 seconds, 
and participants could move the white circle away from or towards the red circle 
to keep them as close together or as far apart as they wanted them to be. We 
calculated the distance between the two circles on each sample (every 300ms) 
using their horizontal and vertical positions given as a percentage of the screen 
(i.e. 0%,0% for the top left corner, 50%,50% for the center, and 100%, 100% for 
the bottom right corner). The distance was calculated by summing the vertical 
distance and the horizontal distance on each sample. We calculated the average 
distance across the course of the trial by taking the mean distance over each of the 
50 samples.  
Given that our Experiments 8 and 9 showed that the predicted effect of 
congruency on perceived distance between the behaviours and outcomes was not 
187 
 
simply due to them being similarly valenced (i.e., because the effects of 
congruency on perceived distance were weaker when the outcome occurred to a 
different vs. the same person), we did not include a Person factor in Experiment 
10. Following a practice trial with neutral sentences (as per Experiment 8), 
participants responded to four congruent (e.g., “Joe robbed a store at gun point” 
and “Joe’s apartment was destroyed by fire”) and four incongruent (e.g., “Tim 
kidnapped a child” and “Tim received a major pay rise at work”) scenarios. 
Participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 8 sets of 8 scenarios (see 
osf.io/37g9k/); the scenarios were presented sequentially in a random order 
across participants.   
Results 
The distances participants kept the circles associated with the outcomes 
from the “chasing” circles associated with the deeds were analysed with a 2 
(Congruence) x 8 (Set) mixed ANOVA. Analyses revealed a significant effect for 
Congruency, F(1,67) = 45.50, p = <.001, ηp2 = .404, such that participants actively 
kept the outcome circles closer to the “chasing” immoral action circles when they 
were congruent (M = 16.42, SD = 7.65) than when they were incongruent (M = 
22.41, SD = 6.04). Like the previous two experiments, between-subjects analysis 
showed that there was no significant difference between sets, F(7,67) = 0.92, p = 
.445. 
General Discussion 
Events that are causally linked appear closer together in space and time 
(Faro et al., 2005; Buehner & Humphreys, 2010). Across three studies, we show 
188 
 
for the first time that even events with no logical causal association feel closer 
together when they satisfy our need to perceive that people get what they deserve 
(Lerner, 1980). Negative life events were positioned closer to previous immoral 
behaviours than were positive life events (Experiments 8 and 9). Furthermore, 
when controlling the movement of a positive or negative life event that was being 
chased by a bad person, participants kept positive outcomes further away from 
bad people (Experiment 10). This suggests that not only did participants position 
bad events and bad people closer together, they actively tried to keep good events 
away from bad people.  
Taken together our findings show that the fallacy of immanent justice 
reasoning extends beyond a belief that bad behaviour causes negative life events, 
such that this belief generates a bias in the spatial proximity of these two events. 
This effect was not merely driven by participants being more inclined to group 
together two negative sentences, since the effect was significantly larger when the 
two events were described with the same protagonist. As such, although a 
cheating spouse and a car crash victim might feel closer together, this is 
particularly the case when the negative event has befallen the person committing 
the immoral act.  
The current studies contribute to the growing literature of immanent 
justice reasoning by extending beyond self-report measures ordinarily employed 
(Callan et al., 2014). Where spatial binding research demonstrates the perceived 
contraction in space between causally linked events, we equally demonstrate that 
beliefs concerning justice can impact the spatial proximity between two complex, 
social events. In other words, the cognitive and motivational underpinnings of 
immanent justice reasoning extend to implicit measures, and our desire to 
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maintain justice against threats not only affects our causal reasoning, but our 
sense of spatial contiguity. Additionally, given that, other than chance, no rational 
explanations to the sequences of events are possible, our findings highlight that 
our inferences of causality dependent upon spatial proximity may be as equally 
subject to non-rational causal systems as our explicit explanations of why bad 
outcomes happen to bad people.  
From just-world theory, we would assume that this pattern occurred due 
to the perception that negative (positive) outcomes were more deserving of 
negative (positive) outcomes. The relationship between deservingness and 
immanent justice reasoning is tightly linked, where the more deserving of the 
outcome an individual is perceived to be, the more likely that events that befall 
them will be causally attributed to them if they are morally congruent (Callan et 
al., 2014). This presents the opportunity to solidify our findings: future studies 
could ask participants to rate the deservingness of scenarios and using 
mediational analysis could determine the extent to which spatial proximity of 
morally charged sentences is underpinned by concerns for deservingness. 
However, an alternative explanation of closer proximity placements for 
morally congruent sentences may be confounded by the extent to which the 
sentences are perceived as similar. Casasanto (2008) found that participants rated 
stimulus word pairings (e.g., memory-hope) as more conceptually similar the 
closer together the words appeared on screen, arguing that people use spatial 
proximity as a cue for judging similarity. Thus, participants may have positioned 
morally congruent sentences closer together on the basis of similarity; for 
example, “Neil assaulted a child” and “Neil slipped and fractured his leg” are 
similar given that they are both negative and involve physical harm, rendering the 
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decision to remove the person factor from Experiment 10 potentially problematic. 
Thus, future work could additionally acquire ratings of similarity of sentences and 
using scenarios as the unit of mediational analysis would allow us to address 
further the issue of whether congruence per se is associated with the spatial 
binding of bad outcomes to immoral actions or whether conceptual similarity 
between actions and outcomes might be confounding this association. Specifically, 
where we showed a significant main effect of congruence driving sentence 
placements, such an effect may divide between congruence and similarity, 
denoting which produces the most influence. 
Consideration should also be given to the possibility that response bias 
(responding consistently with beliefs about what the experiment wants to find) 
may have contributed towards participants’ decisions of sentence placement. In 
other words, closer spatial proximity between morally congruent sentences (and 
vice versa for incongruent sentences) may have been driven by participants 
presuming upon the experiment’s aims and expectations. In order to minimise any 
contribution from response bias in future experiments, one option would be to 
conduct a between-subjects style design, where participants are divided by moral 
congruence, such that participants would only see morally congruent or 
incongruent scenarios. Alternatively, asking participants at the end of the 
experiment whether they could guess the hypothesis of the experiment would 
allow the removal of those participants who had guessed correctly. 
A further caveat to our experiments, however, is that participants chose to 
position events based on how close they felt the events should be. Although 
participants were asked to place events according to how close they felt the events 
should be, participants actively chose the spatial proximity, rather than perceiving 
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a particular distance, as is typical in spatial binding research (Buehner & 
Humphreys, 2009). Therefore, these experiments did not deal with perception per 
se, but rather the conscious decisions made that reflect spatial contiguity, and so 
our experiments cannot be fully labelled as an implicit measure. Nevertheless, 
even if inferences of causality drawn from spatial proximity cannot be relied upon 
in terms of perception of events, then at least we appear to spatially relate events 
closer together in terms of their causal relatedness in conscious decision-making. 
Subsequently, these experiments do extend previous IJR findings beyond the 
overtly explicit self-report measures of which are typically employed.   
The next step in this line of research should be to ascertain whether the 
desire for spatial proximity between events extends to the perceptual level, closer 
in line with previous spatial binding research (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010). For 
example, a ball representing a good or bad action could contact a one side of an 
object, launching a second ball representing a morally (in)congruent outcome on 
the adjacent side, and participants could then replicate the size of the object, with 
smaller sizes suggesting a stronger causal connection between the two, as per the 
archetypal Michottean launching task (Michotte, 1963).  
To extend this line of investigation even further, and, given that children 
demonstrate less immanent justice reasoning that adults (Raman & Winer, 2004), 
either measure of spatial binding (free placement or perceptual) could be 
compared between adults and children to explore whether the implicit bias we 
have found parallels the existing explicit causal reasoning bias shown throughout 
development. Naturally, as has been shown in previous research, we might equally 
expect that spatial binding would inflate with prior exposure to an unrelated, 
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innocent victim’s suffering (Callan et al., 2006) or to long-term goal focus (Callan, 
Harvey, et al., 2013). 
Overall, we have shown that when making sense of the world around us, 
our experience of the spatial proximity between events is warped to fit the idea 
that the world is a fair and just place; bad people really do feel close to bad 
outcomes. 
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General Discussion 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate how attributions of causality, 
specifically the temporal binding between actions and their outcomes observed 
within sense of agency (SoA) research, translate to social, meaningful contexts. 
Moreover, a secondary aim of this thesis was to provide further input as to the 
specific mechanisms of temporal binding as a measure of SoA and implicit causal 
attribution in general. 
As my PhD research progressed, the findings from my experiments 
motivated a shift in theoretical focus: not only did I fail to replicate previous 
research suggesting that temporal binding, and thus SoA, could be modulated by 
social factors (Chapter 2), this equally prevented the line of investigation I wished 
to pursue across the previous three years of academic research. Given that the aim 
of my thesis was to investigate implicit causal beliefs within the context of SoA 
first, and continuously adapt my experiments to further socially relevant settings 
and known explicit biases in causal reasoning/inference, again, the findings from 
Chapter 2 suggested our approach be modified.  
As the specific outcomes used in Chapter 2 involved emotional valence, we 
shifted our approach by exploring temporal binding with immanent justice 
reasoning (IJR) in Chapter 3. However, similar to Chapter 2, we again found no 
modulation of temporal binding. The findings from both chapters 2 and 3 led to 
the experiments contained within Chapter 4, where our approach was further 
modified to examine under what conditions causal beliefs modulate the perceived 
time between causally related events. In Chapter 4 I extended/replicated two 
well-cited experiments in an attempt to clarify the mechanisms of temporal 
binding in terms of causal perception and low-level factors such as temporal 
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prediction. The findings of Chapter 4, however, only provided slightly more clarity 
over why two causally related events become temporally attracted to each other. 
Thus, chapters 2–4 construct a narrative where temporal binding, 
measured with a variety of methods, remained mostly impassive to modulation, 
regardless of physical or abstract causality, with a tentative conclusion drawn 
from Experiment 6 that causality is not wholly necessary to produce binding. As a 
result, my research transferred over to spatial binding, where I explored how 
otherwise causally unrelated events could influence feelings of spatial contiguity 
due to the moral valence of the events (Chapter 5). Chapter 2 has subsequently 
been published in the journal Consciousness and Cognition, and Chapter 5 has 
been submitted for publication at this time of writing. 
  
Summary of Findings 
                       Experiments 1 – 4 investigated if and how temporal binding is 
modulated by emotional valence. In accordance with the aims of my thesis, these 
experiments were conducted to establish a basic effect that temporal binding, and 
by extension, our SoA, could be modulated by social outcomes. However, 
Experiments 1 and 2 found no significant difference in binding between positive 
and negative emoticons (Experiment 1) or positive and negative real facial 
expressions (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 revealed that the stimuli used in 
experiments 1 and 2 were equivalent in valence and arousal to stimuli that have 
previously been observed to modulate temporal binding (Yoshie & Haggard, 
2013). Finally, in a highly powered replication study (Experiment 4), we observed 
no significant modulation of temporal binding by emotionally valenced 
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vocalisations. This occurred despite the original paper’s (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013) 
reported findings that negative vocalisations produced significantly less binding.  
Experiment 5 investigated the extent to which unconnected events could 
be causally linked due to their moralistic congruency, measured via temporal 
binding. This experiment sought to both further support previous explicit causal 
attributions within immanent justice research, as well as investigate the 
effectiveness and accuracy of temporal binding as a tool with which to measure 
implicit causal attribution. However, using estimations of the interval between a 
scenario depicting either a good or bad individual and a subsequent good or bad 
outcome elicited no modulations of temporal binding. Similar to Chapter 2, this 
experiment questioned temporal binding’s usage as a measure of implicit causal 
beliefs; at least, to the extent that social outcomes can have a direct influence (e.g., 
Christensen et al., 2016; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). 
Experiments 6 and 7 investigated causal binding with regards to self- and 
other-actions. These experiments were conducted to explore whether top-down 
processes (knowledge of a causal relationship) were sufficient to produce the 
binding phenomenon when measured via stimulus anticipation. Moreover, these 
experiments directly follow those from Chapter 2, which questioned temporal 
binding as measure of SoA, and by extension, its ability to detect any modulations 
in implicit causal beliefs. Experiment 6, an extension of Buehner (2012), found 
significantly stronger temporal binding for self-caused actions at 500ms 
compared to a baseline condition. A time-sequence condition, where participants 
observed a time-sequence counting upwards and a signal occurred within a 2 – 5 
second range, did not differ from either of the other two conditions. At 900ms, 
participants anticipated the target stimulus significantly more so than both 
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baseline and self-causal conditions, with no difference observed between the 
latter two. Our findings partially replicate Buehner (2012), who found greater 
temporal binding for his self-causal and machine-causal conditions at 500ms 
(compared to baseline), and more temporal binding for the machine-causal 
binding at 900ms. 
Experiment 7 failed to replicate Desantis, Roussel, and Waszak (2011)’s 
findings that causal beliefs modulate temporal binding. Specifically, in our study, 
there were no differences between self- and other-outcome stimulus 
anticipations.   
Due to our inability to find sufficient evidence of temporal binding being 
modulated by either emotional valence, causal beliefs, or justice-based reasoning, 
experiments 8—10 investigated the extent to which explicit self-report measures 
used within immanent justice reasoning research replicates with spatial binding. 
Specifically, participants chose where to place two objects representing sentences 
that dictated the moral worth of an individual (e.g., a good or bad person) and an 
outcome occurring to them later on (good outcome or bad outcome). Per previous 
research (e.g. Callan et al., 2006; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009), we expected 
closer positioning of the two events when they were morally congruent, but only 
when the events concerned the same person. As a result, the findings of Chapter 5 
showed that participants positioned representations of people’s fortuitous 
outcomes significantly closer in space to representations of their previous 
immoral actions when the outcomes occurred to the same person (Frank punched 
someone - Frank was in a car accident) more strongly than when the outcomes 
occurred to a different person (Frank punched someone - Joe was in a car 
accident) throughout experiments 8 (ordering sentences in a ranked list) and 9 
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(freely placing one event around the screen). Experiment 10 showed that 
perceived deservingness predicted spatial position, with participants acting to 
keep good outcomes and bad people apart, as compared to bad outcomes and bad 
people.  
 
Discussion of key variables – Sense of Agency and Temporal Binding 
Research within the SoA literature suggests it is prone to influence from 
external factors (Aarts et al., 2007; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Engbert et 
al.,2007; Takahata et al., 2012). Specifically, Yoshie & Haggard (2013) suggested 
that, via the self-serving bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999), outcomes with a 
negative valence extend the perceived temporal interval between action and 
outcome. Conversely, positive outcomes induce actions and outcomes closer 
together. The findings from Chapter 2, however, seriously question this assertion. 
A more recent study, citing the research within Chapter 2, replicated our findings 
where valence had no impact on binding (Barlas, Hockley, & Obhi, 2017). Recent 
evidence by the same authors as those whose experiment was replicated in 
Experiment 4 (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013) conducted a further laboratory 
experiment investigating the effect of predictability of emotionally valenced 
outcomes (Yoshie & Haggard, 2017). Whilst no effect of unpredictable outcomes 
was found, predictable positive outcomes produced significantly more binding 
than negative outcomes. This effect was solely due to outcomes being perceived 
as earlier, rather than actions being perceived as later. This is slightly inconsistent 
with their previous paper (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013, supplementary materials), 
where they report both action and outcome shifts influenced the overall binding 
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effect (though the effect was still predominantly driven by outcome binding). 
Again, this is also inconsistent with our data, where the majority of the composite 
binding observed was due to action binding, although did not reach a statistically 
significant level.  
Thus, at least as far emotional valence goes, temporal binding does not 
appear to be modulated by such external factors. Future work should therefore 
attempt to replicate and extend other examples of self-serving bias in temporal 
binding (Aarts et al., 2012; Takahata et al., 2012) and sensory attenuation 
(Gentsch et al., 2015) to further advance our understanding of how (or if) outcome 
valence influences implicit agency.  
Moving forward, not only do the results from Chapter 2 suggest that 
emotional valence does not influence temporal binding, but they also challenge 
the idea that the self-serving bias interacts with temporal binding (and by proxy, 
the SoA). However, some evidence suggests that positive outcomes do engender 
more SoA than negative outcomes using explicit causal judgements: Oishi et 
al.(2018) asked participants to move a controllable dot to a target whilst the target 
was of a specific colour. The dot contacting the target during the correct colour 
denoted a success trial. Conversely, an incorrect colour denoted a failed trial. On a 
0-100 scale, participants significantly rated more control over the dot during 
success vs. failed trials. Thus, concerning sense of control over our actions 
measured explicitly, the self-serving bias may influence our judgement. That we 
failed to find any such influence with temporal binding methodologies leads to two 
interpretations: my thesis further contributes either 1) to the doubt that temporal 
binding measures the SoA, or 2) to the evidence that feelings (implicit) and 
judgements (explicit) of agency are distinct concepts, and that judgements of 
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agency are more susceptible to cognitive biases such as the self-serving bias 
(Synofzik et al., 2008). Where feelings of agency refer to the implicit SoA that 
temporal binding is purported to capture, my thesis suggests that the self-serving 
bias may not interact with this aspect of SoA, and, as Oishi et al. (2018) 
demonstrate, may only hold influence over judgements of agency. Recent evidence 
also suggests that neither sensory attenuation (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014) nor 
temporal binding (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Saito et al., 2015) correlate with 
explicit reports of agency. While explicit and implicit measures will never show 
total convergence, positive evidence of covariation is important to argue that 
conscious reports and unconscious biases are indeed measuring the same 
underlying process.  
Another important debate with regard to temporal binding is the extent to 
which this reflects agency per se., or simply causality. Chapter 4 of my thesis 
investigated how causal beliefs, and not intentional actions, modulate temporal 
binding, in order to shed some light on the matter, using stimulus anticipation. 
Specifically, we extended previous research (Buehner, 2012) in order to test 
whether knowledge of a causal mechanism to produce a stimulus change would 
elicit temporal binding. Buehner (2012) compared self-caused actions to 
machine-caused actions to investigate whether knowledge of a causal mechanism 
was sufficient to produce binding. Buehner found that both self- and machine-
caused actions produced greater binding overall than passively observing a signal 
indicating the sequence of events. Unlike Experiment 4, we managed to partially 
replicate this original paper, where at 500ms self-caused targets were anticipated 
earlier than those in the baseline condition. Our time-sequence condition that 
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replaced Buehner’s machine-causal condition, however, did not differ from either 
baseline or self-causal conditions.  
Thus, at a shorter time interval, we appear to reinforce Buehner’s findings. 
However, at 900ms, outcomes in the time-sequence condition were anticipated 
more than the other two, with no distinction between self-causal and baseline 
conditions. Experiment 6 showed that, at least in part, the causal binding 
presented within Buehner (2012) might have been partially driven by processes 
other than an understanding of causality between events. The lack of self-causal 
binding at 900ms suggests that intentionality, despite that it may be neither 
necessary nor sufficient to solely produce binding (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; 
Obhi & Hall, 2011), may still contribute to an overall binding effect at shorter 
intervals. As previous research suggests temporal binding for self-causal actions 
may weaken beyond a certain threshold, where voluntary actions produce 
temporal shifts at short intervals (Engbert et al., 2008; Haggard et al., 2002), 
intentional action might explain the findings for our self-causal condition between 
500ms and 900ms.  
Such a conclusion is reinforced by the quantity of studies suggesting that 
voluntary actions do produce temporal binding (David et al., 2008; Moore et al. 
2009a; Moore and Haggard 2008; Tsakiris and Haggard 2003), and that 
intentional binding, i.e. temporal binding with intentional actions, is a subset of 
causal binding as Buehner (2012) suggests, where intentional actions contribute 
to causal predictivity of outcomes, drawn towards the action under the principles 
of temporal contiguity. This line of reasoning falls within Bayes theorem of 
ambiguity reduction, where judgement under uncertainty necessitates the use of 
multiple signals to arrive at the most probabilistic cause of an outcome.  
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However, the influence of intentionality has been found primarily through 
measuring temporal binding via the Libet clock or temporal estimation methods, 
as opposed to stimulus anticipation. Moreover, Buehner (2012) showed 
inconsistent patterns in the self-causal condition between his Experiments 1 and 
2, finding less self-causal binding in the latter when participants initiated the trial 
with a preliminary button press. This may either indicate that stimulus 
anticipation is less susceptible to the influence of intentionality of action, or that 
this method may be less reliable than other well-tested measures. 
Hence, another possible interpretation of Experiment 6’s results portends 
to the reliability and/or effectiveness of stimulus anticipation serving as a 
measure of temporal binding. This was reinforced in Experiment 7 where we 
found no difference between the self-causal condition and baseline measures. 
Such a result conflicts with that of Experiment 6, which did show a significant 
difference between self-caused actions and passively observing events in the 
baseline condition, albeit only at 500ms. Furthermore, given that only three 
known prior publications have utilised stimulus anticipation to measure temporal 
binding (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2012; Blakey, et al., 2019), our 
findings, and lack of replication in Experiment 7, suggest that stimulus 
anticipation, as compared to other known methods (e.g., temporal estimation, 
Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007), is not as reliable.  
Speculation might also posit that stimulus anticipation’s inability to detect 
differences between self-caused outcomes and baseline measures is due to 
stimulus anticipation’s nature as an active task, meaning actions are actively timed 
to the onset of when an event is thought to occur. The Libet Clock/temporal 
estimation tasks, on the other hand, are retrospective judgements free from action 
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planning, motor coordination and active time computation in order to accurately 
align action and event onset. Therefore, with increased cognitive load, stimulus 
anticipation may be less susceptible to response bias than other measures (e.g., 
Libet Clock/temporal estimation) that might enable biased temporal estimations 
for shorter/longer temporal interval durations based on experimental condition. 
However, given the limited publications on stimulus anticipation binding 
(Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2012; Blakey, et al., 2019), none of which 
discuss the actual mechanism underlying stimulus anticipation beyond stating 
that if temporal binding is present, the interval between the two events in the 
causal condition relative to the non‐causal condition should be underestimated, 
future work would need to establish the cognitive load potential of stimulus 
anticipation relative to other measures. 
Conversely, our findings may otherwise suggest that top-down 
mechanisms, such as the existence of a causal relation between events, might not 
modulate temporal binding. Specifically, that efforts to convince participants that 
a machine acting as a causal agent, and causal beliefs regarding the author of 
outcome, are not necessary.  
As has been discussed in Chapter 1, efferent motor signals, espoused by the 
comparator model of SoA, have been proposed to produce binding (Haggard & 
Clark, 2003), but may not be strictly necessary (Moore et al., 2013; Poonian & 
Cunnington, 2013). Intentional actions have been shown to elicit binding in some 
research (Haggard et al., 2002), but are also not strictly necessary (Buehner, 2012; 
Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). Knowledge of the causal mechanism between two 
events may influence temporal binding (Buehner, 2012), but, as Chapter 4 
demonstrates, may also not be necessary, as is the case at 900ms where a simple 
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visual counter, giving a predictable temporal window of the initial event, 
produced greater temporal binding for the following event than self-caused 
actions. 
The difference between our self-causal condition and baseline can be 
attributed to the aforementioned notion that the effect of intentional action 
diminishes over time. However, what other mechanisms remain as to explain how 
temporal binding for our time-sequence condition was greater than self-caused 
actions at a later interval? In this condition, no voluntary action was performed, 
and therefore proponents of the comparator model would be unable to answer. 
Equally, no notion of causality was apparent to participants, who passively 
observed one event following another.  
In their review Hughes et al. (2013) suggest four factors that influence 
prediction of a stimulus or action-effect: temporal prediction, temporal control, 
non-motor identity prediction, and motor identity prediction. Applying a contrast 
to our conditions in Experiment 6, the self-causal condition is left with both 
temporal control over the outcome (using one’s action to control the point in time 
at which a stimulus will occur), temporal predictivity (the ability to predict the 
onset time of when the stimuli will occur) and motor identity prediction 
(prediction of the identity of a sensory event based on an action) over the time-
sequence and baseline condition. However, both the baseline and time-counter 
conditions contained the same processes of temporal predictivity and motor 
identity prediction. One conclusion, therefore, is that temporal control over the 
onset of outcome may only generate temporal binding at shorter intervals. 
However, this still leaves the disparity between the time-sequence and baseline 
conditions at a longer interval of 900ms, which, despite the same processes 
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outlined in Hughes et al., differed on two accounts: the relative temporal 
predictivity of the signal stimulus, and the visual representation of time. 
Specifically, the baseline condition was predictable within a 500ms margin, with 
the signal stimulus occurring between 2,300–2800ms after trial initiation. -
Conversely, the time-sequence condition was predictable within a 3000ms 
margin, between 2–5s. Note, this difference between conditions is separate from 
the processes listed in Hughes et al. (2013), which concerned the relative effects 
on action-effect prediction, whereas the differences concerning the baseline and 
time-sequence condition only impacted the cue of the action-effect. Given that the 
baseline condition would appear more temporally predictable than the time-
sequence condition, we may rule this out as to why, at a longer interval, the time-
sequence yielded far greater binding (ignoring the line of reasoning that the more 
unpredictable the cue of a stimulus is, the more it is anticipated).  
A remaining factor that differentiated between the time-sequence and 
baseline conditions was the visual depiction of the timer, placed where the signal 
would occur. This visual depiction of time may have employed more visual and 
temporal attention to the oncoming stimulus cue. Research measuring sensory 
attenuation, the counterpart to temporal binding when measuring SoA, has shown 
increased attention modulating sensory attenuation of auditory stimuli, such that 
more attention leads to lower N1 potentials (Lange, 2009). Sensory attenuation 
implies a sufficiently correct match between predicted and actual sensory 
feedback, which, although distinct, complements the perceived temporal 
contiguity between events. Thus, temporal attention may orient participants 
towards a sensory event that predicts a second event, causing the second event to 
appear closer in time. Furthermore, this influence would be more noticeable at 
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longer intervals, where shorter periods enable easier prediction of stimulus 
timings (for a review, see Niemi & Näätänen, 1981). However, this is only 
speculation.  
In a related study, Haggard & Cole (2007) found that attention to a specific 
event (intention, action, or action-effect) produced less binding than when 
participants were instructed to estimate the onset time of the specific event after 
the trial. However, the temporal interval for all trials was 250ms, and the authors 
employed the Libet clock method, which due to involving retrospective time 
estimations (as opposed to the aforementioned dynamic nature of stimulus 
anticipation), may engage different anticipatory properties to stimulus 
anticipation. For example, Spence, Shore and Klein (2001) showed, using a 
temporal order judgement task where an individual is asked to judge the temporal 
order of a sequence of stimuli, that attending to a particular modality speeds up 
the relative temporal processing of that modality. Hence, in Experiment 6, visually 
attending to the timer may have caused a shift in the temporal processing speed 
of visual information, leading to earlier anticipations of following visual stimulus 
events. Future research could explore this further by varying the duration of visual 
attention before presenting a following stimulus to be anticipated to observe any 
modulatory effects. One may also argue that the self-causal condition would have 
greater attention than passively observing a point on the screen, which may 
explain our finding at shorter intervals. 
Overall, the role of attention in temporal binding still requires clarification. 
Experiment 6, although not primarily aimed at investigating attention, found 
results that may serve to base further research upon. Several possible options 
involve either using a visual stimulus unrelated to the counter in place of where 
208 
 
the counter would be, or to have the counter in a different location, in order to 
distinguish between visual and temporal attention. A counter could equally be 
displayed in the self-causal condition in order to fully distinguish between the 
roles of temporal attention and control. Lastly, multiple onset times could also be 
utilised in order to observe a fuller picture of linear trends in binding across short 
and long intervals. 
 
Discussion of key variables – Immanent Justice Reasoning 
Despite the lack of success in observing modulation of temporal binding by 
socially salient outcomes (Chapter 2), or by modifying methods that manipulated 
causal beliefs (Chapter 4), we persevered with our original aim of this research 
project, that the perceptual error phenomena observed within SoA (Moore & Obhi, 
2011) and causality (Buehner, 2012) research, in chapters 3 and 5. Given that our 
findings from Experiment 6 challenged the notion that knowledge of a causal 
relationship between events directly and significantly impacts binding, we were 
cautious to accept such a finding without scepticism. Moreover, such findings may 
have arisen due to stimulus anticipation’s reliability as a measure of temporal 
binding, where causal events, such as intentional action producing a stimulus, 
invoke perceptual contraction of the temporal interval between the events (as has 
been observed via temporal estimation; Fereday & Buehner, 2017; Humphreys & 
Buehner, 2009; Kumar & Srinivasan, 2017). Thus, progressing from the well-
established area of immanent justice reasoning (IJR; Callan et al., 2014), we sought 
to examine how the modulations of explicit causal judgements due to concerns for 
justice translated to temporal (using temporal estimation) and spatial binding.   
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Experiment 5 of Chapter 3 showed that the moral congruence of events 
does not modulate temporal binding. Put simply, it did not matter whether a 
person described as either good or bad encountered a fortuitous good or bad 
event – temporal binding was consistent with typical interval estimations of those 
intervals regardless of condition. As stated in the relevant discussion section, 
three possible conclusions explain the results of Experiment 5: 1) the 
experimental mechanics, i.e., use of a temporal binding measure between a 
vignette and visual outcome, were not appropriate to detecting implicitly held 
causal beliefs; 2) IJR is not susceptible to implicit measures of causal relations 
between two events, or at least, the effect size is vastly small in comparison to its 
relative success using explicit measures (Callan et al., 2014); 3) temporal binding, 
as has been purported (Hughes et al., 2013), is less of a measure of causal relations, 
but is rather much more susceptible to an amalgamation of processes including 
temporal prediction, temporal control, and non-/motor-identity prediction. 
This further lack of success is no surprise given the previous three 
experiments utilising temporal binding. And, as notable point, this is despite using 
both interval estimation and the Libet clock as the measure (or stimulus 
anticipation in further experiments). As such, the most reasonable conclusion to 
draw is that temporal binding may result from several factors, with potential 
emphasis upon weighted integration of sensory evidence, temporal control and 
non-motor identity prediction processes (Desantis et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 
2013). However, for all the wealth of research defining IJR’s strength as an 
influence over explicit causal judgements (Callan et al., 2006; Callan et al., 2014; 
Maes, 1998; Raman & Winer, 2002, 2004; Woolley et al., 2011), this phenomenon 
has yet to be extended to implicit measures.  
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In order to rule out the second conclusion, that IJR is not susceptible to 
implicit measures of causal inference, experiments 8—10 employed spatial 
binding to test whether people would actively keep apart morally incongruent 
events, or conversely place congruent events closer together. We hypothesised 
that spatial binding, the spatial equivalent to temporal binding, may procure more 
promising results after previous evidence demonstrates its relative consistency as 
a measure of causal beliefs (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010; Woods et al., 2012). 
Spatial binding, although less studied than its temporal counterpart, nevertheless 
retains evidence that causally-related stimuli attract each other in space (Buehner 
& Humphreys, 2009; Scholl and Nakayama, 2002). Specifically, the spatial distance 
between two events becomes perceptually contracted when a causal relationship 
exists between them. Given the strength of evidence behind IJR with explicit 
measurements (Callan et al., 2006; Callan et al., 2010; Callan et al., 2013; Harvey 
& Callan, 2014), and that the distance between two moving balls is judged to be 
smaller when the movement of the two balls are causally linked (Buehner & 
Humphreys, 2010), we expected that a robust measure of implicit causal beliefs 
will yield similar results. 
Contrary to our experiments until now, Experiments 8—10 showed that 
when controlling the position or movement of a positive or negative life event, 
relative to the position or movement of a bad person, positive outcomes were kept 
further apart from bad people. This suggests that not only did participants 
position bad events and bad people closer together, they actively tried to keep 
good events away from bad people. One caveat may arise in the form that these 
experiments did not deal with perception per se, but rather the conscious 
decisions made that reflect spatial contiguity. Thus, our experiments cannot be 
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fully labelled as an implicit measure, but they do extend previous IJR findings 
beyond the overtly explicit self-report measures of which are typically employed. 
Future work, in order to ensure covariation between explicit and implicit IJR, 
should also employ explicit measures such as those used within IJR research (e.g., 
“To what extent do you feel XXX caused YYY”, Callan et al., 2006). Covariation 
would validate implicit measures, which, within an area largely based upon 
explicit measures, is important in order to generate confidence that the implicit 
measure is truly measuring the same underlying construct as the explicit measure. 
 Additionally, consideration should also be given to the possibility that 
response bias (responding consistently with beliefs about what the experiment 
wants to find) may have contributed towards participants’ decisions of sentence 
placement. In other words, closer spatial proximity between morally congruent 
sentences (and vice versa for incongruent sentences) may have been driven by 
participants presuming upon the experiment’s aims and expectations. Although 
response biases should always be controlled, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
completely remove such biases from non-natural experiments, especially in 
relation to those involving decisions pertaining to social stimuli (Nederhof, 1985; 
Paulhus, 1991). Moreover, social desirability has been shown to be a separate 
construct to just world beliefs (Dalbert, Lipkus, Sallay, & Goch, 2001; Loo, 2002). 
Cognitive measurements of IJR utilising eye-tracking have also been consistent 
with the self-report style of typical IJR research (Callan et al., 2012), providing 
evidence that people genuinely expect or look for outcomes morally congruent to 
prior events. As such, our findings were weighted on IJR as a genuine 
phenomenon, as the aforementioned evidence suggests. A further way to 
minimise any contribution from response bias in future experiments may involve 
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a between-subjects style design, where participants are divided by moral 
congruence, such that participants would only see morally congruent or 
incongruent scenarios.   
Taken together our findings show that the fallacy of immanent justice 
reasoning extends beyond a belief that bad behaviour causes negative life events, 
such that this belief generates a bias in the spatial proximity of these two events. 
This effect was not merely driven by participants being more inclined to group 
together two negative sentences, since the effect was significantly larger when the 
two events were described with the same protagonist. 
What the research within Chapter 5 demonstrates is that, in contrast to 
temporal binding, spatial binding may yield more of a true implicit measure of 
causality, though the research is beyond making a direct comparison between 
Hume’s tenants of temporal and spatial contiguity and their interaction with the 
binding phenomenon in causal contexts. Furthermore, these results add to the 
discussion of feelings vs. judgements of causality: although participants were 
asked to place events according to how close they felt the events should be, there 
is the additional component that participants actively chose the spatial proximity, 
rather than perceiving a particular distance, as is typical in spatial binding 
research (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). Therefore, even if inferences of causality 
drawn from spatial proximity cannot be relied upon in terms of perception of 
events, then at least we appear to spatially relate events closer together in terms 
of their causal relatedness in conscious decision-making.  
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Thesis Overall Contribution 
 This thesis contributes to the discussion of temporal binding as a 
purported implicit measure of SoA and causality. Specifically, the findings 
question whether temporal binding is indeed a measure of these notions at all, and 
although not directly tested, suggests other mechanisms may explain the findings 
seen throughout previous research. There is no doubt that temporal binding, as a 
phenomenon whereby actions and outcomes are temporally drawn together, does 
occur within laboratory settings. However, the question of why the interval 
becomes contracted requires significant clarification and cannot be wholly 
attributed to one mechanism or another. Many articles continue to assume the 
reasons behind temporal binding; for example, binding reflects SoA due to the 
influence of voluntary action over event/time perception (relative to involuntary 
action/outcomes occurring in isolation), specifically when said actions produce 
learned motor-identity outcomes (Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, 2010; Engbert & 
Wohlschläger, 2007; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Kumar & 
Srinivasan, 2017; Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009; Moore et al., 2012). This 
assumption remains, and is still cited within, recent articles (e.g., Haggard, 2017) 
despite several articles suggesting otherwise; for example, those that show 
neither agency (Buehner and Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2012; Dogge et al., 
2012) nor motor-predictive processes (Desantis et al., 2012; Hughes et al., 2013) 
are required for binding to occur.  
In going beyond the immediate interpretation of each of the previous 
chapters, this thesis overall indicates that temporal binding, albeit an interesting 
phenomenon, might poorly translate to contexts that extend to higher-level 
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processes that involve socially meaningful outcomes, causal inference of 
mechanical agents, or non-physical causality between events.  
In terms of temporal binding arising from weighted cue integration, 
whereby the sensorimotor system combines information from different sources 
such as multiple sensory modalities and external information (Desantis et al., 
2011; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Hillis, Ernst, Banks, & Landy, 2002; Moore & Fletcher, 
2012; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner, & Rowe, 2013), this 
thesis fails to find support for external cues, such as causal knowledge and the 
emotional ramifications of causing negative outcomes, modulating temporal 
binding. 
Much evidence supports the strength of internal cues on our action 
awareness and perception of ensuing sensory events (Balslev, Nielsen, Lund, Law, 
& Paulson, 2006; Frith, 2005; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Tsakiris, 
Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 2005). Where explicit SoA is concerned, 
previous research typically suggests that both internal and external cues are 
optimally combined: for example, Farrer, Valentin and Hupé (2013) showed 
greater SoA attributions when both premotor signals (in an active task) and 
contextual information (a tone occurring at the time of action) were present.  
Further research additionally purports that cue integration is limited to 
action binding, as opposed to outcome binding (Wolpe et al., 2013). However, this 
is inconsistent with research showing the extent to which external factors that 
modulate temporal binding largely (such as identity of the outcome) impact 
outcome binding more significantly relative to action binding (e.g., Yoshie & 
Haggard, 2013). Such findings (e.g., Wolpe et al., 2013) are nonetheless consistent 
with the research presented throughout chapters 2 and 3. 
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Additionally, of note is the continued parallel usages of ‘temporal’ and 
‘intentional’ binding, where in reference to binding as an implicit measure of SoA, 
it is typically referred to as intentional binding (e.g., Haggard, 2017; Wen, 
Yamashita, & Asama, 2015); conversely, temporal binding is seen more frequently 
in research that does not necessarily refer to SoA (e.g., Blakey et al., 2019; Fereday 
& Buehner, 2017), despite using the same methods (e.g., Libet clock, temporal 
estimation, stimulus anticipation) to measure the same perceived temporal shift. 
Moreover, the applicability of these terms and the situational appropriateness of 
when they apply (if they are separately valid terms) has not, to my knowledge, 
been explicitly discussed within the binding literature.   
Subsequently, one possible avenue of thought draws from the lack of 
convergence between explicit and implicit measures of SoA (Dewey & Knoblich, 
2014). In turn, one may infer that such measures indeed measure different aspects 
of SoA. The judgement of agency, and the feeling of agency, are empirically 
distinct; thus, the judgement of causal relationship, and the feeling that two events 
are causally related, might also be distinct, resulting in the lack of convergence 
between explicit and implicit measures, of which temporal binding fails to 
measure. Recent evidence employing transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS) also showed a lack of convergence between implicit and explicit agency: 
Hughes (2018) asked participants to press the ‘up’/’down’ key to produce a 
loud/quiet tone, yet only half of experimental trials contained congruent action-
effects to keypresses. A Libet clock was present throughout the trial, and 
participants were asked to estimate the onset times of their keypresses and the 
following tones in separate trials. Post-trial, participants then respond to seven-
point scale that asked to what extent the participant felt their action caused the 
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tone. Hughes also applied tDCS to participants’ right temporoparietal junction 
(TPJ) in Experiment 1 (left TPJ, Experiment 2). The results showed that 
congruency of action to learned outcomes only impacted explicit ratings of agency; 
binding was unaffected by congruency. Additionally, and despite prior research 
(Khalighinejad & Haggard, 2015), temporal binding was unaffected by TPJ 
stimulation, whereas explicit ratings were reduced with tDCS applied to the right 
TPJ. Hughes (2018) highlights not only the mismatch between implicit and explicit 
agency, but also that congruency fails to modulate temporal binding despite the 
clear causal link between action and the outcome (up for louder sound, down for 
quieter sound). Equally, within the context of the review of temporal binding 
research by Hughes et al., (2013), no studies manipulating action identity 
prediction demonstrate binding modulation.  
Throughout our experiments both congruency and valence failed to 
modulate temporal binding. Therefore, if binding is not modulated by socially 
relevant factors (Chapter 2), consistency of morally valenced action-outcomes 
(Chapter 3), and similar binding occurs between outcomes resulting from 
intentional actions and a time-sequence condition (Chapter 4), simpler 
attentional/temporal control mechanisms cannot be discounted as the cause of 
binding. For example, in their review, Hughes et al. (2013) demonstrate how 
previous studies have failed to isolate motor-identity prediction from temporal 
control. In conjunction, Desantis et al. (2012) also show that temporal control is 
sufficient to produce binding regardless of motor-identity prediction. Moreover, 
as this thesis has shown binding is not modulated by what we know to influence 
explicit agency (e.g., Oishi et al., 2018), we provide evidence that temporal binding 
is less a measure of implicit agency attribution or causal inference and may instead 
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be a process evoked from attentional/temporal control mechanisms. Further 
research should seek to clarify the relation between temporal control, temporal 
attention, motor-identity prediction and causal beliefs to isolate their modulatory 
influence upon temporal binding. 
Naturally, one possible conclusion that our findings from chapters 2 – 4, as 
well as the inconsistencies between explicit and implicit measures of 
agency/causality, indicate, is that temporal binding does not actually measure 
causality or agency. The assertion that binding measures SoA/causality is 
frequently stated (Buehner, 2012; Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Engbert, Wohlschläger 
& Haggard, 2008; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009; Obhi 
& Hall, 2011a), but this has always been a theoretical assumption on the grounds 
of Hume’s notion of temporal contiguity. One perspective to view this issue is from 
the ideomotor effect, the well-established notion that learned outcomes are 
mentally represented the same way as the actions that produce them (Elsner and 
Hommel, 2001; Greenwald, 1970). Strong evidence suggests we do internally 
activate specific effects that we predict on the basis of our selected actions (Kunde, 
2003; Pfister, Kiesel, & Melcher, 2010; Waszak & Herwig, 2007). However, the 
evidence that binding arises from such effect-prediction, as many propose (de 
Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004; Evans, 1982; Farrer, Franck, Georgieff, Frith, 
Decety et al, 2003; Farrer et al., 2003; Marcel, 2003; Mechsner al., 2001; Saito et 
al., 2005), or even from general causal mechanisms (Buehner, 2012) becomes 
questionable given the lack replicability of findings, the lack of convergence 
between explicit and implicit measures of agency (Dewey and Knoblich, 2014; 
Hughes, 2018),  and the lack of testing for low-level explanations of binding 
(Hughes et al., 2013). 
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The existence of temporal binding is unique and interesting, yet we are still 
in midst of fully understanding why we feel time is shorter between two related 
events. Although the research contained within my thesis cannot make any 
specific statements, it does cast doubt on existing explanations. Therefore, to the 
primary aim of my research, that of how the perceptual error phenomena 
observed within SoA research translate to more social contexts, our current 
understanding of the answer is: not very well. This is problematic given that SoA 
is defined as the relation between one’s actions and our effects upon the world 
around us, not merely the interaction between our perception of relatively simple 
actions and the ensuing stimulus feedback within laboratory settings. Naturally, 
however, the research presented here would further need to be replicated in 
laboratory settings to fully extrapolate these assertions.  
 That being said, there are a few limitations to my research that should be 
recognised: Chapter 3, although a novel methodology in combining temporal 
binding as a measure of implicit causality and IJR, our procedure in Experiment 5 
may simply not have been sufficient to produce a temporal binding effect. Such an 
occurrence could be explained by the explicit causal judgements made in typical 
IJR research, whereby the second of a pair of events often begins with a derivative 
of “later that day”. In other words, although participants may believe that a 
negative outcome is caused by prior immoral behaviour, this does not necessarily 
reflect at relatively shorter time intervals.  
 Additionally, the research contained within Experiment 7 is unable to 
make any particular claims as to the effect of causal beliefs on temporal binding 
due to the lack of belief in the existence of a confederate. Although this is noted 
and subsequently my discussion does not utilise the findings from this 
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experiment, future research would be prudent to carry out more careful 
procedures in order to ensure adequate deception.  
 Finally, the research contained with Chapter 5 requires extrapolation in 
order to carefully test the relationship between spatial binding and causal beliefs. 
As stated previously, although we found that participants placed morally 
congruent events close together, this does not theoretically test causality given the 
conscious decision-making aspect. Our results could be explained by conceptual 
similarity between the two events (Casasanto, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). For 
example, drawing on work on mental metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), 
Casasanto argued that people use spatial proximity as a cue for judging similarity. 
Thus, in our experiments people might have positioned the morally congruent (vs. 
incongruent) events closer together not because they were inferring causality 
from deservingness but simply because the events were conceptually similar (e.g., 
poisoning one’s dog and contracting a serious illness are conceptually similar 
because they are both bad), and thus further research is required to distinguish 
between causal and implicit association factors.  
One such method to explore the underpinning mechanism would be to 
specifically link judgements of physical closeness to beliefs of deservingness, 
rather than only assume this, given that if people generally perceive others 
positively, then they should perceive others’ good outcomes as more deserving 
than their bad outcomes (Harvey et al., 2014). As an example, ratings could be 
obtained regarding the outcomes of each scenario as to its deservingness and 
similarity during the spatial positioning task. A linear mixed effects model could 
then be used to investigate the predictive power of both factors upon spatial 
distance. 
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 Overall, future studies should follow the recommended steps set out in 
Hughes et al. (2013) in order to isolate the various components of temporal 
binding in order ascertain the accuracy of assumptions that binding is a measure 
of SoA, or causality in general. In temporal binding research, this is paramount in 
order to develop a model that correctly identifies the key contributions of the low-
level processes (temporal prediction and control, and motor non-/identity 
prediction), as well as high-level processes such as intention and knowledge of 
causal relationships. Isolating these specific processes will enable a sorely needed 
model that could provide information as to the relative predictive power of each 
process. However, such a model may equally highlight the lack of influence that 
high-level processes have relative to low-level processes, as is the case in Chapter 
2. Furthermore, the axiom that temporal binding is an implicit measure of SoA has 
been challenged by the research within this thesis, and, as has been stated, 
replication of key studies, specifically with the isolation of individual processes 
laid out within Hughes et al. (2013), is equally sorely needed if genuine insight 
into temporal binding is wanted.  
Conclusion of Thesis 
 The temporal contraction between two events, otherwise known as 
temporal binding, has been shown to be elusive as to its underlying mechanism/s. 
This thesis casts further doubts as to the extent temporal binding, and its 
purported measurement of the sense of agency, is modulated by high-level 
processes such as emotional valence, the self-serving bias, intentional action, and 
known biases in explicit causal reasoning. Equally questioned is whether the 
findings from the sense of agency literature can be applied to real-world contexts. 
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Understanding causal relations between our actions and their effects upon the 
environment is indeed vital for the human species, but, as I have shown, 
measuring such a notion through temporal binding, as it stands, is highly 
questionable, and other implicit measures should be pursued. We have shown is 
that we can feel physically unconnected events to be closer together in space, 
specifically with an interesting interaction between concerns for justice and 
spatial contiguity, the inference of a causal connection based on spatial proximity. 
Therefore, spatial binding may offer a more suitable case in measuring our implicit 
causal belief, but that is research route yet to be fully explored and awaits the 
resources of another eager PhD student. 
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Appendix A 
 
Scenarios used in Chapter 3: 
 
Scenario 1:  
 
While walking home after work, Simon offered to carry an elderly woman's bags 
and helped her cross the road.   
 
While walking home after work, Simon yelled at an elderly woman to get out of 
his way and shoved her into the gutter as he passed by.  
 
Scenario 2:  
 
Jamie saw a homeless man drop his wallet. Jamie picked up the man's wallet and 
ran after him to give it back.   
 
Jamie saw a homeless man with a bucket for change, and stole the homeless 
man's money. 
 
Scenario 3:  
 
Laura patiently allowed a man in a wheelchair to go ahead of her in the taxi rank.  
 
Laura jumped the taxi queue while shoving a man in a wheelchair out of the way.  
 
Scenario 4:  
 
Carole saw a woman fall over, and ran immediately to check if she was okay.   
 
Carole saw a woman fall over, and walked past while calling her a “fat cow”.   
 
Scenario 5:  
 
While walking home, Maria saw a child looking lost, and helped them find their 
way back home.  
 
While walking home, Maria saw a child looking lost, and ignored the child's 
request to help them find their way back home.   
 
Scenario 8:  
 
Emily helped a struggling elderly lady at the tube station with the ticket machine.    
 
Emily pushed an elderly lady on the floor, fracturing the woman's hip, and called 
her “retarded”.   
 
Scenario 9:  
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Jack threw his water bottle in the public waste-bin, and decided to clean up the 
other rubbish on the ground, too.   
 
Jack threw his water bottle at a squirrel that was eating a walnut on the bench 
next to him, killing the squirrel instantly.   
 
Scenario 10:  
 
Sonia spent more than twenty minutes patiently driving around the car park, 
even though the disabled parking space was available.  
 
Sonia parked in a disabled parking space, forcing a genuinely disabled person 
was forced to park their car at the very end of the car park.   
 
Scenario 11:  
 
Harry told the woman that was flirting with him that he had a wife, and walked 
away.    
 
Harry told the flirtatious woman to lead the way back to her place, even though 
Harry was married with children.  
 
Scenario 12:  
 
Carrie noticed that Giula's sandal was not fastened properly, and quickly knelt to 
fix it for her.   
 
Carrie noticed that Giula's sandal was not fastened properly, but did purposely 
not tell her, leading to Giula breaking her ankle.  
 
Scenario 13:  
 
Miriam sacrificed her chance of acquiring the nursing job because she knew her 
friend Kate deserved it more.     
 
Miriam told person in charge that Kate was a terrible nurse so that she could get 
the job herself.   
 
Scenario 14:  
 
Brian accidentally bumped into a parked car, and left a note offering to pay for 
the repair himself as an apology.   
 
Brian was drunk-driving when he crashed into a car killing the other driver and 
the passenger. 
 
Scenario 15:  
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Leonard made a donation to the local charity shop. He noticed the window was 
broken, so went home to collect his tools, and returned to fix the window.  
 
Leonard was caught stealing from a charity shop. Although he got away, he 
returned to the shop, and threw a brick through the window.  
 
Scenario 16:  
 
Jordan risked his own life to save a drowning puppy in the river.    
 
Jordan kicked a puppy into the river, where it drowned.   
 
Scenario 17:  
 
Samantha gave blood at the local hospital, although she doesn’t like the sight of 
blood herself.  
 
Samantha, a married mother of three, took a day off work yesterday to meet up 
with an attractive man at a seedy motel.   
 
Scenario 18:  
 
Richard went into his autistic son’s room, took him in his arms, and promised 
him that he would always love him.   
 
Richard went into his autistic son’s room, slapped him in the face and left saying 
that he was never coming back.   
 
Scenario 19:  
 
Wendy told Janice that her house was absolutely lovely, and offered her some 
flowers in a very beautiful hand-made vase.  
 
Wendy pretended to go to the restroom, but instead went into Janice's bedroom 
and stole one of her most valuable necklaces.   
 
Scenario 20:  
 
Frank paid for his items at the shop, and whilst no one was looking, put all of his 
spare change into a charity pot.  
 
Frank paid for his items at the shop, and whilst no one was looking, stole all of 
the change from a charity pot. 
 
Scenario 21:  
 
David saw an elderly man fall over his walking cane down the street, and rushed 
over to help the elderly man to his feet.  
 
254 
 
David saw an elderly man fall over his walking cane down the street, laughed, 
and took a picture of the elderly man on the floor. 
 
Scenario 22:  
 
Although she was late for work, Rachel cycled slow on a school road full of 
children.  
 
Rachel cycled at a fast and dangerous speed, leading her to crash into a child and 
knocking them onto the ground, breaking two of their teeth.  
 
Scenario 23:  
 
During the race, Ben ran back to pick up Peter, and they both crossed the finish 
line together.  
 
During the race, Ben kicked Peter’s ankle so that he could win the race and the 
gold medal.  
 
Scenario 24:  
 
Amanda stayed after class to help Monica go over the schoolwork she was 
finding difficult.  
 
Amanda shouted to her students in the playground to point and laugh at Monica, 
calling her a “stupid little girl”.  
 
Scenario 25:  
 
On a busy train, Mark gave up his seat for an elderly lady in crutches.  
 
On a busy train, Mark scoffed at an elderly lady in crutches, refusing to give up 
his seat.  
 
Scenario 26:  
 
John bought some food for a homeless man.  
 
John kicked and stole money from a homeless man.  
Scenario 27:  
 
Andrew volunteered to help care for sick children at the hospital. 
 
Andrew, a married man with children, spent the night with a prostitute. 
 
Scenario 28:  
 
Marty returned home after spending 6 months of service in the army protecting 
civilians in Afghanistan.  
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Marty returned home after smuggling heroin from Afghanistan.  
 
Scenario 29:  
 
Nina defended a Turkish shop assistant from a racially abusive woman. 
 
Nina joined in with another woman to racially abuse a Turkish shop assistant. 
 
Scenario 30:  
 
Jan donated a large sum of money to a children’s cancer charity. 
 
Jan embezzled a large sum of money from a children’s cancer charity. 
 
Scenario 31:  
 
Lisa volunteered to spend the afternoon at a school teaching young children of 
the dangers of drugs and alcohol.  
 
Lisa spent the afternoon near a school selling drugs to teenage students.  
 
Scenario 32:  
 
Aisha freely took the blame for her colleague who had broke a store item. 
 
Aisha accidentally broke a store item and blamed her colleague. 
 
Scenario 33:  
 
Philip stopped by a stranger’s car to help give them a jumpstart, even though it 
was very cold and raining. 
 
Philip stopped by a stranger’s car to help give them a jumpstart, but instead 
assaulted them, stole their belongings, and drove off.  
 
Scenario 34:  
 
Whilst shopping, Margaret noticed she had been significantly undercharged, and 
informed the cashier straight away.  
 
Whilst shopping, Margaret noticed she had been significantly undercharged, but 
decided not to tell the cashier. 
  
Scenario 35:  
 
Alistair signed up to volunteer at a children’s care home. 
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Alistair thought it was a complete waste of time to volunteer at a children’s care 
home. 
 
Scenario 36:  
 
Dawn gave her coat to a shivering homeless woman. 
 
Dawn stole the coat from a shivering homeless woman. 
 
Appendix B 
 
Scenarios used in Chapter 5, Experiments 1 and 2: 
 
SET 1 [SET 2] 
 
S = same person experiencing the outcome 
D – different person experiencing the outcome 
C = congruent outcome 
I = incongruent outcome  
 
SC1 [to DC3, Geoff-Mark] 
 
Frank raped a co-worker at a company retreat 
Frank was in a freak car accident 
 
SC2 [to DC4, Mark-Tony] 
 
John embezzled funds from a children's cancer care organization 
John's ground-floor apartment was destroyed by flooding 
 
DC1 [to SC3, Frank-Frank] 
 
Geoff fled the scene after hitting a child with his car in a crosswalk 
Paul lost his job of 20 years due to corporate downsizing 
 
DC2 [to SC4, John-John] 
 
Mark kicked a homeless woman in the face because she smiled at him 
Tony contracted a serious illness 
 
SI1 [to DI3, James-Charlie] 
 
Michael robbed a convenience store at gunpoint 
Michael won $100,000 from a scratch-and-win lottery ticket 
 
SI2 [to DI4, Graham-Alexander] 
 
Bruce poisoned his dog because he didn't want to take care of it any longer 
257 
 
Bruce received word that he won a luxury cruise trip from a sweepstakes he 
entered 
 
DI1 [to SI3, Michael-Michael] 
 
James has been cheating on his wife with his younger intern at work 
Charlie's stocks and shares skyrocketed 
 
DI2 [to SI4, Bruce-Bruce] 
 
Graham's been selling drugs to school kids 
Alexander won a year's worth of free air travel from a travel agency's promotion 
 
Scenarios used in Chapter 5, Experiment 3: 
 
Set 1 [sentence started with same name during the task] 
Frank raped a co-worker was in a freak car accident b 
Joe robbed a store a gunpoint apartment was destroyed by fire b 
Neil assaulted a child contracted a serious illness b 
John drowned a puppy slipped and fractured his leg b 
Ben punched an elderly woman won the lottery g 
Tim kidnapped a child received a major pay-rise at work g 
Jeff beat his wife won a luxury cruise trip g 
Jim poisoned his mistress received a massive inheritance g 
   
Set 2   
Frank raped a co-worker received a massive inheritance g 
Joe robbed a store a gunpoint was in a freak car accident b 
Neil assaulted a child apartment was destroyed by fire b 
John drowned a puppy contracted a serious illness b 
Ben punched an elderly woman slipped and fractured his leg b 
Tim kidnapped a child won the lottery g 
Jeff beat his wife received a major pay-rise at work g 
Jim poisoned his mistress won a luxury cruise trip g 
   
Set 3   
Frank raped a co-worker won a luxury cruise trip g 
Joe robbed a store a gunpoint received a massive inheritance g 
Neil assaulted a child was in a freak car accident b 
John drowned a puppy apartment was destroyed by fire b 
Ben punched an elderly woman contracted a serious illness b 
Tim kidnapped a child slipped and fractured his leg b 
Jeff beat his wife won the lottery g 
Jim poisoned his mistress received a major pay-rise at work g 
   
Set 4   
Frank raped a co-worker received a major pay-rise at work g 
Joe robbed a store a gunpoint won a luxury cruise trip g 
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Neil assaulted a child received a massive inheritance g 
John drowned a puppy was in a freak car accident b 
Ben punched an elderly woman apartment was destroyed by fire b 
Tim kidnapped a child contracted a serious illness b 
Jeff beat his wife slipped and fractured his leg b 
Jim poisoned his mistress won the lottery g 
   
Set 5   
Frank raped a co-worker won the lottery g 
Joe robbed a store a gunpoint received a major pay-rise at work g 
Neil assaulted a child won a luxury cruise trip g 
John drowned a puppy received a massive inheritance g 
Ben punched an elderly woman was in a freak car accident b 
Tim kidnapped a child apartment was destroyed by fire b 
Jeff beat his wife contracted a serious illness b 
Jim poisoned his mistress slipped and fractured his leg b 
   
Set 6   
Frank raped a co-worker slipped and fractured his leg b 
Joe robbed a store a gunpoint won the lottery g 
Neil assaulted a child received a major pay-rise at work g 
John drowned a puppy won a luxury cruise trip g 
Ben punched an elderly woman received a massive inheritance g 
Tim kidnapped a child was in a freak car accident b 
Jeff beat his wife apartment was destroyed by fire b 
Jim poisoned his mistress contracted a serious illness b 
   
Set 7   
Frank raped a co-worker contracted a serious illness b 
Joe robbed a store a gunpoint slipped and fractured his leg b 
Neil assaulted a child won the lottery g 
John drowned a puppy received a major pay-rise at work g 
Ben punched an elderly woman won a luxury cruise trip g 
Tim kidnapped a child received a massive inheritance g 
Jeff beat his wife was in a freak car accident b 
Jim poisoned his mistress apartment was destroyed by fire b 
   
Set 8   
Frank raped a co-worker apartment was destroyed by fire b 
Joe robbed a store a gunpoint contracted a serious illness b 
Neil assaulted a child slipped and fractured his leg b 
John drowned a puppy won the lottery g 
Ben punched an elderly woman received a major pay-rise at work g 
Tim kidnapped a child won a luxury cruise trip g 
Jeff beat his wife received a massive inheritance g 
Jim poisoned his mistress was in a freak car accident b 
 
